Πνεῦμα IN PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA

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by

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INTRODUCTION

The Greek word πνεῦμα cannot be translated by any single English word. In a particular context it appears to mean sometimes wind, or air or breeze, sometimes breath or respiration, sometimes spirit, inspiration, divine spirit or an immaterial being. In the works of Philo the word has a great variety of meaning not only because of the richness of the word itself, but also because Philo drew upon two particularly complex sources of meaning. Standing at the apex of Hellenistic Judaism and working primarily as an exegete, he interpreted Scripture in the light of the eclectic philosophy of his milieu. Any study of πνεῦμα in Philo, therefore, must take cognizance of both Hebrew and Greek sources of meaning.

Since πνεῦμα is a biblical term, the Septuagint translation of the Hebrew ru'ah is important to understand the relation between the words and to note the differences between the πνεῦμα of the Septuagint and the πνεῦμα of Philo. Since πνεῦμα is also a Greek term with a past in Greek religious and philosophical literature, it is important to understand the relations between Philo's concept and Greek notions, especially those of the Stoics for whom πνεῦμα was an essential term and basic doctrine. Philo inherited much from the Greeks; the question is to what extent their notions affected his concept and on what basis he chose some concepts and rejected others.

The notion of πνεῦμα was important for Philo. There are more than two hundred instances of the word in his writings, and these are scattered over a variety of meaning and context. It was an important anthropological term because Scripture explained man as a being formed from the earth and the breath (πνεῦμα or πνοή) of God, and as a creature of flesh who could not expect to retain God's spirit for long. Philo followed both of these notions and made them foundational for his religious psychology: man has, in his view, an obligation to regain or to retain the spirit. When he abandons this goal he is like a ship on a stormy sea, tossed about by violent winds. If, however, he controls his flesh and asks for help, God will send His graces since it is only natural that when God has breathed down upon a creature, He is wont to call him up again to the heavens. Πνεῦμα had a prophetic role in Philo not only as inspirational, but as the spirit of God which evicts the human mind and fills man with divine light or power; it is theologically important that the spirit of God was thought to be divine in essence. Πνεῦμα was an important concept in its own right, but it also was important in relation to other key words and doctrines: λόγος, νοῦς and σοφία ; and in relation to some significant cognate words: ἀήρ , αἰθήρ, and πνοή . The inter-relation and differences among these terms will be an essential part of the study of the Philonic πνεῦμα .

This study will demonstrate that the πνεῦμα in Philo is the key to his theology of grace; it has not proceeded from an a priori, but it has been nourished on the presupposition that Philo's primary motivation was religious, not philosophical, and that his standard was piety, not

scientific certainty or philosophical speculation. It can be shown that the πνεῦμα of Philo is neither that of Scripture nor that of the Stoics, but a specific and original doctrine in its own right. It is complicated and somewhat reduced in importance by its relation to other words and concepts, but it also benefits from those connections. Since the notion of πνεῦμα was rooted in cosmology and anthropology, it had a very general impact and universal significance for Philo. Further, it was crucial to his religious psychology and extended to prophecy and interpretation; and because of its extensiveness and importance, it was germane to the most vital points of man's spiritual and moral life. It is from the vantage point of religious psychology that one can find the beginnings of a theology of grace in Philo. In the many interesting aspects of his doctrine of πνεῦμα , the most basic to this study is his contribution to the doctrine of participation. Here πνεῦμα was conceived of as a divine power (not a divine person, but a kind of divine energy) sent to complement man, or as part of the ideal man now lost but to be regained. More than a divine help, however, the Philonic πνεῦμα was conceived as something which permeated man's moral life, quickened that which was spiritual in him. At its best πνεῦμα was the gift of divine life to the perfect. The notion of who is "perfect" or who can become so is a primary consideration of the Philonic corpus. If religious psychology is a key to Philo, and if πνεῦμα is as important to his religious psychology as it appears to be, then this study is basic both to the study of Philo and to his theology of grace and the spiritual life.

Since the concept of πνεῦμα in Philo is here considered to be crucial, even basic to an understanding of him, it must be explained why

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it has not been undertaken before this time. According to general and specific bibliographic tools there has been only one small study devoted exclusively to πνεῦμα in Philo: André Laurentin's dissertation, Le Pneuma dans la doctrine de Philon.[1] It is probably because of his work that the topic was spared other investigations, especially in Europe, and were Laurentin's work comprehensive and his methodology valid there would be no reason to choose the topic now. The work is good in many ways, but it is also problematic and insufficient. For one thing, it appears to rely exclusively on the Leisegang index[2] and not on a thorough analysis and understanding of Philo. This means that it is basically a word study which misses the rich connections and sources of meaning available to one who pursues the concept in its connections with other words and larger concepts. It also means that it suffers a serious omission: Leisegang did not index the Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesin and the Quaestiones et Solutiones in Exodum which are particularly rich in material. Laurentin, then, missed a rich vein of material in the primary sources. Further, very few indexes are absolutely complete--Leisegang's is not--so Laurentin missed even the completeness which a word study demands. More serious, however, is his omission of any good comparison with Greek concepts and sources, or even with ru'ah as found in the Old Testament. One can only guess why this is true and suggest that

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[1] André Laurentin, Le Pneuma dans la doctrine de Philon (Louvain, 1950).

[2] Johannes Leisegang, Philonis Alexandrini: Opera quae supersunt, v. VII, Indices ad Philoni Alexandrini Opera (Berlin: 1926).

he relied too heavily upon Verbeke.[3] More recent investigations[4] permit a better evaluation of Philo's Greek sources and thus a more comprehensive understanding of Philo himself on this important doctrine.

There are in Laurentin serious methodological errors. His trinitarian presuppositions impeded his analysis because he sometimes tended to personify πνεῦμα in clear violation of the evidence against such personification in Philo. More importantly, however, the second part of Laurentin's work is methodologically invalid. After having pursued a study of terms, which is good but incomplete, he attempted to delineate the significance of πνεῦμα in Philo, but instead of coming to terms with Philo's doctrine, preferred to compare it to the élan vital of Henri Bergson, losing Philo in the process. Philo deserves better than this and his doctrine of πνεῦμα is too important in itself to be subsumed under a wholly different understanding as if its validity and importance rested upon the comparison.

The spiritual theology of Philo has surely not been totally neglected; it has just not been treated precisely as it will be treated here. The classic works on Philo are all good and important sources for this study, but none of them is devoted to an exhaustive exposition or analysis of his doctrine of πνεῦμα. Even studies which bear more importantly on specific parts of Philo, his sources or particular doctrines or methods have not pursued the doctrine of πνεῦμα exclusively.

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[3] G. Verbeke, L'Évolution de la Doctrine du Pneuma du Stoicisme à S. Augustin (Paris, 1946).

[4] Notably Jean Pépin, Théologie Cosmique et Théologie Chrétienne (Paris, 1964) and R. P. Festugière, La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste, 4 volumes (Paris, 1950-1954).

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The first part of this study will be a systematic-analytic study of terms in their meanings and uses. It will focus upon the word πνεῦμα as it was used in Greek literature, Stoic philosophy, the Septuagint and upon the meaning of the Hebrew ru'ah. The main focus, however, will be upon how the term was used by Philo, where it appears in his work and what it meant to him. The chapter on Philonic usage will not be restricted to πνεῦμα alone, but will include important relational terms and cognate words.

The second part of the study will be a relation of the doctrine of πνεῦμα to larger doctrines in Philo: cosmology and anthropology, prophecy and inspiration, morality and the spiritual life. The use of πνεῦμα in each of these doctrines will be traced to similar doctrines in Hebrew and Greek thought with an eye to possible connections. Part two, then, will be synthetic and critical, but the burden of it will be to show the richness of the doctrine of πνεῦμα as it emerges through the larger concerns of Philo's works. Resumés of Philo's doctrines and possible Hebrew and/or Greek sources have been delineated in a variety of places, and this study does not propose to enlarge upon that work. The purpose of this work is to connect these rich veins of thought to my own research on the concept of πνεῦμα, to show the basic imporance of πνεῦμα in these doctrines, and to show its possible significance for a theology of grace.

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CHAPTER I

Πνεῦμα IN STOIC PHILOSOPHY

Πνεῦμα is derived from the verb πνέω, to blow or to breathe. It has a range of meaning which makes it a key word in classical literature, philosophy, science, mythology and religion; but a detailed analysis of those meanings need not be delineated here. In the first place such an analysis would involve an excursus considerably beyond the limits of this study. More importantly, however, most of the available meanings and functions of πνεῦμα were gathered into a single comprehensive doctrine by the Stoics: in their philosophy πνεῦμα became a point of departure and the doctrine of πνεῦμα found its most consistent and historically most influential systematic development.

The primary meaning of πνεῦμα is wind, either as a violent blast or a gentle breeze. The notion of power is inextricably bound to the word even when its primary meaning is taken metaphorically, i.e., as a breeze or influence. Besides wind, πνεῦμα also means breath or even the air that one breathes, and the connection between air and breathing as necessities for life led to a third meaning: the breath of life. Although the notion of the breath of life is bound in some ways to the element, air, there was a distinction made between πνεῦμα as the air breathed, and πνεῦμα σύμφυτον as the air born in and residing in the body, a kind of

congenital breath.[1] Because the Greeks had a notion of man's participation in the scheme of the cosmos, and sought to extrapolate man into the expanse of the cosmos, they easily regarded the cosmos as a living organism. S. Sambursky maintains that their biological metaphors (e.g., the breathing of the cosmos) are not simply allegorical but affirm their belief that the cosmos had its own rhythm of life and that its laws are basically organic.[2] Further, there came to be an identification between πνεῦμα and ψυχή, soul; the soul was conceived of as something having a substance very much like air or breath, and as something intimately bound to the notion of life.[3] One can see in these meanings of πνεῦμα the basis for a concept of the πνεῦμα as the soul of the world: the identification of πνεῦμα and breath of life, the interchange between πνεῦμα and ψυχή, and the conception of the world as a living body all contribute to the notion.

There seems to have been no concept of an individualized or personified πνεῦμα, even though as a universal principle of life it had come to

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[1]This was the distinction of the Sicilian medical school which was adopted from Diocles by Aristotle and later served as a basis for Zeno's speculations about the localization and functions of the πνεῦμα. For a discussion of this point and of the contribution of the medical schools in general to the concept of πνεῦμα see Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 12-15, 175-221.

[2]The Physical World of the Greeks (New York: Macmillan, 1956), p. 40. Sambursky's work is devoted to situating philosophical models within their scientific framework. Convinced the Greeks believed that nature was capable of rational explanation, Sambursky traces the development of that rational explanation in terms of physics and indicates at the same time what future different concepts had in the general history of science.

[3]Xenophanes (sixth century B.C.) is said by Diogenes Laertius to have been the first to declare that the soul (ψυχή) is πνεῦμα (IX Xen. 3) and this appears to be the first written reference to it. It is logical to assume, however, that the power of symbolic thinking in older cultures led to similar identification.

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mean spirit. It was conceived of as a substance which constituted the soul in man and, by extrapolation, in the cosmos; and as a kind of repository of life principle. In Stoicism all these meanings were combined with mythological and medical functions of πνεῦμα and pressed into service as the cornerstone of a complex doctrine. Πνεῦμα for the Stoics was a technical term, that which unites the cosmos into a single whole by virtue of an all-pervasive state of tension; but it was not confined to technical usage.

Stoicism arose in the post-Aristotelian age after the conquests of Alexander had opened Greece to the influences of the East. The new influences from the Orient and the political instability which followed Alexander's death both put new pressures on philosophy: the vicissitudes of the political order were not conducive to speculative philosophy; theoretical knowledge did not appear to be as compelling as practical knowledge. The end of life was still considered to be happiness, but the definition and achievement of happiness were severely questioned. Further, philosophy began to replace religion among cultured classes who were no longer interested in mythology and older religious forms. New philosophies therefore had to answer to some extent the need for new religious forms: "no early system was so closely connected with religion as that of the Stoics."[4] The Stoics answered practical questions by insisting that the purpose of philosophy was moral conduct or virtue, by which they meant rational action or action in harmony with nature. Their success was due in great part to the earnestness of their moral teaching and its intimate

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[4]Eduard Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (London: Longmans, Green and Co., revised edition, 1892), p. 341.

relation to religion: the combination of practical knowledge (moral teaching) and religious considerations (that moral philosophy begins with the divine Law and ends with one's submission to the will of God) was entirely pertinent to the needs of the time. In addition, their notion of κοσμοπολίτης citizen of the world, inspired by their belief that all men have a common relationship to God was more in line with the new political order than the theories of Plato and Aristotle which had been based upon the concept of a small civic community.

Stoicism was primarily an ethical-religious system and its dogmas were presented as theology, not physics or metaphysics.[5] The key to their system was the πνεῦμα . Since living beings (man or the cosmos) could be explained in terms of breathing and thermic processes, air currents (πνεύματα) were foundational for the Stoic system.[6] They were extrapolated to explain God, the universe, man's physical and moral health and the cohesion and distinction of all things. The philosophical/scientific antecedents of their system lie in Anaximenes (in whom one can find a decisive relation established between man and the cosmos and an implied world-soul[7]), Heraclitus (for whom πνεῦμα and λόγος were nearly

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[5]This is basically the position of Zeller and of R. D. Hicks, Stoics and Epicureans (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962) and conflicts with that of Sambursky (op. cit., p. 158) who tends to regard its scientific achievements as basic and primary, though he concedes that the main channels for the dissemination of science were the philosophical schools.

[6]This should be understood scientifically in the context of the history of science: the concept of primordial matter, the positing of a cause, the teleological view of Aristotle, the atomic versus the continuum theories of the universe, and the Stoic combination of the elastic, active qualities of air with the life-giving, thermic properties of fire. S. Sambursky, op. cit., is excellent here.

[7]"Even as our soul which is air holds us together, so breath (πνεῦμα) and air encompass the whole universe," Aët I, 3, 4 (Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed., D13 B2).

synonymous and were connected to fire and intelligence[8]) and in the medical schools (in which πνεῦμα was connected with notions of proper breathing and extended to spiritual, physical and intellectual health). The system itself, however, and the development of the meaning of πνεῦμα within that system were unique to the Stoics.

Πνεῦμα was one of the words used by the Stoics to describe God: others were ἀίθηρ , ἀήρ and πῦρ.[9] What matters, however, is not which word was used, but the notions of activity and rarity associated with the words themselves, and the notion that God was considered above all to be all-pervasive. God was also conceived as the λόγος or νοῦς or ψυχή of the cosmos; as the λόγος σπερματικός containing in himself the germs of all things while at the same time acting as the connecting element for all things. Zeller maintains that in Stoicism the expressions are equal and that it is unimportant which particular one describes God since they all describe Him: He is πνεῦμα because air currents cause the properties of things and give them shape; He is πῦρ because fire is creative.[10] The Stoic deity therefore is primary power and primary matter in one.

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[8]"This πνεῦμα which we breath with the air and whereby we gain our faculty for thinking that is adequate to it, is subtler than the air, it is pure fire," D22 A20.

[9]There is a distinction between ordinary fire (ἀτέχνον πῦρ), which is the fire of combustion, basically destructive, and an artistic fire (πῦρ τέχνικον), which is creative and preservative. The concept of τέχνικον πῦρ is what the Stoics mean when they describe God as πῦρ ; it is a concept borrowed from Heraclitus. For a discussion of this see Zeller, op. cit., pp. 340-365.

[10]Zeller, op. cit., p. 351. In saying this, Zeller implies that there was a clear distinction between πνεῦμα and ἀήρ . Sambursky (op. cit., p. 134) maintains that the πνεῦμα of the Stoics was not simple, but "took the place of air and fire as an active, dynamic principle." He traces the antecedents of his position in the activity of fire and air scientifically and their interdependence in the biological model. He is correct, but it was a position which developed over a period of time.

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Πνεῦμα was the basic physical component of the Stoic universe. Its principal function was the generation and cohesion of matter and the maintenance of contact between all parts of the cosmos. Working from a biological model wherein the existence of a living body depends upon its breathing and being warm, the Greeks presumed that the existence of an inorganic substance also depended upon a dynamic principle permeating it. In man the principle of life was the soul (which was often identified with breath or πνεῦμα); so too in the universe, it was presumed that there was a kind of soul. For the Stoics it was the πνεῦμα, the all-permeating, active substance which makes the whole living world into a single unit.[11] As an active principle, the πνεῦμα makes all substances coherent, and gives to each thing its individuating characteristics. Πνεῦμα pervades inorganic substances as a bond of union, an ἕξις which holds them together; it pervades plants as a forming power, a φύσις which gives them the power of growing and reproducing; it pervades animals as a power of motion, perception and desire, a ψυχή which gives them the powers of vital life. In man the πνεῦμα pervades as a rational soul, a νοῦς which gives man the powers of reason and thinking. The force which pervades everything is the πνεῦμα , but it permeates a substance in different ways: it is thick and cold in minerals, moist and cold in plants, warmer and more rarefied in animals and in man achieves the level of warm, fiery breath, part of the divine nature. Because man shares in the nature of God through the πνεῦμα , virtue could be equated with the following of

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[11] SVF II, 439, 440, 473, 787. The power of making coherent points to the derivation of πνεῦμα from the active elements of air and fire.

nature. For the Stoics, life according to nature was not a following of instincts, but a life according to that principle which is active in nature, the λόγος which is imparted to man by the all-pervading πνεῦμα of God.

Πνεῦμα has a physical property peculiar to itself: tension (τόνος). "The Stoics say that earth and water have no binding force of their own, nor can they bind substances together. They maintain their unity by partaking of the power of πνεῦμα and πῦρ. Air and fire on the other hand, through their inner τόνος and through being mixed with the other two, provide these with tension, permanance and substantiality."[12] Sambursky maintains that pneumatic tension is the most significant distinguishing quality of the πνεῦμα.[13] Working from a biological model, the Stoics believed that the πνεῦμα allowed tensional movement in man, a continuous flow back and forth: this movement could explain purely physical movements like walking (where a man's πνεῦμα vibrates in a special way) or talking (where the πνεῦμα strikes the continuum of the air to produce sound waves); and it could be extrapolated to the moral sphere. As a tensile force πνεῦμα was believed to give shape to all physical phenomena and was thus a cosmic force, but it was extended by the Stoics to the sphere of moral action because the structure and unity of the cosmos, its harmony, depended upon the existence of the πνεῦμα. Harmony in man's life could thus be logically explained by virtue of the same tensile force. Sin was

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[12] Plutarch, De Communibus Notitias Adversus Stoicos 1085D.

[13] Sambursky, op. cit., p. 135.

defined as ἀτονία.[14] A man is virtuous when his tension is right, when the πνεῦμα in him vibrates according to rational patterns. In a wise man the tensional movement is calm and continuous; in fools (sinners) it is disorderly and disruptive.

Πνεῦμα was also used by the Stoics to explain man's physical health: it was the unifying principle which holds the body together, the rational soul of man, the warm breath diffused through the body, and the force which vibrates in the body and which is fed by vapors from the blood.[15] The rational soul had a dominant part, the ἡγεμονικόν which the Stoics located in the heart. The soul was not divided into parts, but was thought to be a unity in which the ἡγεμονικόν was associated with reason and conceived of as the primary power from whence all other powers derived. It was, in part, the conception of the unity of man which led the Stoics to adopt a medical model for the explanation of moral action in man. Plato had insisted that moral action resulted from right choice, that there was a rational and an irrational part of the soul. Aristotle defined virtue as a disposition by which one chooses the good and rejects the

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[14]It should be noted that ἀτονία does not mean lack of tension, but wrong tension: it is the opposite of εὐτονία, which is right, or proper tension. Sin was also defined as ασθένια which means weakness, but the concept of weakness could be (and was) connected with the concept of tension. See for example SVF III.473 where Galen makes the connection between them. For a discussion of tension as it relates to the moral life one should consult Zeller, op. cit., and the excellent discussion in J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1969).

[15]The argument about the blood as the vital principle, the place of the dominant part of the soul, the function of breath in the body and other medical arguments are discussed at some length in Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 12-15, 175-221. The whole notion of πνεῦμα as breath cannot be divorced from the medical antecedents or from the scientific arguments about structure and functions of the cosmos. Sambursky, op. cit., situates the arguments scientifically as principles of physics, and Verbeke situates them in their medical context.

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evil on the basis of rational choice.[16] What this means is that one chooses when he is faced with a struggle between different parts within his own personality, a concept rejected by Zeno who replaced parts of the soul model with a medical model of organic unity. Sin for Zeno was not the result of a bad choice of one part of a person, but was a corruption of the whole personality; moral activity was conceived of as a state of the total personality. The true self or personality of a man was thought to be his ἡγεμονικόν which rules him (or should) as the λόγος rules the cosmos.

Stoic philosophy, by relating the cosmos to the human body and by adopting the medical theories of πνεῦμα in the body was able to offer a comprehensive explanation of the whole organic and inorganic world in its constitution and unity, its tension and vitality, its being as a whole and the individual qualitative nature of each individual creature within it. Πνεῦμα was important in all phases of Stoic philosophy, but it was not without development within these phases. The major philosophers of Stoicism each gave πνεῦμα a high degree of importance and each also left the impact of his own thought upon the doctrine. It is noteworthy that many of the more "spiritual" tendencies acquired by the πνεῦμα were the work of Stoic philosophers who were later than Philo; still, there are interesting developments within the period relevant to this study: the early and middle Stoa.

Zeno (c. 330-260 B.C.), the founder of Stoic philosophy, borrowed the πνεῦμα of the Sicilian medical model and transformed it into a truly

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[16]For a discussion of the concept of personality in the Greek world see E. R. Goodenough, By Light, Light (Yale, 1935), pp. 370-413.

philosophic concept.[17] The medical schools of the fifth century B.C. had recognized a difference between the air which comes into the body with breathing (πνεῦμα) and the congenital breath already in the body (πνεῦμα σύμφυτον). The first was a natural substance; the second was a psychic spirit, the principle of movement and sensible knowledge. For the school of Hippocrates, air (πνεῦμα) was inhaled and transformed in the brain into the πνεῦμα σύμφυτον . The brain, therefore, was conceived as the center of life. In contrast to this, the Sicilian school believed that the πνεῦμα σύμφυτονwas truly congenital, that it exhaled itself from the blood into the body; πνεῦμα was localized for them in the heart, and the heart (or breast) was considered to be the center of human life. Zeno adopted the Sicilian model. For him the πνεῦμα was an individual principle of life tied up intimately with his concept of the human soul. He defined soul as a warm breath, πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον ,[18] which penetrates and animates the body. Since his definition involves the concepts of breath and warmth (or fire) it would appear that he held a quasi-divided concept of soul; but he did not. Zeno identified πνεῦμα and πῦρ so that the soul for him was constituted by only one corporeal element. Verbeke believes that this identification was a major innovation in Greek thought. The πῦρ with which Zeno identifies πνεῦμα was the τέχνικον πῦρ of Heraclitus, the stuff of the sun and the heavenly bodies, itself a vital principle. Fire "is the cause which renews the cosmos and

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[17] Verbeke, op. cit., p. 16.

[18] SVF I.135.

the cause which will end it."[19] In Stoicism, this concept is conceived of as corporeal. This is not odd since the Stoics believed that whatever exists must either act or be acted upon, action implies contact (i.e., action implies corporeal things), therefore, only corporeal things have existence. The syllogism may be far-fetched, but it was fundamental to the system and led them to explain even emotions and virtues as material. It is not surprising then that within their system both πνεῦμα and creative, artistic πῦρ are conceived of as corporeal realities. What emerges from Zeno's identification is not a "spiritualization" of the πνεῦμα but the elevation of it to a higher plane of energy. It was no longer conceived of as the element air, or even the congenital breath in the body, but as a more subtle and infinitely more mobile order of energy connected in some way with divinity. Zeno moves πνεῦμα from an identification with the second element, air, to an identification with the first element, fire.

Zeno's successor, Cleanthes (331-232 B.C.) headed the Stoic school from 264 B.C. to his death. He enlarged upon the already innovative concept of πνεῦμα in Zeno by identifying it with the λόγος thus making πνεῦμα the active principle which penetrates all reality. Zeno had posited two principles to explain all reality: an active principle which is God or reason (λόγος) and a passive principle which is matter devoid of qualities. The λόγος as the active principle contained within it the active forms of all things, the λόγοι σπερματικόι which unfolded themselves in the forms of individual things.[20] This germinal spirit concept

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[19] W. Wili, "The History of the Spirit in Antiquity," translated from Eranos Jahrbücher 13 (1945), in Spirit and Nature: Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks, Bollingen Series 30-1, Pantheon Books, p. 81.

[20] Diog. Laert. VII.135-137.

is based on the analogy between a human organism and the universe and explains the generative cycle in man and in the universe. It also supports the Stoic doctrine of universal conflagration, the cycle of the universe: "all nature must be transformed to fire, as to seed, and from it the cosmos must be restored as it was formerly."[21] Where Zeno had used the term λόγος , Cleanthes used the term πνεῦμα which identified πνεῦμα even more intimately with divinity, and suggested strongly that the substance of human intelligence was divine. How close πνεῦμα approached divinity, even a god, can be seen in Cleanthes' magnificent Hymn to Zeus.[22] Πνεῦμα for Cleanthes is no longer identified with the first element, but surpasses the elements by its clear identification with the Deity. This does not result in a more "spiritual" πνεῦμα since the Deity in the Stoic system was material, but πνεῦμα does take on more vital and divine qualities.

Chrysippus (280-207 B.C.), who headed the school from 232-208 B.C., is known as the second founder of Stoicism: with him Stoic doctrine became more learned and dialectical. It had been established by Zeno that man is composed of πνεῦμα + matter, and that the cosmos was composed of πνεῦμα + matter. On the basis of the analogy between man and the cosmos, and this conception he had developed a system of monistic materialism to which Chrysippus adhered. The system suffered from some imprecision in terminology, however, and Chrysippus found himself in the position of defending or re-defining concepts more precisely. One of the results of his

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[21] SVF I.107.

[22] SVF I.537.

work was that the πνεῦμα was brought down from the exalted position it had reached in Cleanthes, who put it above the four elements and made it the active principle in the universe. For Chrysippus, πνεῦμα became a composite of the two superior elements in the universe, air and fire. These elements surpassed water and earth by virtue of their intensity and activity, and πνεῦμα shared their excellence, but it lost its prerogatives as a substance above the elements. Πνεῦμα was for Chrysippus the real stuff of the soul, the material substance of the human soul which was permeated by the λόγος . As such, it was thought to be active: as the πνεῦμα σύμφυτον its activity was the extension of itself from the governing soul to the organs of sense-perception as a vital fluid. Verbeke believes that in reducing πνεῦμα to a mixture of air and fire, Chrysippus proved himself to be the most eloquent spokesman of the materialism characteristic of Stoic philosophy.[23]

The two most significant philosophers of the middle period of Stoicism are Panaetius and Posidonius; in them one can find a real impetus toward the "spiritualization" of the πνεῦμα . They both lived and taught in a new political and philosophical milieu: in the middle of the second century B.C. Greece had beeome a Roman province and philosophy had become more and more eclectic. It was "a period of uncertainty and readjustment in which almost all existing schools were tentatively and sensibly modified and a gradual fusion and approximation of sharply opposed theories set in ... the independence of every system was threatened."[24]

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[23] Verbeke, op. cit., p. 89.

[24] R. D. Hicks, op. cit., p. 354.

Panaetius (185-110 B.C.) headed the Stoic school from 129-110 B.C. He lived for years in Rome and saw himself as a kind of representative of Greek culture in Rome. As an apostle of Stoicism to the Romans he found that he had to modify some of the doctrines of the early Stoics, diluting some of the early puritanism to conform, in part, to the Roman interest in the practical concerns of man. True to the eclectic spirit of his times, he was much interested in and influenced by Platonic and Aristotelian concepts which he found useful in humanizing Stoicism. The Stoic system was under attack from Carneades and the Sceptics; in responding to their challenge, Panaetius rejected some earlier Stoic positions. Starting from a philosophy of nature, he rejected the eternity of the cosmos, mantic inspiration and the immortality of the soul. He also rejected the Stoic ideal of the wise man, ἀπαθής . In Zeno,moral behavior was explained in terms of a medical model: the virtuous man was conceived as healthy, and the sinful man, unhealthy. Πάθη did not mean passion, per se, but disease so that the wise man as ἀπαθής was the man free from disease, or from irrational or immoral passions; his passions were controlled, rational (literally, happy) εὐπάθειαι . The corrolary of Zeno's explanation was that there were no real stages in virtue: one had either reached it or had not, was either virtuous, or a sinner. This left very little room for those striving for virtue and meant, in effect, that there were very few virtuous men in the world. It was this puritanism which Panaetius modified. His ethical system was based on his belief that virtue consisted in or was founded upon the natural strivings of men; it emphasized the notion of progress with the aim of encouraging men to begin and to continue in the path of virtue. The Platonic and Aristotelian

influence showed themselves in his admission of an irrational part of the soul. As long as the soul was conceived as πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον , a particle of divinity in some way, as it was for the early Stoics, virtue depended solely upon one's living according to the rational principle within himself, conforming his total personality to the will of God. By positing a certain interior dualism within the soul, Panaetius was forced to exclude some functions of the soul as non-psychic, a consequence which indirectly contributed to developing the concept of πνεῦμα . His direct influence on the doctrine of πνεῦμα cannot be assessed since no texts are available, but the indirect influence upon the concept is clear: the association of the soul with πνεῦμα and the notion of an irrational element in the soul provided a new basis for the Stoic ethical system and demanded a new explanation of the meaning and functions of πνεῦμα .

Posidonius (130-46 B.C.) opened a school of Stoic philosophy in Rhodes in 78 B.C. He was widely traveled, eloquent and very learned. Zeller calls him "the most universal mind that Greece had seen since the time of Aristotle."[25] Stoic monism was fundamental to him and within a monistic system he posited a hierarchy of grades of being governed by divine Providence. At the top of the hierarchy was God, absolute reason, all-pervading rational activity. Proceeding from God as a rational, fiery breath (πνεῦμα) was a vital force which permeates the world. In his system, God becomes distinct from nature as an intelligent πνεῦμα whose function it is to give shape to everything and bind all things together.

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[25] E. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy (London, 1931).

In ethics, Posidonius found it impossible to explain unhealthy emotions as a morbid state of unified rational soul as the earlier Stoics had done. Following the lead of Panaetius he pursued a Platonic dichotomy of the soul and posited a rational faculty (ἡγεμονικόν) and an irrational faculty which contained both a spirited element (θύμος) and a concupiscent element (ἐπιθυμία). All three faculties were made subordinate to the one substance of the soul, the fiery πνεῦμα which, he thought, was located in the heart. Against the rational monism of Chrysippus, Posidonius held that the passions are non-rational and as such not unnatural. Since the soul is not merely rational, but also contained irrational functions, sin does not come from without, but has roots in the soul itself. The consequence of this for moral behavior is that the παθή should be educated: there is a real moral struggle in man between rational and irrational functions of the soul.[26]

The duality in the soul of man corresponded, in Posidonius, to a duality in the cosmos itself. He posited a heavenly, imperishable world and an earthly, perishable one: the two worlds were thought to be united in man who is the bond (δεσμός) between them. Since man is composed of body and spirit he is the ontological bond between the worlds of body and spirit. Man stands at the apex of the corporeal world, and at the very bottom of the spiritual world. The duality in the cosmos is the duality of God and matter. Since God had been identified by Posidonius as fiery πνεῦμα which penetrates matter in the same way that the soul penetrates

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[26]Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 110-142, has a masterful discussion of Posidonius and his contribution to the concept of πνεῦμα . Sambursky, op. cit., pp. 140-143, gives a good discussion of Posidonius' concept of cosmic sympathy and its scientific relevance.

man, the πνεῦμα has a divine character: God is πνεῦμα .[27] In ethics and the moral sphere, therefore, man can achieve his end by cooperating with the rational element in the cosmos; both man and the cosmos have a rational principle and both rational principles were identified by Posidonius with πνεῦμα.

There is an identification between the soul of man and the soul of the universe by virtue of the πνεῦμα , but the identification is not absolute. There are no irrational tendencies in the soul of the world; the soul of the cosmos was conceived of as a unity while the soul of man was thought to be a composite of good and evil functions or δαίμονα . This conception in its Platonic-Aristotelian presentation is new to Stoicism, but the ideas behind it are not. Zeno had recognized a cosmic πνεῦμα which he sometimes called νοῦς and sometimes πῦρ νοερόν . The cosmic πνεῦμα was identified with God and was thought to be in man; the difference between the cosmic πνεῦμα and the πνεῦμα in man was in the cooling. The πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον at the birth of the child was cooled by the air and stimulated and thus became a living being. The soul of man therefore was not considered to be merely πνεῦμα but πνεῦμα in a certain state or condition, πνεῦμα πῶς ἔχον; and it was being in this certain state which distinguished it from the cosmic πνεῦμα .[28] Posidonius differs from this in his conception of the origin of the human soul.

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[27] Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 134-143, has a good discussion of this point, and a good argument against I. Heinemann's position (in Poseidonios' metaphysische Schriften, II [Breslau, 1928] 29f.) that Posidonius made a great innovation in Stoic pneumatology by positing a perpetual and autonomous movement of the divine πνεῦμα. Verbeke notes that this was the position of Chrysippus and that the innovation was in the Aristotelian presentation of the idea (p. 137).

[28] For a good discussion of these ideas and their sources see C. J. de Vogel, Greek Philosophy: A Collection of Texts with Notes and Explanations, volume III, The Hellenistic-Roman Period (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959).

For him it was not born with the body and cooled by the air into a certain condition, but entered the body at birth. The superior or rational part of the soul (ἡγεμονικόν) was thought to be immortal, to leave the body after death to feed on the ether. The close identification between the fiery πνεῦμα of the soul and the divine πνεῦμα meant to him that the soul must seek the higher regions after death. The identification between the ἡγεμονικόν and an inward demon connected with the πνεῦμα of the universe was, according to de Vogel, a more religious interpretation of the ancient Stoic doctrine of the fiery πνεῦμα.[29] Wili sees in Posidonius the rediscovery of the πνεῦμα as pure spirit opposed to any substance in every possible way.[30] It would seem, however, that a concept of pure spirit could not be sustained within a system characterized by its materialism. It is true that Posidonius does not introduce something new with his concept of a divine πνεῦμα (one can find this in Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus), but its conception in Platonic-Aristotelian terms is a significant departure from the early Stoics.[31] The contribution of Posidonius to the "spiritualization" of the πνεῦμα lay in his religious interpretation and in his adaptation of dualistic psychology and cosmology.

Πνεῦμα in Stoic philosophy was the key to anthropology, cosmology, theology, psychology and ethics. It retained the element of power associated with πνεῦμα in earlier usage, but generally surpassed earlier meanings of wind, breath and air. It was regarded as a substance of its own,

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[29] de Vogel, op. cit., p. 1212.

[30] Wili, op. cit., p. 101.

[31] Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 137f.

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sometimes identified with fire, sometimes with fire and air, sometimes above them as the principle of the elements; but always superior by virtue of its greater mobility, activity and vitality. It was never conceived of as purely spiritual, but maintained throughout the system as a vital, material substance which permeates and vivifies all reality. It was conceived of as a substance close to divinity, a particle of divinity, even divinity itself and as such was closely connected to intelligence and life. As the soul of the universe and the principle of unity for the cosmos it was conceived of as the cohesive force in all reality, as that which held the world together in harmony, and as that which distinguished each individual being or thing from another. As warmth, activity and vitality it was part of God, never really distinct from the deity but never really absolutely identified with it; in a monistic system it could never really be distinct from the world. It could provide man with a key to rational or virtuous life and with a path to a close association with divinity. As the vital source of life in man it circulated through him activating not only his senses and powers of speech and reproduction, but serving as the substance by which reason dwelt in him. It was the source of all perfection, an energy of a divine or higher order.

CHAPTER II

רוח IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

Ru'ah has a much wider range of meaning than πνεῦμα. As a key word in the Jewish Old Testament it expressed a constellation of meanings both connected to and separate from other important words and concepts.[1] It appears 378 times in the Jewish canon, scattered through the entire Old Testament and over four general spheres of meaning: physical, charismatic or supernatural, physiological, and emotional. Since an understanding of the Hebrew tradition is important for an accurate appraisal of Philo, the meanings of ru'ah need to be summarized so that they can act as a backdrop for the Philonic interpretation of πνεῦμα, the Septuagint translation of ru'ah.

The primary meaning of ru'ah is air in motion, wind or breath; in the Old Testament ru'ah is used 131 times to indicate wind or something associated with the idea of wind. Since the wind and movements of the air are invisible, powerful and mysterious, ru'ah was always connected to a notion of power or energy and carried with it the notion of inscrutability, especially when it was linked with Yahweh, the cause of all things. The winds were conceived of as the breath of Yahweh, under His control as a medium of His power. The powerful and mysterious breath of Yahweh could be creative, even salvific (as in Ex 14.21 where the ru'ah caused the sea

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[1]The meanings and occurrences of ru'ah can be found in a variety of places. The main sources used here were G. Kittel, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (Grand Rapids, 1964), VII.359-367, and John L. McKenzie, Dictionary of the Bible (Milwaukee, 1965), pp. 840-842.

to recede for the escaping Israelites) or it could be destructive (as in Ex 10.13, 19 where the ru'ah brought the plague of locusts upon the Egyptians). However it was conceived, ru'ah always belonged to and was under the control of Yahweh: it was sent, put into a person, taken away at the will of Yahweh. The ru'ah was characterized as mysterious and unpredictable power. "It is not surprising, therefore, to find exceptional displays of power in men are ascribed to the action of ru'ah: the same characteristics--strength and mystery--belonged to those prodigious exploits as to the energies of the wind."[2] In later writings ru'ah acquired a figurative sense which signified an empty (or windy) life (Job 7.7) or even a false prophet (a windbag) (Jer 5.13).

The second main use of ru'ah was that which denoted supernatural influences upon men. In this sense ru'ah is more readily translated as spirit and functions in an inspirational or charismatic sense; and within this pattern of usage an interesting development occurred. There was on the one hand evidence of a belief in spirits both good and evil, and on the other an evolving conception of ru'ah in prophecy and inspiration.

The origin of a belief in supernatural or extra-human spirits is difficult to trace. One would expect it to derive from a primitive etiology of mental and physical illness where sickness could be explained in terms of possession by an inhospitable or evil spirit. There would be a close association of this explanation to the mysterious and powerful wind, or breath of Yahweh. When the concept was extended it led to a belief in evil

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[2]David Hill, Greek Words and Hebrew Meanings (Cambridge, 1967), p. 207. The article in this volume on πνεῦμα is weak in some places (notably in Philo where he relied solely on Leisengang and tends to dismiss the word as unimportant) but generally accurate. It is very thorough (pp. 202-294).

spirits as creatures employed in the service of God's anger; this too was intimately connected to observations about winds and storms. In later literature evil spirit was personified as Satan in order to explain, in part, the problem of evil. In terms of the notion of power already connected with ru'ah evil spirits "rush upon" or "overcome" men; an evil spirit "frightened" Saul (1 Sam 16.16). Ru'ah as evil spirit could be metaphorically extended to mean evil dispositions, the spirit of jealousy or even the spirit of whoredom.

In its charismatic sense ru'ah was predominantly designated as ru'ah Yahweh, and sometimes as ru'ah Elohim. They are not the same: the ru'ah Yahweh operated the works of Yahweh as savior and judge and in post-Exilic prophecy was conceived or as the force of inspiration; the ru'ah Elohim was a neutral or indifferent principle.[3] In the historically earliest sources the ru'ah Yahweh was experienced in intermittent fashion as an overwhelming power: it rushed upon and pushed men into extraordinary deeds. Samson killed a lion with his bare hands and slew thirty men under the influence of the ru'ah Yahweh (Jgs 14.6, 19). In early texts therefore the coming of the spirit of Yahweh upon a man meant the accession of a divine,

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[3]This is the opinion of McKenzie, op. cit., p. 841. There is, however, an argument about the translation of the phrase ru'ah Elohim in Gn 1.1 which would question the interpretation here adopted. The opinion of von Rad, Eissfeldt, Goodspeed and others (as summarized in Hill, op. cit., pp. 214f) is that ru'ah Elohim should be translated as "a mighty wind," a translation that links the ru'ah Elohim to cosmological interpretation and to other ancient near Eastern cosmogonies. As Eugene Maly notes (Jerome Biblical Commentary [New Jersey, 1968], p. 11), the translation as wind suggests a clear dichotomy between impotent void and the vivifying power of God. Hill argues persuasively, however, that the verb merahepheth suggests brooding or hovering which would not be congruent with "a mighty wind." This argument is summarized also in C. K. Barrett, The Holy Spirit and The Gospel Tradition (London, 1966), pp. 18f.

violent and overwhelming power. The power was temporary and the spirit of Yahweh was sent like this only in specific crises which affected the nation of Israel.[4]

Ru'ah was also used in connection with sudden outbursts and oracles. The spirit of Yahweh was sent and rushed upon Saul and transformed him into another man who began to prophesy (1 Sam 10.9). It is questionable whether ru'ah Yahweh was closely connected with inspiration in pre-Exilic texts. Hosea is called a man of the spirit (Hos 9.7) but this appears to be the only place in pre-Exilic literature where a prophet was so defined. If there was a real connection between the ru'ah Yahweh and prophecy in early texts, then it should be noted that even there the ru'ah Yahweh was conceived as a strange, violent and temporary endowment, not a permanent gift.

There are two ways to approach a development in the meaning of ru'ah Yahweh when connected with prophecy. If the ru'ah Yahweh was clearly connected with inspired prophecy in early texts, then the almost total absence of this concept in the major pre-Exilic prophets is an oddity which requires careful explanation. If the ru'ah Yahweh was not clearly connected with inspired prophecy in early texts, then the absence of the connection in the major prophets before the Exile can be construed as a normal pattern of development from a special and temporary charismatic influence in early literature, to a concomitant or necessary acquisition of the prophet in later literature.

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[4] J. Guillet, Thèmes Bibliques (Paris, 1950), p. 253.

The evidence for an inspiration function of the ru'ah Yahweh in early texts is ambiguous. There are reasons for making the connection but equally compelling reasons (tied to the uses of ru'ah as the forceful, powerful mysterious winds) for not making the connection. There is no question that the ru'ah Yahweh was conceived as charismatic, that it was sent from Yahweh and imparted to those who had an office in Israel. This function of ru'ah Yahweh carries throughout the Old Testament from the deeds of the early judges under the influence of the ru'ah Yahweh to post-Exilic literature where the artistry of the temple craftsmen was accounted for by the fact that they received the ru'ah Yahweh. There is no question that the ru'ah Yahweh confers upon those who receive it both the qualities necessary to fulfill their function and the inspiration to deeds above and beyond ordinary capabilities. Indeed, "this is a true sign of the ru'ah, that a man rises above his habits and attainments."[5] The question is whether this charistmatic gift which often inspired people to frenzied worship or great deeds is equivalent to prophetic inspiration.

One text cited to support the thesis that the ru'ah Yahweh was an early conception of prophetic inspiration is Num 11.17-29. Yahweh tells Moses that He will take some of the ru'ah which is upon him and transfer it to the seventy elders so that they can share in the burden of the nation with him; Yahweh takes some of the ru'ah, puts it upon the elders and they prophesied (but only temporarily); the ru'ah also fell upon two others who began to prophesy; this caused jealousy and caused Moses to say: "If only the whole people of Yahweh were prophets, and Yahweh gave His ru'ah to all

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[5] McKenzie, op. cit., p. 841.

of them." The sources for these passages are J and E, both early, and the text appears to be clearly connected with prophecy. It can be argued, however, that the ecstatic or pentecostal outburst of Num 11 is not really comparable to prophecy in the major prophets. The prophet in pre-Exilic literature is nabi, the mouthpiece of God. He is God's spokesman. The "hand of Yahweh" is upon the prophet (Jer 15.17), and possession of the word of God, dabar Yahweh, qualifies the prophet for his ministry.

If one concludes that there is no real connection between the ru'ah Yahweh and prophecy in the early texts, then the absence of connection between prophecy and ru'ah Yahweh in the pre-Exilic prophets is not particularly peculiar. Indeed, it is quite likely that the absence of ru'ah Yahweh in these prophets is an intentional opposition to the irrational and extravagant frenzies provoked by the ru'ah Yahweh in earlier times.[6] The earlier "prophetic" outbursts associated with ru'ah Yahweh were equivalent to mantic or frenzied activity on the part of the individual who had been "rushed upon" by the spirit of Yahweh. In the pre-Exilic prophets, however, ecstatic forms of worship associated with ru'ah were replaced with a conception of prophecy as clear-minded communion with Yahweh and as such exhibited very few of the symptoms associated with earlier forms. The word of Yahweh was the authenticating feature of the prophet. One can argue that there is some common ground of meaning between dabar Yahweh and ru'ah Yahweh (especially in terms of creation and life) and that argument prevents an absolute distinction

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[6] S. Mowinckel, "The Spirit and the Word in the pre-Exilic reforming Prophets," JBL 53 (1934), 199-227.

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between them. Still, the concept ru'ah Yahweh was available to the prophets and must have had a meaning for them. Their choice not to use it demonstrates that ru'ah Yahweh had not yet reached the level of inspirational power it was to reach in post-Exilic literature.

In Exilic and post-Exilic literature the concept of ru'ah Yahweh notably advanced to a new level of meaning. The turning point appears to be Ezekiel who claimed to act under the influence of the ru'ah (2.2). For him the ru'ah was responsible for his reception of the divine message and his ability to proclaim it. In addition, ru'ah was presented by him as an energizing cause of movement capable of reviving a dead nation (37.5-9). He challenged men to cooperate with Yahweh in the making of a new spirit into which Yahweh would pour His own ru'ah (18.31). In contradistinction to the bestowal of the ru'ah Yahweh on those few who had a mission in Israel, the "new spirit" would come to and abide with the whole nation; in contradistinction to the temporary and intermittent presence of ru'ah Yahweh in earlier literature, the "new spirit" would stay with an ideal Israel. And in contrast to the mighty deeds and superhuman activities of the early judges and others who received the ru'ah Yahweh, the "new spirit" would result in a moral life of unbroken fellowship with Yahweh (39.29). Perhaps the climax of the new understanding of ru'ah Yahweh in Ezekiel was chapter 37, the Ru'ah and the dry bones: the spirit was conceived as a quickening and regenerating power which could revive a morally dead people.

In other post-Exilic texts the ru'ah Yahweh is referred to the past history of Israel: earlier prophets were conceived as those who spoke the words which Yahweh sent by His ru'ah (Zec 7.12). It retained the

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notion of power and the notion that it was something sent by Yahweh as the source of powers beyond normal human experience. It is possible to interpret the ru'ah Yahweh in these texts as an extension of the personality of Yahweh, a power through which Yahweh exercised a mysterious influence upon men.[7] The ru'ah Yahweh, in addition to being reflected in Israel's past history was projected into the future history of the nation. The abundant fruitfulness and social righteousness which were to characterize the future age were thought to have been guaranteed and made possible by the action of the ru'ah Yahweh (Is 32.15-20). Further, it was conceived as a gift which all might receive: Yahweh would pour out His spirit on all mankind (Joel 3.1f).

The ru'ah Yahweh may be characterized as the divine presence experienced as a power of action. It was manifest as a charismatic spirit inspiring heroic exploits or ecstatic worship, as a prophetic spirit, a necessary concomitant of prophetic inspiration, or as an ethical spirit engendering righteous living. It was conceived as a power through which Yahweh worked in the world, but it was never conceived as a distinct being. There are texts which lend themselves to the interpretation of the spirit of God as a separate entity (Ps 104.30) but such an interpretation can be outweighed by other considerations. In the first place, monotheism could not countenance another divine being. This does not rule out some tendencies toward hypostatization, but it does qualify them. In Zecariah 4.6 Israel is saved not by divine power or strength, but by Yahweh's spirit. This is a quasi-hypostatization, but to conclude that

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[7] A. R. Johnson, The One and the Many in the Israelite Conception of God (2d ed., Cardiff, 1961), pp. 15-17.

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ru'ah Yahweh was beginning to be conceived of as a person goes beyond the evidence. It is significant enough that ru'ah began to be conceptualized as a substantial source of force and energy. The Hebrew language did not allow ru'ah to take on abstract qualities. Greek can easily express πνεῦμα as a static and abstract concept which functions in physical and metaphysical theories, but Hebrew is characterized by a paucity of abstract terms and an abundance of rich concrete images. Since ru'ah as wind was conceived as something exterior to a person, separable from him, the ru'ah Yahweh as spirit of God was conceived as somehow acting apart from Yahweh. To say, however, that the ru'ah Yahweh was really distinct from Yahweh pushes the limits of a dynamic language too far.

The third main use of ru'ah was physiological. Ru'ah was used 39 times in the Old Testament to denote breath in living beings or a principle of life. While there is a close connection between ru'ah and the sustaining, vital power of life (Ps 104.29 when Yahweh gives ru'ah, men live; when He takes it away, they die) it would be incorrect to say that ru'ah is the vital principle in man comparable to the Greek usage of πνεῦμα for soul, or substance of the soul. There is no concept of ru'ah as soul (nephesh) in the Old Testament.[8] The ru'ah is an element foreign to man, given to him and taken from him by Yahweh; it is not a constitutive part of the human personality. Nephesh, on the other hand, was intimately related to the concrete existing self as the subject of action and passion; it was conceived as that which distinguished one self from another. In Stoic philosophy πνεῦμα was that which distinguished one thing from another, and πνεῦμα was associated with a concept of soul.

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[8] McKenzie, op. cit., p. 840.

Ru'ah does not have the same association. Both nephesh and ru'ah were distinguished from the flesh (basar) but not precisely in the same manner. In making the simple assertion that ru'ah was not flesh, the Old Testament distinguished ru'ah from the carnal, mortal, corruptible, weak and sinful element in man. The distinction between nephesh and basar does not occur because basar is mortal and sinful, but because basar is flesh, i.e., body. Nephesh was not entirely removed from basar as ru'ah was: nephesh, though distinct from the flesh was still able to share the experience of the flesh, to experience grief and pain with it (Ps 42.5, Job 30.16).

Ru'ah as breath of life was used in association with nephesh (Is 42.5) and neshamah (breath) (Is 26.9). Ru'ah hayyim was used in Genesis 6.17, and 7.15, to denote the breath of life in men and animals, but not in 2.7. Ru'ah as the breath of life was conceived as a gift from Yahweh to men which returned to Yahweh when a man died; it did not belong to the man. Life only lasts so long as there is ru'ah or nephesh.

When ru'ah was used in its charismatic sense as ru'ah Yahweh, it was a temporary endowment which equipped a man to perform heroic deeds and when it was withdrawn the man returned to normal life, fully alive but no longer in possession of the special ru'ah Yahweh. When the ru'ah designated vital breath, however, it meant a necessary endowment for existence: when it withdraws men are weakened (Jud 15.19) and ultimately die (Ps 104.30). The absence of ru'ah meant diminished vitality and its return meant an increase in strength and well-being. As the breath of life, therefore, ru'ah signified the difference between life and death.

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The fourth main usage of ru'ah was emotional. Ru'ah is used 74 times in the Old Testament to express the inner life and emotional state of man. This usage still had attached to it notions of power and energy manifested in ru'ah as wind, and was also closely aligned with observations about breathing. Anger resulted in hot and heavy breathing, impatience was characterized by shortness of breath, and terror by spasmodic breathing. In post-Exilic texts these meanings were metaphorically extended to incorporate the notion that the emotions were somehow located with or in the ru'ah, or that intellectual operations could be predicated of it: the ru'ah was conceived as wise (Dt 34.9) and as something through which thoughts enter (Ez 20.32).

Ru'ah had attached to it a constellation of meanings. It was conceived as the wind, a divine breath through which Yahweh accomplished His purposes in the world or in the nation of Israel. It could be construed as a saving wind, creative breath, charismatic power or an agent of the anger of Yahweh, a demonic power. It was never conceived of as a personal being or entity separate from God. It was seen as God, Himself in some way present to man, but not as a constituent part of man. Ru'ah was described in concrete terms and with picturesque language, but it remained (like the winds) mysterious and uncontrollable; its origin could not be discovered, but it was convincingly real; man could experience ru'ah but he could not really understand it. As a divine influence acting upon man it supplied a point of contact between man and his transcendant God. The ru'ah supplied man with life, but did not belong to him; man died when Yahweh took away His ru'ah. Since man was flesh, i.e., carnal and sinful, he could not be

sustained indefinitely by Yahweh's ru'ah. In post-Exilic prophetic literature, ru'ah Yahweh acquired a new level of meaning when it was conceived as a permanent gift and a sign of God's renewing and regenerating activity in the messianic age.

The differences between ru'ah and πνεῦμα as the Stoics used it were differences of language and intention. In both there was a notion of power associated to the word; both could mean wind, air in motion, breath and breath of life (though Stoic usage of πνεῦμα as air was minimal), and both were associated in some way with Deity. Both ru'ah and πνεῦμα signified an active energy which operated in nature and in human life with vivifying, sustaining, creative effects. In Greek literature there is no evidence of a personalization of πνεῦμα : it is always a thing, never a person. It remained, until after the contact with Christianity, a material substance, refined and rarefied, which permeated the cosmos, even acting as its soul. It was never conceived of as spiritual in the strict sense, i.e., it was never clearly distinguished from matter, nor was it construed as a divine gift. It acted as a vital and natural force immanent in the world and impersonal. It was used to describe the substance of the human soul and the substance of God, but it was not absolutely interchangeable with the concept of soul as ψυχή . In the Old Testament ru'ah is conceived of as a substantial force and energy which was creative and salvific, but it belonged to God and was never separated from Him as a distinct person. There is no word in Hebrew for "material" and no evidence that a concept of the immaterial was developed in the Old Testament.[9] Ru'ah was neither material nor immaterial, but a divine influence

[9] Ibid., p. 842.

distinguished from weak and sinful flesh. Ru'ah did not describe the substance of God, since nothing could describe the substance of a transcendent God. The God of the Old Testament was not immanent, but He did act in the world, and the ru'ah was the agent of His activity. Neither did ru'ah describe the substance of the human soul. In its meanings as spirit and spirit of God ru'ah went beyond normal meanings of πνεῦμα . As a word which described human emotions ru'ah incorporated into its usage notions and descriptions which Greek predicated of other words (ψυχή , νοῦς , e.g.).

The Stoics were interested in the philosophical connotations of πνεῦμα in its functions within systems of physics, logic and ethics. Insofar as those concerns were tied to their basic concerns about religion, πνεῦμα was a religious concept. The Hebrews had no interest in or vocabulary for philosophical speculations. For them the realities of religious awareness could be expressed in a variety of dynamic meanings from the nature of the winds to the life and impulses of men and even to the activities of God Himself. The God of the Hebrews was different from the God of the Stoics. In the pantheistic system of Stoic philosophy God was immanent, part of both man and the universe. It was possible for God and man to share the same πνεῦμα because it was a material substance which belonged to all things and all beings; the differences between creatures was a different mode of the same πνεῦμα . In the transcendent system of Hebrew religion God was above man, but personal and interested in man and in the universe. God could not be part of man, but He was present to him through the activity of His ru'ah.

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CHAPTER III

THE ALEXANDRIAN MILIEU

In Philo's time Alexandria was a beautiful sophisticated city, the intellectual center of the world.[1] It was the site of one of the seven wonders of the ancient world--the lighthouse at Pharos--the former capital city of the Ptolemies and the present capital of the Roman administration in Egypt. It had been founded by Alexander in 332 B.C. to serve as one of the major centers of cultural fusion within his Empire, and had been maintained by the Ptolemies apart from the rest of Egypt as a Greek city. The combination of Greek peoples, a large Jewish population (one of the richest and most influential and possibly the largest of the Diaspora communities) and native Egyptians invited an intermingling of cultures and ideas. The "mystery religions" exercised a strong attraction upon the Greeks providing, as they did, a mystic closeness to divinity and a promise of future life which was lacking in the pure metaphysical speculations of Greek philosophy.

The Jews were an intimate part of the economic and political community.[2] Their language and their names were Greek, their judicial framework was Hellenistic and their educational policies were designed in part

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[1]Descriptions of the resources and impact of Alexandria on the Hellenistic world are as available as the nearest reference book. For an extraordinarily compact yet wide-ranging description see: William L. Langer (ed.), An Encyclopedia of World History, revised 4th edition (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968), 87f.

[2]On the Jews in Alexandria, their laws, customs, privileges, etc., see Victor Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews (Philadelphia, 1961).

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to come to a deeper understanding of Greek culture as a whole. At the same time, however, the Jews remained legally independent: they were permitted to live according to their ancestral laws and to maintain an internal social and religious autonomy. They were afforded special privileges which insured freedom of religion: they did not have to worship Greek gods, they did not have to participate in the life of the community at large on the Sabbath, they were exempted from the military and were permitted to collect money and send it to Jerusalem.[3] Their privileges were not always solidly affirmed--there were anti-Semitic uprisings--but under normal conditions their situation was nearly ideal: they were occupationally and economically stratified much like the rest of the community and were, perhaps, somewhat wealthier; their religious autonomy was supported by the state so that they could maintain their Jewish identity without being forced into a ghetto situation; and could take advantage of the cultural and philosophical situation without being absorbed by it, supported as they were by a strong religious community.

Alexandria was intellectually stimulating. The academy of scholars (Museum) founded by the Ptolemies provided a new impetus for scientific learning: mathematics, physics, astronomy, philosophy and medicine took root and flourished in the environment. Scholars were attracted from all parts of the world and old centers of scientific learning began to give way to the new scientific capital of the world. In medicine especially the schools of Hippocrates and Empedocles were replaced by a new vigor of medical learning at Alexandria. In the third century B.C. Herophilus

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[3] Ibid., p. 307.

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and his pupil Erasistratus made significant advances in theories of the circulatory and nervous systems and the functions of the brain. Their theories influenced some of the Stoics. Erasistratus proceeded from a basis in pneumatology to form theories about the place and function of the vital breath and blood in the body which were still prevalent in Galen's time. Erasistratus' books were read well into the fourth century A.D. In the process of his physiological speculations he became involved in the old argument between the Hippocratic and Sicilian schools on the place of πνεῦμα in the body; but his theories tended to compound rather than to solve the argument. He distinguished two πνεύματα: a vital breath (πνεῦμα ζωτικόν) which he located in the heart and ventrical system, and a psychic breath (πνεῦμα ψυχικόν) which he located in the brain. He did not, however, take pains to distinguish between the natures of the two. His interest was not in proceeding from a medical model to philosophy (as the Stoics had done) but in explaining pathology and organic functions. Πνεῦμα was for him not the substance of the soul or a particle of divinity, but a necessary element for the proper functioning of an organism. His importance in this study lies in the distinction he made about πνεῦμα and the fact that his distinction was at least theoretically available to Philo.[4]

Part of the academy of scholars was the library. It was founded by the Ptolemies and was the largest known and first public library in existence. It may have been modeled on the carefully organized library set up by Aristotle at the Lyceum, but it exceeded that library in its

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[4]Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 177-191.

scope and magnificence. There is no accurate assessment of its holdings which have been estimated from 100,000 to 700,000 volumes; but its impact and importance can hardly be overstated. Under a succession of distinguished scholar-librarians textual criticism and philology began to replace creative writing. The editing and interpretation of texts coincided with an interest in the lives, works and doctrines of the founders of the Schools and, in part, accounted for a new interest in philosophical orthodoxy.

The philosophical mood, however, may best be characterized as eclectic.[5] Potamon of Alexandria founded a school some time during the reign of Augustus (31 B.C.-14 A.D.) which was called "eclectic."[6] He knew Plato well enough to write a commentary on the Republic, but his school combined Stoic and Peripatetic elements. The school of Q. Sextius (b. 70 B.C.) also showed eclectic tendencies by its combination of Pythagorean and Platonic-Aristotelian elements; but his successor, Sotion of Alexandria, leaned more heavily upon Pythagorean elements alone. None of these schools appear to have had much influence; they are important here only as part of the philosophic atmosphere of Philo's time. The tendency toward eclecticism was not new with them: Posidonius introduced Platonic and Aristotelian concepts into Stoic philosophy, and Antiochus of Ascalon abandoned the scepticism of the Academy in favor of a melange of Platonic-

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[5]Besides standard encyclopedia reference works one can find a good summary of eclecticism as a mood and movement in Frerick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, volume I, Greece and Rome (Westminster, rev. ed., 1966), 438-450. An old but still in many ways unsurpassed work is Eduard Zeller, The History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy (London, 1883).

[6]Diog. Laert., Proem. 21.

Aristotelian-Stoic philosophy "believing that there were no essential differences among them."[7] Particularly important in the eclectic period in Alexandria was Neo-Pythagoreanism, which appears to have been more of a trend than a system.

Neo-Pythagoreanism was established as a school in Alexandria in the first century B.C. Its eclectic tendencies reflected the philosophic and religious needs of the period by combining philosophic tenets with mystical and ascetic elements. It was related to the old school of Pythagoras by its interest in scientific pursuits, asceticism and number mysticism, but it added to this a synthesis of Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic philosophy and claimed direct intuition of the Deity and revelation. The combination of diverse elements and the emphasis placed upon different streams of influence by different members of the school resulted in a rich variety of ideas and problems which was not particularly systematic. Concepts of providence, God's relation to man, emanation, the existence of beings in the air or ether, an equilibrium of opposites, and universal harmony were available as a kind of collection upon which other philosophers could draw. The Neo-Pythagorean school eventually gave way to the Neo-Platonic school which remained dominant well into the first centuries of the Christian era. There were some similarities between them which are important here only because they reflect a general cast of mind in the Neo-Pythagorean school of Philo's time. Both put philosophy in the service of religion and conceived the aim of philosophy to be to bring man into proper relation with God. As such, both answered contemporary demands for a more practical and more spiritual philosophy.

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[7] de Vogel, op. cit., p. 277.

The Alexandrian milieu into which Philo was born was complex and stimulating. Philo stood at the apex of Hellenistic-Jewish philosophy, a philosophy which arose almost naturally from the combination of a stimulating intellectual environment and a strong Jewish community. Within the literature of the Hellenistic-Jewish community of Alexandria two works are of major importance for this study: the Septuagint and the Wisdom of Solomon. The Greek translation of the Scriptures was the foundation and cornerstone of Jewish-Alexandrian literature. Philo repeats the legend of the seventy-two translators and affirms that the Septuagint translation of the Pentateuch is not only accurate, but truly inspired (Mos II 7,37-40). Since ru'ah had a wider range of meaning than πνεῦμα, it is important to note how ru'ah was translated into Greek and what ramifications that translation had for the Philonic interpretation of Scripture. The Wisdom of Solomon was written by an Alexandrian Jew late in the first century B.C., but earlier than Philo.[8] Since the author stood in the same milieu as Philo and had a great deal to say about the spirit of wisdom (πνεῦμα σοφίας) account must be taken of the work with particular attention to any new developments in the meaning of πνεῦμα .

The problems of date, authorship, versions and motive of the LXX need not be considered here.[9] There is agreement that the translation was made in Alexandria for the large Jewish community of that city and it is

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[8]This appears to be a common opinion and can be found in all the basic commentaries of the last few years. The source for the descriptions adopted here is: Addison G. Wright, "Wisdom," in The Jerome Biblical Commentary (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1968), pp. 556-568.

[9]Wright, op. cit.

probable that the Pentateuch was translated first, perhaps for liturgical use. Further, the translation of the Pentateuch has been analyzed as faithful and probably the best work in a generally uneven translation.[10] Translations, however, are never just translations: the change from one language to another--and this is especially true from Hebrew to Greek--requires interpretation and change. Greek does not support the variety of anthropomorphic expression peculiar to Hebrew, but it is suited for a more abstract and philosophical rendering than Hebrew ever was. This shows up clearly with the translation of ru'ah as πνεῦμα since the semantic field differs considerably from Hebrew to Greek.

Of the 378 occurrences of ru'ah in the Jewish Old Testament, 277 were rendered in the LXX by πνεῦμα . It has been noted that both ru'ah and πνεῦμα could mean air, wind, breath and breath of life; but that ru'ah could also mean spirit and spirit of God while πνεῦμα could not. Where ru'ah meant wind Greek used πνεῦμα and in some cases, ἄνεμος which appears to be nearly synonymous when applied to the wind. Where ru'ah meant breath it was almost always translated with πνεῦμα . Sometimes n^{e}shemah was translated with πνεῦμα which indicates the close association between πνεῦμα and breath in the minds of the translators.[11]

As noted, Greek did not have a concept which corresponded to the Hebrew ru'ah Yahweh. When faced with this concept either as a temporary

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[10]This is summarized in the Jerome Biblical Commentary, op. cit., but one should not for that reason neglect an old but still excellent reference work: Herbert B. Swete, Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek (Cambridge, 1902). The section on versions and quality of translation can be found pp. 315-341.

[11]Kittel, op. cit., pp. 367-372, is the best single source for the various translations and uses of πνεῦμα in the LXX.

charismatic gift or a permanent prophetic endowment, the translators used πνεῦμα θεοῦ or τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ . Ru'ah Yahweh was thought to be a power of God acting in the world or a presence of God to men, not a separate agent or autonomous entity. Πνεῦμα , on the other hand, was thought by the Stoics to be a substance shared by both God and men, describing God in some way but separate from Him. One can see the problems the two concepts posed for translators. In Psalm 51, for example, the psalmist implores Yahweh, "Take not from me the ru'ah of your holiness." There is some distinction here between the source of the gift and the gift itself, but the distinction is one of language and metaphor, the very thing Greek could not support as well as Hebrew. In Greek the passage became τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον σοῦ , which indicates a greater degree of distinction between God and His spirit than the Hebrew language and religion could support. The same is true in those passages where ru'ah was understood as spirits under the control of Yahweh: the Greek translation makes explicit what is only metaphorically contained in Hebrew. This tendency eventually led to calling angels and demons spirits, a sense which went beyond the Old Testament understanding.[12]

One text, already treated briefly,[13] which is of interest in a study of Philo is Genesis 1.2. In Hebrew the text reads ru'ah Elohim was moving over the waters, which in Greek becomes πνεῦμα θεοῦ . It is somewhat significant that the LXX does not render τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ and one would have to conclude that the translators intended to say that the breath

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[12] McKenzie, op. cit., p. 842.

[13] See above, p. 28.

of God moved over the waters or the wind of God moved over the waters; they do not appear to intend one to read "the spirit of God" was moving over the waters. Philo, however, continually interpreted and translated this passage in the sense of the "spirit of God," distinguishing πνεῦμα from πνοή .[14] His interpretation may suggest that he was closer to the richness of the Hebrew meaning (where ru'ah Elohim could and did mean spirit of God) than to the Greek translation, and that he was reflecting a more traditional Jewish understanding. One cannot conclude from this, however, that Philo knew Hebrew, and this is not the place to enter the argument over Philo's linguistic competence.[15] Still, the shades of meaning conveyed by his exegesis appear to go beyond ordinary Greek usage. He may, however, simply have been forced into his position by the omission of ru'ah (πνεῦμα) in Genesis 2.7.

Ru'ah could, as noted, be used in an emotional sense to describe human moods and feelings. Greek had no such usage for πνεῦμα and translated only about half of the passages which used ru'ah in this way with

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[14] H. M. Orlinsky, "The New Jewish Version of the Torah," JBL 82 (1963), 254-258, in defending the translation of ru'ah Elohim as "wind" argues that the influence of Philo who consistently translated the passage with "the spirit of God" was in large part responsible for the loss of the translation "wind." This contention gives a little too much weight to Philonic influence. It appears that one can use the translation wind or breath and be faithful to the Greek translation, but that the richness of the Hebrew allows "spirit of God" within its limitations.

[15] For a good summary of the main arguments on either side see S. Sandmel, Philo's Place in Judaism (Cincinnati, 1956), pp. 1-29. Sandmel confronts Wolfson's contention that Philo knew Hebrew and that the burden of proof is upon those who claim he did not; Sandmel reverses the challenge and says that the burden of proof is upon those who claim he did. On the basis of Wolfson's arguments for Philo knowing Hebrew (in Philo [Harvard, 1948] I.88-93), and Sandmel's counterarguments, I would agree with Sandmel: there is no compelling amount of evidence that Philo knew Hebrew.

πνεῦμα .[16] More often they translated ru'ah in its psychic sense with other, more psychically oriented terms: θυμος, ψυχή, or νοῦς. The close connection between πνεῦμα and ψυχή in Greek and in the LXX translation led to a closer identification of concepts and in later literature the concept of ru'ah became almost synonymous with nephesh and took on some of the properties of the Greek ψυχή like pre-existence, and immortality. Philo stood in the stream of this development and profited from it.

The philosophical and religious atmosphere of the author of the Wisdom of Solomon was eclectic.[17] The intermingling of Greek philosophical ideas, Oriental mystery religions and Hebrew traditions was viewed by him as a great danger from which one could escape only by remaining faithful to the beliefs and traditions of Israel. Genuine wisdom was for him the belief in the one true God and fidelity to His law. It is difficult to determine the exact nature of πνεῦμα in this work because the author was not interested in expounding a systematic doctrine or in defining the nature of πνεῦμα exactly. He was touched by Greek philosophy, but not deeply; his interest in philosophy seems to have been in its practical application to the problems of human destiny. Significantly, he introduced the notion of soul as πνεῦμα and affirmed its immortality; but his contributions to pneumatology were richer than that: there were two major ways to conceive πνεῦμα as a principle of life (ψυχή) and as the spirit of wisdom (πνεῦμα σοφίας).

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[16] Hill, op. cit., p. 219.

[17] Wright, op. cit., and McKenzie, op. cit., were basic sources for this section.

For the author of WS the πνεῦμα was almost synonymous with ψυχή . In chapter 15 he says that men who worship false gods are those whose hopes are cheaper than dirt, those who fail to know the one who forms men and inspires them with an active soul (ψυχή) and breathes into them a living spirit (πνεῦμα ζωτικόν). One can ask if the author is trying to distinguish the divine principle of life from actual life, but this does not eliminate the possibility that he intended to equate them. As a principle of life πνεῦμα is inbreathed by God (15.11) and thus belongs to God who loans it to man (15.16). That which lives in all living creatures is not the πνεῦμα (2.3) but the incorruptibility of God giving Himself to each individual (12.1). If there is an identification between πνεῦμα and ψυχή it should be able to be demonstrated from the sources he used for his concept.

The phrasing, πνεῦμα ζωτικόν , is not Stoic but very similar to that employed by Erasistratus in his medical research. In seeking to explain organic functions he distinguished between a psychic (πνεῦμα ψυχικόν) and a vital (πνεῦμα ζωτικόν) breath in man. His distinction endured in medical schools and was most likely current when WS was being written.[18] The fact of availability, however, does not determine

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[18]It is curious that Kittel, op. cit., p. 370, says that the author of WS "took over the concept" from Erasistratus but "may have been" influenced by Old Testament notions and then cites Verbeke to support the assertion. Verbeke, however, says quite the opposite: "la distinction entre le πνεῦμα ζωτικόν et le πνεῦμα ψυχικόν a été introduite par Erasistrate, et il n'est pas impossible que ce soit sous l'influence de la terminologie de son école, établie à Alexandrie, que l'auteur sacré s'en est servi. D'ailleurs cette terminologie lui était directement suggérée par la Bible elle-meme, Gen II.7. ... Cette explication est d'autant plus probable que l'auteur, un juif profondément religieux, n'introduit pas la distinction d'un double pneume comme les disciples d'Erasistrate: nous croyons donc que le πνεῦμα ζωτικόν est plutôt une traduction plus souple de l'hébraïsme de la Genèse," (p. 225). This is not the mistake of the English translator; the same misreading of Verbeke occurs in the German edition of Kittel.

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influence. It is more logical, especially since the author intended to warn against Hellenistic learning, that the source lay closer to home. In Genesis 2.7 one finds: "God formed man out of the dust of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life (πνοή ζωής) and the man became a living soul (ψυχὴν ζῶσαν)."

The identification between πνεῦμα and ψυχή is not really Stoic either. For the Stoics ψυχή was not simply πνεῦμα , but πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον which was cooled at birth by the air to a certain condition (πνεῦμα πῶς ἔχον). The cosmic πνεῦμα was, for them, πῦρ νοέρον which Zeno called νοῦς While there were similarities between πνεῦμα and ψυχή and while πνεῦμα was in some ways the substance of the ψυχή there was not an absolute identification between them. Πνεῦμα was a much richer concept than soul or soul-stuff: all souls had some πνεῦμα , but not every πνεῦμα was a soul.[19]

Neither is there an identification between breath of life and soul in Hebrew. The breath of life (ru'ah or neshema hayyim) was given by God to men, and the soul was man as man once he began life.[20] If the identification is neither Scriptural nor Stoic, the only logical explanation left is language. The Hebrew notion of nephesh was a dynamic concept which conveyed none of the ideas contained in the Greek ψυχή . When nephesh was translated into Greek, however, it was translated as ψυχή , a word which conveys a more abstract understanding and also allows a closer identification between

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[19] For a discussion with texts of these points see de Vogel, op. cit., who shows clearly with evidence the differences between the πνεῦμα which functioned as world-soul, cohesive bond of all things, etc., and the πνεῦμα cooled in man as soul.

[20] For an encapsulated discussion of Hebrew anthropology with bibliography see J. L. McKenzie, "Aspects of Old Testament Thought," in The Jerome Biblical Commentary (New Jersey, 1968), pp. 746ff.

breath of life and soul. Whether, in conveying the Scriptural description of man as soul, he intended to convey all the nuances of ψυχή or not, the implicit identification between πνεῦμα and ψυχή is fairly clear.

There is some evidence of Stoic vocabulary in WS but no real evidence that the author understood Stoic philosophy or advocated it. In Stoicism, the vital principle in each man was thought to be part of the divine πνεῦμα which penetrated all beings and animated the cosmos. In WS, however, πνεῦμα is not part of God, but the work of God: there is a distinction between God and man which shows that Stoic monism was either foreign or abhorent to the author and also shows that his understanding of the human soul (though expressed in Greek terms) was probably inspired by the Biblical concept.[21] Further, the very distinction between the cosmic πνεῦμα and the πνεῦμα in man in Stoic philosophy led the Stoics to affirm the mortality of the soul. Zeno believed that the soul of man did not perish with the body, but it was mortal. The author of WS clearly affirms the immortality of the soul and the recompense of the just after death, and clearly links his notion of immortality to πνεῦμα (2.23, 3.4, 5.15 e.g.).

When the author delineated his concept of the spirit of wisdom (πνεῦμα σοφίας) he did so without clearly distinguishing its functions from the πνεῦμα as the principle of life. There is in this notion the same surface awareness of Stoic concepts, but it is clear overall that the author's basic justification and source is Scriptural. Wisdom is a loving πνεῦμα (1.6), a πνεῦμα which is understanding, discerning, and subtle (7.22). It has an educative function (1.5) and is

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[21] Wright, op. cit., and Verbeke, op. cit. (see note 18, p. 49 above).

universally extended, permeating all things (7.24). No one learns God's will unless he receives God's Holy Spirit (9.17) and no one receives this spirit unless he implores God for it (7.7). This is a strange melange of cosmic activity (a πνεῦμα which comes to all and permeates all things) and esoteric activity (a πνεῦμα sent from God only to the morally pure who implore Him for it): it shows some knowledge of Stoic concepts of permeation by the πνεῦμα and the universal nature of the πνεῦμα , as well as Hebrew notions of πνεῦμα as a gift from God given to special people in special circumstances. Verbeke explains the double aspect as a double activity of πνεῦμα in WS.[22] There is on the one hand πνεῦμα σοφίας as a creative force which penetrates and renews all things, which is given to all men regardless of their moral state; and on the other the πνεῦμα σοφίας as a principle of superior knowledge and moral life, a knowledge which extends to the practice of virtue (7.17-21, 9.11, 8.7, e.g.). It is in this second aspect that the spirit of wisdom is reserved for those who aspire to a high moral life and who open themselves to the action of the spirit through prayer.

In terms of hypostatization of the πνεῦμα WS is somewhat ambiguous. In 7.21-8.4 it appears as if the spirit of wisdom is an emanation from God, an intermediary being between God and the world which serves to create and govern the cosmos. This understanding comes more from the language of the author than from Scriptural presuppositions. In the light of his presentation of the πνεῦμα σοφίας as a symbolic but real

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[22]Verbeke, op. cit., p. 230.

representation of the activity of God in the world, neither really distinct from God nor identified with Him, he stands in the Old Testament wisdom tradition, a tradition which can be distinguished from other Near-Eastern wisdom traditions by its relationship to faith in Yahweh.

There is no trace of Stoic pantheism in WS: God is clearly distinct from creation and from the human soul (2.23, 7.22, 9.4, 13.1). For the Stoics πνεῦμα was the substance of divinity; for the author of WS πνεῦμα σοφίας was a representation of an aspect of divinity, the creative and sanctifying activity of God in the world. For the Stoics πνεῦμα penetrated the entire cosmos and was a constitutive factor in the personality of man; for the author of WS the πνεῦμα σοφίας was on the one hand a creative activity of God which penetrated the entire cosmos, but on the other as the spirit of wisdom extending to the moral life and the practice of virtue, it penetrated only the righteous who asked for it. Questions of materiality or immateriality of πνεῦμα were not asked by the author of WS who apparently had no interest in them. The πνεῦμα σοφίας was depicted as most subtle (γεπτοτάτων) (7.23) and far superior to the material world. As such, it transcended sensible reality, but explicit "spirtualization" is not at all clear.[23]

One can see in WS the benefits and complications which arose from the LXX translation. Key words in both Hebrew and Greek had semantic fields and constellations of meaning which were not totally congruent. For the author of WS who addressed himself to Jews too impressed with Hellenistic learning and who wished to affirm the importance of fidelity

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[23]This is especially the opinion of Verbeke, op. cit.; it is borne out also in Wright, op. cit., and McKenzie, op. cit.

to the beliefs and traditions of Israel, the Greek language was not an entirely accurate tool. His foundations and inspiration appear to be Scriptural, but the language employed forced him to understandings which went beyond purely biblical understandings. The result is significant for the study of pneumatology and for its place in Hellenistic-Jewish philosophy. The author was able to reaffirm traditional Jewish doctrines (God's transcendence, His activity in the world, man's total dependence upon God and the necessity for prayer) and at the same time enrich the Hebrew notion of soul by affirming its relation to the breath of life from God and its immortality. His superficial understanding of Greek philosophy and terms showed at least an acquaintance with Greek thought and a willingness to use it, even though his purpose was to warn Jews against a too deep involvement in Hellenistic culture. Only fifty years later Philo would show the same willingness and even a positive attitude toward Greek philosophy. As a student and admirer of the Greeks Philo wished to demonstrate that the Jewish law, the source of all wisdom (as it was for the author of WS) was truly a philosophy, viable and capable of growth, and able by its superiority as a philosophy to compel attention and devotion.

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CHAPTER IV

Πνεῦμα IN PHILO

The uses of πνεῦμα in Philo are a blend of the abstract descriptions of Greek philosophy and the richness of the Old Testament concept of ru'ah and must be delineated before his doctrine of πνεῦμα can be appreciated. Verbeke finds four basic meanings of πνεῦμα in Philo: air, cohesive bond, psychological principle and prophetic spirit.[1] His division reduces the Philonic πνεῦμα to its simplest form, but it misses some of the interaction between πνεῦμα and other terms and makes it appear as if the uses of πνεῦμα can be precisely categorized. The genius of the Philonic πνεῦμα lies precisely in the different levels of meaning he gave to it, and in the bargains he made with different philosophical systems, within his basic Hebrew frame of reference. The purpose of this chapter is to give the meanings of the word in Philo's writings so that the word itself can be related to his doctrines and possible sources in the second part of this study.

Since Philo was prolific but not particularly systematic, it is difficult to find the unity of any particular concept, especially when he often presents what appear to be contradictory opinions. The complexity of his milieu and the fact that he drew from the variety of disparate elements within it has led to a variety of interpretations both of Philo and of his doctrines. I have tried to let Philo speak for

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[1] Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 236-60.

himself, i.e., I have shied away from imposing an artificial structure to explain his thought; but I have worked out of certain hypotheses about Philo and his purposes. My basic hypothesis is that Philo's primary motivation was religious, not philosophical; that his use of philosophical concepts, mystery vocabulary or allegory all suited a basic purpose of showing the progress of the human soul from its life on earth to a life with or vision of God. F. H. Colson states it succinctly: "his purpose was . . . to set forth an allegory on the history of the human soul and its relations to God."[2] Reverence for his ancestral religion and his attraction to Greek philosophy combined with apologetic intent led him to see in Moses a philosopher-prophet-mystic with a mission to mankind. It is not surprising, therefore, that he was willing to draw upon any religious or philosophical system which could clarify that concept for the Jew and non-Jew alike. Philo believed that Moses was concerned with the progress of the soul, with pointing a way to union with God in some way. He saw a longing for God in many of the tendencies of Greek philosophy and mystery religions. It is not odd, therefore, that he used their terms, for with them he could demonstrate the religious and philosophical viability of the true wisdom and the true god: the Mosaic Law and the God of the Jews.

It has been noted that post-Aristotelian philosophy was called upon to satisfy practical and religious needs, and that within this philosophy there was a development from the predominantly ethical-religious system of the Stoics to the predominantly mystical-religious

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[2]In the introduction to Philo with an English Translation (Loeb Classical Library edition, Harvard, 1962), I.xv.

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system of Plotinian Neo-Platonism. Philo stood roughly in the middle of the transition from the spiritual independence of ethics to the spiritual dependence of religious philosophy.

> The tendency to insist on the Ethical, the self-sufficient perfection of the personality and the acquisition of a true moral personality was Stoic. The tendency to insist on the attitude of the worshipper to the Divine, or the need of the non self-sufficient human being to unite himself to God was part of the Mystery cult religion. Neo-Platonism was an attempted synthesis of these two, subsuming the Ethical under the religious principle without diminishing it.[3]

Philo stood in a transitional, eclectic philosophical period, in a culture which supported a variety of religious forms, and in a religious community which maintained its autonomy and ties with ancestral worship and beliefs. He is attractive not because he was eclectic or because he used the vocabulary of the mysteries when it suited him, or because he was Jewish; but because he was motivated by a single purpose and was willing to use any source or methodology which would explain man's opportunity to share in divine life. Philo was involved in a perplexing problem: as a Jew he knew that he could not hope to grasp or understand the transcendent God, but as a man of deep religious consciousness he knew that nothing else could satisfy him.[4] If some of the disparate elements of his culture or religious heritage could combine to clarify the problem or suggest a solution, therefore, he gladly pressed them into service. This explains, in part, why many of his

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[3] Copleston, op. cit., p. 382.

[4] This is the position and thrust of H. A. A. Kennedy's Philo's Contribution to Religion (London, 1919). Kennedy's approach is based upon his impression that Philo is profoundly religious and interested primarily in spiritual progress.

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doctrines are so variously expressed. His genius lay in his ability to combine ideas and expressions into a concept which could come close to answering the unanswerable questions of religious experience.

A key to Philo's religious orientation is the πνεῦμα. In arriving at his doctrine, Philo exhausted every possibility suggested to him by the LXX and Greek philosophy reflected through his religious awareness. Since he was primarily an exegete and used the LXX translation, the uses of πνεῦμα which occur in the LXX occur in Philo: wind, moving air, breath, spirit and spirit of God. Since Philo was also influenced by Greek philosophy and sensitive to the doctrines of the Stoics, πνεῦμα could also mean for him the cohesive bond of the cosmos, a vital principle acting in conjunction with blood to animate the body, a constitutive principle of human psychology and a basis for cosmological speculation. One of the crucial differences between the Greek and Hebrew understandings of πνεῦμα was its relation to human nature. The Hebrew understanding (based on the Old Testament ru'ah) conceived of πνεῦμα as a gift from Yahweh to man which sustained his life and which could, on occasion, endow some men with charismatic powers; it did not belong to man and could not be construed as part of his nature. The Greek understanding on the other hand (especially Stoic) conceived of πνεῦμα as part and parcel of man's nature, a material principle shared by both man and God which constituted life and gave distinction and cohesion to all things. Philo combined both usages in a way that πνεῦμα remained a gift from God to man, but also constituted part of man's nature. The very fact that God breathed into man and granted πνεῦμα to man as a gift meant for Philo that God had given

man a real share in Himself. Man begins life, therefore, in a real kinship with God, a kinship he can either ignore or develop; for in proportion as man allows the divine in him, the πνεῦμα , to assert itself, he will strive after a more complete union with God.

Πνεῦμα appears in Philo's work between 200 and 250 times. The approximation is necessary for two reasons: first, the usage of such terms as breathless (ἀπνευστι) or breathing space (διαπνευσασα) are so close to πνεῦμα as breath that they should be included. Secondly, many of the instances of πνεῦμα appear in the Questions and Answers in Genesis and Exodus which are extant only in an Armenian version, and the Armenian (h)ogi can be translated either by πνεῦμα or ψυχή . Since one has to decide on the basis of context (where no fragments exist) there can always be argument about the exact number of times πνεῦμα really occurs. My figure is 231.

As the element, air, πνεῦμα appears seven times, usually connected with the other elements as part of the whole of creation. In both Hebrew and Stoic cosmology the element air was afforded the special distinction of second place, fluid, mobile and invisible like the first element (heaven or fire) yet cold and corruptible and subject to diverse influences. It was considered to be superior to water not only because it existed above the water but because it was capable, through the action of the winds, of moving and influencing the water. It was considered to be superior to the earth because the earth was heavy, sensible and lumpish. As an element air itself was subject to physical and metaphysical laws, the first regulating its movements and dynamism and the second regulating its order and harmony with the other elements.

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Philo used the word ἀήρ at least 200 times to convey a variety of meaning: air itself was one of the elements, a substance or property, an important meteorological indicator, a medium full of life and living things and the sustainer of life, something which functioned in perception, sensation and vitality. Within all of these usages he sometimes substituted the word πνεῦμα for ἀήρ which indicates that the old identification of πνεῦμα and ἀήρ was still viable for him. He did not refer to πνεῦμα as a mixture of air and fire, or to πνεῦμα as fire though both positions were held at one time by the early Stoics.

When Philo substituted πνεῦμα for the second element, he did so within a broad range of meaning; πνεῦμα in these instances was always listed with other elements and clearly intended as an element, but it was made to function in a variety of ways. It appeared in a simple listing of elements,[5] in an affirmation of the law of harmony and order,[6] in conjunction with the breath of life,[7] in relation to the mind,[8] and in conjunction with the fullness of life.[9] Laurentin criticized Verbeke for seeing in Philo an identification between πνεῦμα

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[5]"earth, water, heaven and the air (πνεῦμα) we breathe" (Ebr 106).

[6]"love draws lifeless to the living, unreason to reason, air (ἀήρ) to water, water to air (πνεῦμα)" (Cher 111).

[7]first He made the incorporeal heaven and the invisible earth . . . next He made the corporeal essence of water and life breath" (Opif 29).

[8]"our mind is incapable of apprehending itself . . . can we say what it is, can we say that it is breath or blood or fire or air?" (Leg All I.91).

[9]"the universe is full of life . . . the air must then be full of living creatures since it sustains other life . . . do not all creatures live by air and breath?" (Gig 10).

and ἀήρ,[10] and in so doing missed the richness of the association. The identification is clear, but it does not diminish Philo's notion of πνεῦμα because the concept of ἀήρ itself is so vital. Because the air is necessary for life, because it contains and sustains life and has a distinguished place among the elements, the interchange of πνεῦμα and ἀήρ not only testifies to early Greek uses of πνεῦμα, but gives to πνεῦμα all the vital functions of the air. The identification does not suggest that πνεῦμα is no more than ἀήρ but that it is, at the very least, ἀήρ , a subtle, mobile, invisible, vital and superior element.

The second main usage of πνεῦμα in Philo is wind, a concept which serves an illustrative function in his writings and includes the meanings of stormy winds, and fair breezes as well as meteorological uses. Since this is a primary definition of πνεῦμα in Greek literature and in the LXX one would naturally expect to find it in Philo; and since Philo concerned himself with the vicissitudes of the spiritual life, it is not surprising to find it used to illustrate man's spiritual progress, or lack of it. As a wind or breeze of some kind πνεῦμα appears 54 times.

According to Philo man was created in the image of God and as such had a destiny as well as the freedom to accept or reject that destiny. When man chooses to be with God he is wafted along by favoring breezes; when he chooses to be against Him, he is like a ship on a stormy sea, tossed about by violent winds. Philo employed these

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[10] Laurentin, op. cit., pp. 7-13.

analogies many times: "a man who is not good is restless . . . like a chopping wind" (Leg All III.53), "when the mind goes forth from the vision of God . . . it is like a ship at sea battling with violent winds" (Cher. 13), "God alone is constant . . . men and nations are subject to vicissitudes, like ships at sea subject to prosperous and then adverse winds" (Immut 176).

The concept of wind was used to express human folly and to warn against it. One of Philo's major concerns was the temptations of the perfect, the temptations which assailed those who had progressed and followed virtue almost to the end. "When the virtuous think that their virtue is their own doing, they imperil a good beginning with a bad end, like ships almost to harbor struck with a violent head wind and driven back" (Agr 174). It was not enough to progress in virtue; one had to be constantly aware of the dangers, even when the end was in sight. "The mature soul takes caution for his lifemate and is circumspect to the end. lest like a ship which has made a long voyage and almost in harbor escorted all along by a favoring breeze, is suddenly shipwrecked" (Somn II.143).

Though man has a duty to follow God, he is free to turn aside. When he does he is like Lot, irresolute, "like a boat tossed from side to side by contrary winds" (Migr 148), or like Cain, a creature of unsettled impulses, subject to tossing, "like the sea tossed by contrary winds" (Post 22). But the wind does not only describe a result of a direct turning away from God, it also describes the results of a more normal human folly: "when men follow blind wealth as a source of happiness, they have no foothold in life, they are simply borne along

like the restless winds" (Spec I.26). Man must cling to God because "life itself is like an unsteady wind" (Spec II.71).

In addition to the analogical usage of wind, Philo used πνεῦμα as wind and breeze in the simple connotations of weather. The shiftings of the season and of the winds (Congr 133), the glories of nature, the air and the breezes (Praem 41). The attendance circumstances of nature render services to man, "predict the weather, the presence or absence of winds" (Prov 47); but even here there is some evidence of a relation between weather and man's duty towards God: "the forces of nature use draught and rainstorms, violent moisture-laden winds . . . a state of things due to impiety" (Spec II.191). Philo, therefore, presses normal uses of πνεῦμα in tandem with man's relation to God. All men can have abundance if they do not permit irrational pleasures to get control of them, he says, and supports his arguments with analogies from weather and farming where crops are often ruined by violent winds (Opif 80). When he exhorts man to love God or, at the very least, to fear Him, he supports his plea with the analogy of men crossing uncharted seas, tossed up and down by surging waves and violent winds with the implication that if one has sufficient courage to explore something unpredictable and possibly violent he should not balk at placing his trust in someone steady and loving (Spec I.301).

There is also a relationship between good weather and the spiritual life. Speaking of his own experiences Philo says, "if I unexpectedly obtain a spell of fine weather, I ride the waves and tread the lower

air, wafted by the breezes of knowledge" (Spec III.6). This need not be taken literally, but it can be, it reinforces the notion that being with God is akin to being carried along by gentle breezes. In another place he says, "the happily tempered states of the air which send us the breath of its truly life-giving breezes" (Spec II.172). The notion of the breezes as life-giving appears in the natural order, where it nourishes the growth of fruit from seed (Opif 41) and in the supernatural order where it indicates the presence of God to men: "knowledge of moral opposites is in perfect tension . . . if the soul is well-adjusted it will produce a symphony . . . if the soul of man, when it feels the soft breezes of wisdom . . . can dismiss the stormy surge which the fierce burst of the gale of wickedness has stirred . . . God will be with it" (Immut 26).

The use of πνεῦμα as wind or breeze in all its forms and functions does not really expand the concept of πνεῦμα as it existed in the Greek world. Philo drew upon these meanings to highlight points about the spiritual life or to illustrate the vicissitudes of life, but his applications were not untypical of earlier usage. The meaning of πνεῦμα as wind, therefore, does not add to or subtract from his doctrine.

The third main usage of πνεῦμα is breath. There are 62 instances of this usage, a figure which includes concepts of breathless and breathing space as well as the Stoic notion of breath as cohesive bond. The meaning of πνεῦμα as breath was a normal one and taken by itself does not contribute to an original doctrine of

πνεῦμα in Philo; his intermingling with biblical usages at this point, however, does form the beginning of an original concept.

Normally in breathing πνεῦμα is a natural partner with the air: it exists with it in the bronchi, it is a means of sustenance without which there could be no life. Philo was sensitive to these meanings and used them, himself, in very ordinary ways (Praem 144; Spec I.338). Certain conditions are necessary to assure proper breathing: there must be sufficient good air and breathing space (διαπνεύσασα). It has already been noted that the air was seen by Philo as a vital and superior element and that an identification between πνεῦμα and ἀήρ does not diminish the richness of his pneumatic concepts; but he was also aware that the air could be changed by God into a non-vital capacity. Some of the plagues were carried by the air: the hailstorm (Mos 114), the locusts (120); or by a combination of air and earth, ulcers (126). It is not unusual, therefore, for Philo to note the necessity of good air and sufficient breathing space if one is to live, and it is not unusual for him to associate poor breathing with tragedies. During the anti-Jewish riots, for example, Jews were rounded up and herded into small confining places where there was "insufficient space and air for breathing and the air lost its life-giving properties" (Legat 125); the Jews who reported the desecration of the temple by Gaius were "unable to get their breath" (Legat 188, 243). As a natural partner with the air, breath also functioned in speech: "breath from the seat of the ἡγεμονικόν is driven up through the wind-pipe and shaped in the mouth and mixed with air" (Immut 84). This last

usage is typically Stoic and derives from theories about the dominant principle, the vitality of the air and physical theories of sound.[11]

Just as the proper balance of breath and air insured life, improper balance resulted in breathlessness and eventual death; Philo used this ordinary observation to comment upon the spiritual life. He noted that it was theoretically possible to reach the goal of spiritual progress without stopping for breath, but not the norm (Fug 97). "It is difficult for runners to start on the road to piety and to finish without stumbling or pausing to take a breath" (Agr 177). It is interesting that Philo used the notion of pausing for breath in conjunction with unintentional sin, and perhaps it is making too much of the analogy to suggest that without sufficient πνεῦμα one cannot make the spiritual journey; it is clear in other places, however, that breathing space is necessary for the spiritual life.

Just as nature needs a breathing space (hibernation of plants in the winter, e.g., Immut 38), men who wish to pursue the spiritual life need some breathing space. One of the places which affords a breathing space, a retreat from the turmoil of ordinary living, is the temple (Spec I.69). It is interesting to compare the breathing space of the temple to the notion that life in general is like "an unsteady wind" (Spec II.71), a comparison which strengthens the Philonic illustration

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[11] The Stoics conceived of sound as "beaten air" which is a wave-theory explanation consistent with their continuum model of the universe. Sambursky, op. cit., pp. 138-140, notes that this theory is a concrete demonstration of the interaction of their theories of the ἡγεμονικόν pneumatic tension and the cosmos. He notes further that Philo adopted the theory to account for structural differences between organic and inorganic substances (Immut 35), correctly adapting the Stoic theory of tensional movement to describe a state of existence.

that life with God is one of gentle breezes, life-giving air and sufficient breathing space. It is interesting to note further that the concept of breathing space is often aligned with the need for pure air: the Therapeutae settled above the Mareotic Lake for security, but also because the pleasantly-tempered air (ἀέρος εὐκράσις) which arose from the mixture of sea breezes and light breezes from the lake, itself (Cont 22), was conducive to spiritual conduct. The concept of breathing space is an image of grace in Philo because it is an illustration of the vitality and support of the πνεῦμα . When one has the opportunity and space to partake of the πνεῦμα , he can make spiritual progress or advance morally, if he cooperates with it. The availability of breathing space, like the sending of the πνεῦμα itself, is not sufficient insurance for the moral life: the πνεῦμα can be refused. When the Egyptians were given respite (breathing space) from the plagues, for example, they used it to gain fresh strength for evil deeds (Mos I.106). Breathing space, pure air and gentle breezes were used by Philo as images of grace in some way; they were conceived by him as necessary for or signs of the spiritual life, but not sufficient without man's cooperation, to assure spiritual progress.

Nearly one quarter of Philo's usage of πνεῦμα as breath is the Stoic definition of cohesive bond where ἕξις is defined as breath ever returning to itself (Immut 35). His interest is not so much in Stoic theories of πνεῦμα as the connecting bond of the universe as in the possible applications of their pneumatology to his own theories of the spiritual life. He was interested in their theory of pneumatic tension and used it to warn his readers against letting their spiritual

forces relax (or lose their proper tension) (Cher 82). He followed Stoic doctrine carefully in relating πνεῦμα to the dominant part of the soul (Fug 182), and in describing πνεῦμα as a cohesive force in nature: "stones weaken and decay because of the weakness of their cohesiveness, that current of spirit force, that bond which is difficult to lose, but not unbreakable" (Aet 125). His main interest, however, lay in relating their concept of pneumatic tension to the moral life, an application they used continually. Philo's classic account of pneumatic tension and the moral life is in his commentary on Jacob wrestling the angel and having his hip dislocated. Philo says that Jacob received a most valuable prize, numbness, and that this prize was only a symbol of the real prize, viz., the numbing of arrogance and pride. What the incident means therefore is that Jacob had his conceit numbed. "Nothing is more profitable than this, i.e., the hampering of the freedom and laxity of the appetites, the vitalizing forces, the currents of spirit force (τόνοι πνεύματα) paralyzed so that the strength of the passions may be exhausted" (Praem 48). It is interesting to note there that Philo does not follow the Stoics to their doctrine of εὐπάθεια .[12] He is interested not in "happy passions" but exhausted passions or, best of all, no passions at all. Moses is the best possible example of the spiritual life for Philo because Moses achieved ἀπάθεια , the highest of the Stoic ideals (QE II.115). Moses' achievement meant that he was able to live in absolute conformity with nature, the ideal of Stoic ethics; but for Philo it also

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[12]See discussion above, p. 20.

meant that Moses was able to welcome the fullness of divine influence. Moses removed the passions to make room for God.[13]

The fourth main usage of πνεῦμα in Philo stands as a kind of borderline between the purely Greek or philosophical uses of the term and the biblical concept of πνεῦμα as inspirational and divine. There are 20 instances of the relation of πνεῦμα to the mind, soul or reason of man ranging from what appear to be normal Stoic definitions to a clever exegesis of biblical anthropology.

Philo defines the mind (νοῦς) as "breath, all warm and on fire (πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον)" (Fug 133) which is reminiscent of Zeno's definition of the soul as πνεῦμα ἔνθερμον .[14] In another place he says that thoughts (νοήματα) are generated by "the spirit force in the heart" (Spec I.6), a thought and phrasing which is clearly Stoic

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[13]Once Philo moved from the Stoic concept of pneumatic tension as it applied to the spiritual life to his own interpretation of ἀπάθεια (Leg All III.100-250), he did not utilize Stoic vocabulary again. Colson, in a note on Philo's allegory on Jacob and the angel notes that the application of τόνος to the moral life is unusual here (op. cit., VIII.340). I take it that he means the application of τόνος to the moral life in Philo is unusual since the interchangeability of τόνος , πνεῦμα , and ἕξις and their relation to the virtuous life is clearly established in Stoicism. Philo's interest here, as elsewhere, is the spiritual life. If the Stoic concept of tension benefits him, he uses it; if he develops what he believes to be a concept more in line with spiritual progress, he will (and did) drop the Stoic concept. The concept he developed was that of ἀπάθεια as symbolized by Moses and μετριοπάθεια , the tempering of the passions with reason, symbolized by Aaron. Aaron, says Philo, will have to struggle and fight to maintain good thoughts and deeds; he will have to actively oppose evil; Moses has effectively removed the struggle, made way for God and enjoys the contemplative life in its fullest degree (Leg All III.147). It is clear that these concepts are more in concert with Philo's biblically inspired spirituality than are the Stoic concepts of pneumatic tension.

[14]SVF I.35, II.787f. Philo was aware of the identification between πνεῦμα and ψυχή : he notes in Aet 111 that Heraclitus had identified the two.

since the dominant principle for the Stoics resided in the heart and could even be identified with πνεῦμα.[15] He made the same identification himself, saying that the dominant part in us is the rational spirit force within us, something shaped according to the archetypal form of the divine image (Spec I.171). Had Philo simply chosen to follow Stoic philosophy on these points, he could have been consistent within a specified framework; in his fidelity to the Mosaic Law, however, he was faced with contradictions in the Pentateuch, which led him to make what appear to be contradictory statements in his own writings.

Having given some definitions of mind, he asks in another place if one can really define or describe the dominant mind: "Can we really comprehend the dominant mind? Not at all. For what do we suppose it to be essentially? Breath, or blood, or body? No, it is incorporeal" (Somn I.30). This is a strong statement for Philo, that the mind is incorporeal and it is based upon the sharp distinction which permeates his writings between heavenly and earthly things. Heavenly things are consistent, orderly, light, intelligent, influential, active while earthly things are changing, mutable, disorderly, obscure, somatic, passive. Man for him was a mixture of heaven and earth, a heavenly plant. Philo cannot therefore give an absolute definition of mind; it is the heavenly within us, mysterious and incorporeal. What is clear to him from Stoic philosophy is that the mind is somehow related to πνεῦμα and very much bound to the notion of life. But this, itself, presented problems for him since Moses had said in some places that the

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[15] SVF II.838.

essense of life is blood, and in others that the essence of life is breath (Deter 80). His interpretation is based upon his beliefs that 1) the essence of true life is πνεῦμα and 2) Moses would not contradict himself: the passages where Moses claimed that blood is the essence of life mean something entirely different:

> the faculty we share with irrational creatures is blood, but to the faculty which streams forth from the fountain of reason, breath has been assigned; not moving air, but as it were, an impression stamped by the divine power to which Moses gives the appropriate title, image (Deter 83).[16]

One of the interesting facets of Philo's arguments at this juncture is his citation of Genesis 2.7 to support his position. The LXX translation was faithful in this verse to the Hebrew: God breathed into man the n^{e}shamah hayyim (not the ru'ah hayyim) becomes in Greek πνοὴ ζωῆς. Philo, however, cites the text with πνεῦμα ζωῆς (Deter 81). It is curious on the one hand because in another place he made an issue of the fact that Moses did not say πνεῦμα ζωῆς (Leg All I.34, 42).[17] One explanation for the pattern of his arguments and the knowing misquotation of Genesis 2.7 is that he was trying to buttress a valuable philosophic concept with the authority of the word of God in the Torah. In a context so large, the literal meaning of the words do

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[16] It is important here to note that πνεῦμα is characterized by Philo as an impression which is more than a static concept. J. Laporte thinks of it as a "vocational term" i.e., that the image is the vocation to praise God (see Eucharistia in Philo (Paris, 1972). It is significant therefore that Philo used the term, πνεῦμα; if he wanted to use a static term to express himself he could have chosen, perhaps, ψυχή.

[17] See below, p. 75.

not appear to him to be so significant. What was important to him was laying the groundwork for his next assertion:

> God is the archetype of rational existence, while man is a copy and likeness. By "man" I do not mean the living creature with two natures, but the highest form in which the life shows itself. And this has received the title of mind (νοῦς) and reason (λόγος). This is why Moses says that blood is the life of the flesh, but man's life he names breath (πνεῦμα) giving the title not to the composite mass, but to that God-like (θεοειδές) creation with which we reason (Deter 84).

In this fourth usage of πνεῦμα in Philo one can see the difficulties involved in an interpretation of his thought. He has shown a willingness to use philosophic concepts which go beyond the sense and purpose of Scripture while at the same time rejecting anything which offends his scriptural frame of reference. In choosing πνεῦμα as the essence of life he moved closer to his own religious doctrine, clearly dissociated πνεῦμα from the element, air, and related it (as the Stoics had done) to reason; all this while investing it with the richness of his Hebrew anthropology, viz., that man was made in the image of God. This usage shows to some extent the problems and challenges he faced as a religious philosopher and the ingenuity with which he met them. As a starting point for his own doctrine of πνεῦμα which began to grow more freely in the biblical usages of πνεῦμα as prophetic spirit and divine spirit, these passages can be recalled and isolated as a transition point.

The fifth main usage of πνεῦμα in Philo is in relation to the prophetic spirit, a usage which occurs 13 times in Philo's works. It recalls the charismatic use of ru'ah as a sudden, temporary gift from God to individual men, but it is interpreted often by philosophical

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concepts. "What greater dwelling place is there for God than the vision-seeking mind . . . which has a wish to hear the voice of the invisible spirit?" (Somn 252). The notion of vision-seeking mind is not biblical; the "visible voice" is suggested to him by scripture, but his interpretation is that the voice of God, in addition to being mysterious, has the dignity of the first sense, i.e., the certitude of sight, a philosophical concept. Many of his references to the prophetic spirit are entirely faithful to the biblical notion of charismatic spirit: Moses is "filled with the divine spirit . . . chosen to be the interpreter of God's sacred utterances" (Decal 175); he became possessed (Mos I.175); the divine spirit "fell upon him" and he predicted his own death (Mos II.291). Under the inspiration of God Moses had courage (Mos I.77) and performed deeds for the nation. He was a leader and king by virtue of the nobility of his soul and the magnanimity of his spirit; his spirit was most pure (Mos II.40) and even divine (Gig 24). The interpretation of the prophetic spirit and its action, however, are often colored by philosophical reference points: inspiration concerns the mind: it is the mind (νοῦς) which is filled with the breath of inspiration (Heres 184). More importantly, however, inspiration is directly related to Philo's anthropological views: Moses, he says, "did not make the substance of the mind depend upon anything created, but represented it as breathed upon by God" (Heres 56). It is not surprising that the word for inspiration and that for breathed upon are the same, καταπνεύσθεις . If God put his breath into man at the beginning, if He breathes upon man in inspiration and chooses man to be a prophet, there is a clear precedent for spiritual progress,

especially since one of the descriptions Philo gives of prophet is "friend of God" (Mos I.155). There are several types of inspiration in Philo, most of which relate to the spiritual life. There is Judah, who is inspired to praise God (Plant 134-36); Hannah who is inspired with grace (Immut 5) even to the point where she appears to be drunken or crazy (Ebr 145f); Isaac, a type of the perfect, who was showered with the "gifts of God, conveyed [to him] by the breath of God's higher graces" (Congr 38); and Balaam who was inspired in spite of himself and blessed the Hebrews when he had been hired to curse them (Mos I.258-300). The type of inspiration which has a primacy, however, is that of Moses. As a prophet Moses receives many visions, is visited by the prophetic spirit on occasion and thus enjoys the temporary presence of the charismatic spirit; but Moses also possesses a permanent inspiration directly linked to Philo's conception of the spiritual life: ἀπάθεια . By ridding himself of passions, Moses is able to welcome the full force of the divine influence and to commune with God in a permanent fashion.

The sixth main usage of πνεῦμα in Philo is similar to that of the ru'ah Yahweh, the divine spirit. The fact that this concept is not Greek does not hinder Philo from interjecting philosophic concepts into the notion so that one finds here the same willingness to draw from both worlds in order to enrich his concept of πνεῦμα . As divine spirit πνεῦμα occurs 52 times in Philo's writings and applies to four general areas of meaning: the constitution of man, the substance of the soul, the prophetic spirit and the nature of the divine spirit itself.

Half the references to the divine spirit are connected with the constitution of man and support the belief suggested to Philo by

Scripture that man is a mixture of earth and divine breath. Before he could develop his ideas about πνεῦμα and the constitution of man, however, he had to comment upon the absence of the word, πνεῦμα , in Genesis 2.7. It has already been noted[18] that Philo felt free to misquote this passage when he was involved in establishing πνεῦμα as a basic constituent of man; it is interesting to see how he made his distinctions about it, and why he felt he no longer needed them. In the first book on the allegorical laws Philo takes pains to explain why Moses did not say πνεῦμα when describing the constitution of man. Philo quotes Genesis 2.7 correctly, notes that the word, πνεῦμα , had already appeared earlier in the text (1.2) which demonstrates that Moses knew the word, and notes that Moses deliberately chose not to use it in describing the creation of man (Leg All I.34). The choice against πνεῦμα indicates to Philo that there is a crucial difference between it and πνοή :

> Πνεῦμα is conceived of as connoting strength and vigor and power while πνοή is like an air, or a peaceful and gentle vapor. The mind that was made after the image and original [the mind of the ideal man, or archetype] might be said to partake of πνεῦμα for its reasoning faculty possesses robustness; but the mind that was made out of matter [the man formed from the earth] must be said to partake of the light and less substantial air (Leg All I.42).

Leaving aside for the moment the philosophical categories Philo is involved in here, one must ask which view is most representative of his thinking: the one which misquotes Genesis 2.7 and establishes the πνεῦμα as the anthropological basis for his religious psychology, or

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[18] See above, p. 71.

the one which treats the text literally and explains the absence of πνεῦμα in the creation of man. Since the Legum Allegorium I is the only place he takes pains to explain the absence of πνεῦμα, and since by design, the treatise focused on a close interpretation of the text, it is clear that the view expressed in other places, viz., that the πνεῦμα is sent to man at creation, is more particularly Philo's view. In the first place, he used πνεῦμα as the foundational concept of his religious psychology which he based directly on his anthropology; in the second place, every other remark about πνεῦμα[19] and the constitution of man supports his belief that God breathed His own πνεῦμα into man at creation. Even in the Legum Allegorium I, in the precise place he made so much of the absence of πνεῦμα, he prefaced his remarks with these observations:

> God breathes into man for two reasons: to display His wealth, goodness and generosity, and to give man the power to know the good . . . to give man the responsibility for his own actions. Now breathing implies three things: that which inbreathes, which is God; that which receives, which is the mind; and that which is inbreathed, which is the πνεῦμα. And there is a union of these three for the express purpose that we form or begin to form a conception of God. How could the soul conceive of God if He had not breathed into it . . . man cannot venture to God unless drawn to Him (Leg All I.36-38).

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[19] Note for example that he is willing to cite Genesis 2.7 correctly, with πνοὴ ζωῆς when he is arguing that the essential substance of the rational soul is divine spirit (Spec IV.123). This indicates that his own position was so strong on the matter that the word distinction was not necessary for him. In another place he was willing to confront the words of Scripture themselves, and even, to some extent, the sense of Scripture. Commenting on Genesis 2.7 he says "the man who was moulded as by a potter was formed out of the dust of the earth in respect to the body and he received a spirit when God breathed life into his face" (QG I.4). This assertion is at odds with his exegesis of the same passage in the Legum Allegorium I and with the words of Scripture.

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One has to conclude, therefore, that the distinction between πνεῦμα and πνοή is not crucial for Philo. He is interested in establishing an anthropological basis for his theology of the spiritual life which combines the transcendent divinity of the Scripture with the contemplative powers of man gifted with the spirit of God. It is important to him to distinguish between the mind which was made by God and which occupies the highest place in man, and the spirit which is sent from God as an impression of divinity (Deter 81-84); but what is basic to his views on the divine spirit and the constitution of man is that man has an innate capability for spiritual progress which is stamped on him by God himself. "The human body was formed by the hand of God . . . man was judged worthy to receive his soul not from any other created thing, but through the πνεῦμα of God, imparting His own power in such measures as mortal nature could receive it" (Virt 203).

The belief that man was a mixture of the divine and the human meant for Philo that man stood "in the borderland between mortal and immortal nature" (Opif 135). The borderland image is a good one because it allows speculation in both directions which can serve his interests in the spiritual life. On the one hand man aspires to wisdom and is called upwards[20] since those who receive the πνεῦμα of God not only crave Him, but have the power to see Him.[21] On the other hand, man is flesh, and "flesh is the chief cause of ignorance" (Gig 29). Because

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[20]"for it accords with God's ways that those who have received His downbreathing should be called up to Him" (Plant 23).

[21]"The Creator wrought for the body a soul which was not capable by itself of seeing the Maker; but seeing that it would be an advantage to see (since this sight determines happiness and blessedness) He breathed into him from above of His own Deity" (Deter 86).

of the flesh, the spirit of man is not an abiding spirit, it cannot cohabitate with ignorant, mortal, weak human nature very long. This assertion does not bind Philo to a pessimistic view of the presence of the divine spirit to man, but leads him to suggest remedies: if the divine spirit cannot abide long with flesh, then, to insure the abiding presence of the spirit, one must put the flesh aside. "One kind of man only does the spirit aid with its enduring presence, he who has an unhampered mind and comes naked to God" (Gig 53). This is the message of Philo's religious psychology, a message he saw clearly suggested in Scripture where God breathed His own spirit into man at creation.

When Philo speaks about the divine spirit and the substance of the soul he is consistent with his views about the πνεῦμα itself and the substance of the soul; the difference is only in a more clearly stated assertion that the πνεῦμα which is the essence of the rational soul is the πνεῦμα of God. Nothing new occurs in this usage, therefore, only a more direct witness to the fact that the spirit is sent from God and is divine, so that the part of man which is his highest part, his soul, shares in divinity.

When Philo links the divine spirit with the prophetic spirit, however, he does move into new concepts and beyond the ordinary charismatic sense of the ru'ah. The action of the divine spirit in man is more than a temporary presence of God enabling the prophet to perform deeds for the nation; it is comparable to but more than philosophical concepts of ecstacy or frenzy. The divine prophetic spirit

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is conceived of by Philo as a special gift, not a constituent part of the human personality; it does not elevate the mind, but replaces it: "the mind is evicted by the arrival of the divine spirit" (Heres 265). When the divine spirit comes to a man, even the man's voice is no longer under his own control: "reason withdraws and relinquishes its place to the divine spirit which plays upon the vocal organism and dictates words which clearly express the prophetic message" (Spec IV.49). The gift of the divine prophetic spirit, therefore, is a divine possession which brings with it such an abundance of superior knowledge and light that all natural knowledge pales and flees before it. Charismatic prophecy, however, is not the only function of the prophetic spirit. The divine spirit sent to a man transforms him; when it was breathed upon Abraham, he became noble (Virt 217). Its temporariness is bound to the flesh/spirit dichotomy; but it has already been noted that Philo uses that dichotomy to encourage men to lead more "spiritual" lives. The prophetic spirit is temporary as a spirit of charismatic prophecy, and it is temporary as an inspiration for the spiritual life, but it is also capable of staying with those who can divest themselves of the things of the earth and approach God more directly. It is important to recall that one of the bases of Philo's religious psychology is that God proportions Himself to man; God gives Himself freely and generously and in accordance with what man desires and can sustain. That which determines how man will react to God is man himself and his response to the initial gestures from God in creation: if he responds favorably, if he can control the flesh and petition God for more of a share in Himself, he will not be denied. Philo is sure of this because man is made in

the image of God, and shares in God already through the divine essence of his own superior faculties.

> Of supreme importance for human beings is the recognition that their own highest faculties are Divine gifts . . . man's spiritual nature in its supreme aspects is the inbreathing of the breath of God, and conscience in a very real sense is the energy of the Divine Logos actually present in the soul.[22]

The prophetic spirit, therefore, is the gift of the divine spirit sent even more directly to those who wish to pursue and sustain the spiritual life.

What is the divine spirit? This is a key question for Philo in his religious psychology and he appears to be aware of it. All the applications he makes to anthropology, prophecy, the substance of the soul, the spiritual life and religious psychology contribute to a complex doctrine. Philo gives three possible interpretations for the meaning of the phrase

> It is used in one sense for the air which flows up from the land, the third element which rides upon the water, and thus we find in the Creation story, "the spirit of God was moving above the water" (Gen 1.2) . . . in another sense it is the pure knowledge in which every wise man naturally shares. The prophet shows this in speaking of the craftsman and artificer of the sacred works. God called up Bezaleel, he says and "filled him with the divine spirit, with wisdom, understanding and knowledge to devise every work" (Exod 31.2f). In these words we have suggested a definition of what the spirit of God is. Such a divine spirit, too, is that of Moses which visits the seventy elders that they may excel others and be brought to something better--those seventy who cannot be in real truth even elders if they had not received a portion of that spirit of perfect wisdom (Gig 22-25).

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[22] Kennedy, op. cit., p. 146.

The statement is, in some ways, a recapitulation of all that Philo says about the πνεῦμα; but with the qualification, divine, an affirmation of its origin and power. He suggests that the divine spirit may be air, which, as noted, is one of the primary meanings of πνεῦμα , and one which Philo treated with respect. Here, however, he links that possibility with the verse in Genesis about the spirit (or breath) of God hovering over the waters and exerting a kind of mastering function over primary chaos. The association attests to the vitality of the air, but it goes beyond that to the notion of a cosmic divine influence. While Philo suggests, therefore, that the spirit of God might be the air he implies that it is surely more than the air. The cosmic association is at once a demonstration of the power of the spirit and a groundwork upon which to build his anthropology around the microcosm/macrocosm analogy.[23] The second possibility he suggests is that the spirit of God might be pure knowledge.[24] Philo points here to one of the fruits of the spirit, wisdom; but it would dilute his doctrine of πνεῦμα to conclude that he wished to make a simple equation between spirit and wisdom or knowledge. The spirit of God is divine, and the gift of the spirit is an influx of God, Himself, into man in some fashion. It brings with it "an understanding of a higher order" but its most important function is that it permits man to share in the life of God in some way; it is an extension of the anthropological gift of life, the way God provides for those who wish to make their way to Him (Leg All I.38). The third possibility Philo offers is that the divine spirit is

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[23] See below p.

[24] In another place Philo says clearly: "the divine spirit is not a movement of air but intelligence and wisdom" (QG I.90).

the same one possessed by Moses and transferred from him to the seventy elders. The context of the story of the seventy elders (Numbers 11) leads one to conclude that Philo is here defining the divine spirit as the charismatic spirit which inspired an outburst of prophetic frenzy, and which helps the elders to maintain the community; but Philo's own interpretation of the incident shows that he intends to go beyond the scriptural context. He says that the divine spirit visits them so that "they may excel others and be brought to something better." The fact that he has already equated this spirit with the spirit of Moses indicates that the divine spirit is that supernatural gift which can lead men to perfection in the spiritual life (as it has led Moses to perfection in the spiritual life). The divine spirit which abides with Moses gives him a share in divine life: this is Philo's doctrine of the spirit at its richest. In describing the spirit in its relation to Moses Philo went beyond the charismatic spirit of the Pentateuch to a concept of divine spirit as a supernatural gift which can abide in some men and which functions in the moral and intellectual life. The spirit of God so sent brings with it an understanding of a superior order; the implication is that those who receive it may "excel others." Since it could not abide long with the flesh, man was called upon to detach himself from the world if he wished to retain it, to put his trust in God and to follow the promptings of the spirit; if he did so, if he could allow the πνεῦμα of God to operate within him, he could approach divinity and the vision of God which is surely the "something better" Philo alludes to for the elders.

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The divine spirit, therefore, is a divine influence, active and vital like the air but greater than the air; it is the same as the spirit of God which hovered over primal chaos and brought order to it. It inspires man with wisdom and knowledge by giving him an even greater share in divinity than he received at creation when God breathed into him. It is the gift of divine life to those who aspire to the vision of God; it is expansive and vivifying. Perhaps the most important point in Philo's doctrine of the spirit is that the gift of the spirit was not conceived by him as something reserved for the few, but as something freely and universally given. The anthropological basis of his religious psychology is not just a starting point for him, it is a strong assertion that the spirit is given to all men at least as the gift of life and in such a way that all men can respond to it freely; if they spurn the gift of the spirit, it is because they choose evil (Deter 122); God always bestows the gift of the spirit freely (Leg All I.34). Man's inability to detach himself from the world, however, means that in the practical order only a few benefit from the special gifts of the divine spirit: it is these few who make up the wise or "the perfect" in Philo. The fruit of the divine spirit is divine life, a real friendship with God, for when the spirit is allowed to penetrate man fully, he is able to please God by following only those things which are pleasing to God (Opif 144).

In my discussion of Philo I have made it appear as if there were some kind of temporal sequence in his developing concept of πνεῦμα This is an artificial but necessary device; were I to have discussed πνεῦμα in each particular treatise I would have been bound to the

unsystematic approach of Philo himself and unable to clarify it. The uses which appear in this chapter were representative and the structure imposed on them did not change them in any way. For a complete listing of the instances and uses of the word πνεῦμα in Philo, one should consult the appendices where I have catalogued his usage according to treatise and according to meaning.

CHAPTER V

ROLE OF THE Πνεῦμα IN COSMOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

Philo's cosmological writings are "occasional" rather than systematic but there are enough cosmological references or speculations to justify speaking of a Philonic cosmology.[1] Philo was true to his milieu; his cosmology is eclectic and in many respects unoriginal and uninteresting but his motivation for choosing some doctrines and rejecting others commands attention. The symbolic substructure of Philonic cosmology is rich precisely because his interests lay in religious psychology, not in science;[2] his cosmological tenets were chosen not on the basis of their physical-scientific relevance, but on the basis of their significance for the spiritual life. It is important to recall that Philo was primarily an exegete living in a philosophical climate. His sources were Scripture and philosophy, but his

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[1] Nearly every major Philonic scholar has written on his cosmology with an eye to possible sources. Most helpful here were the studies of Émile Bréhier, Les Idées Philosophiques et Religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie (Paris, 1925), pp. 158-175; and H. A. Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Harvard, 4th printing revised, 1968), I.295-325.

[2] It is difficult to separate the two as Sambursky notes in his chapter, "The Interdependence of Things," op. cit., pp. 158-184. "The main channels for the dissemination of science and scientific concepts were the philosophical schools which so deeply influenced the culture of the Ancient World" (158). The interrelation of science and philosophy of religion arose almost naturally from the fact that phenomena were initially explained mythically and that even in later scientific periods, mythical explanations were not totally abandoned. The theory of the four elements, for example, was based upon a mythical view that there was an inherent hostility between certain primary opposites. As F. M. Cornford notes, the primacy of the four elements is "obvious" to Aristotle because the theory of the four elements had a long history stretching back into the mythical epoch (Principium Sapientiae, Cambridge, 1952).

criterion was piety, the respect paid to God as transcendent, as the creator, providential God of Moses. The chief problem for him therefore is the problem of God; any cosmological anthropological, prophetic or spiritual doctrine which involves God in such a way that it negates God's transcendence, or makes man the measure of all things in some way will be attacked by him. On the other hand, problems which have no clear scriptural solution (e.g., the substance of the soul: Moses says in one place that it is breath and in another that it is blood), are taken by Philo to be open questions, problems which can be debated with the help of Scripture and philosophy as long as the criterion of piety is maintained as a standard. It is within this framework that Philo worked out his cosmology.

The two directly cosmological treatises of Philo are the De Opificio Mundi and the De Aeternitate Mundi; the first is an expository treatise written for Gentiles and not intended to deliver the depth and mystery of Philo's allegorical writings,[3] and the second is an incomplete and probably early work intended to confute the Stoic view of periodic conflagration.[4] What is missing is a serious, mystical-allegorical treatment of cosmology; the Legum Allegorium begins with a commentary on Genesis 2, a disappointing fact which supports the hypothesis that the real book one is lost.[5] Since the allegorical books provide a verse-by-verse meditation designed for those already on the

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[3]This is the view of Goodenough, Introduction to Philo Judaeus (rev. ed., Oxford, 1962), p. 35. He says in another place "it is obvious that Philo wrote the De Opificio to demonstrate that the cosmogony and philosophy of Moses was taught by the Platonic and Neo-Pythagorean philosophers" (By Light, Light, p. 121).

[4]Colson, op. cit., IX.172-183.

[5]For a discussion about this, see Bréhier, op. cit., pp. i-vii.

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paths of spiritual progress and would surely have given Philo's most esoteric and richest interpretation of the cosmic order, the loss is a serious one. Oddly enough the Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesin also begin with chapter two of Genesis which means that there is no systematic commentary on the literal and allegorical meanings of the scriptural questions which arise verse by verse in chapter one of Genesis. Since the richer parts of Philonic cosmology are scattered throughout his writings, it is necessary to impose a kind of order on it which it does not have by itself: I will give a brief resumé of his cosmology from the De Opificio and discuss the role of the πνεῦμα, and then proceed to questions relevant to his doctrine of πνεῦμα: the ether, the soul of the world, and the λόγος.

Goodenough calls the De Opificio a "cosmological introduction" and says that it should be read as a tour de force by which Philo shows Gentile readers just how much hellenistic cosmology he can read out of (or into) the first three chapters of Genesis.[6] Philo used cosmology as a device to link his system to the established world order, to ground the Law of Moses on the structure of the created order and in so doing ground his own exegesis and religious psychology on an inexpungable base.[7]

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[6] Introduction, p. 35.

[7] It is Cornford's suggestion that Plato's primary interest and intention in the Timaeus was morality and politics, not physical speculation and that "the chief purpose of the cosmological introduction is to link the morality externalized in the ideal society to the whole organization of the world. True morality is not a product of human evolution, still less the arbitrary enactment of human wills. It is an order and harmony of the soul; and the soul itself is a counterpart, in miniature, of the soul of the world, which has an everlasting order and harmony of its own, instituted by reason." See Plato's Cosmology (London, 1937), p. 6. It is reasonable that Philo's intentions were similar; he certainly shows no compelling interest in physics per se and is clearly motivated by and interested in the problems of God and the world as they relate to the progress of the human soul.

Philo relied heavily upon Plato's Timaeus for his cosmology[8] but did not follow him slavishly. He says in one place that the Platonic view is the same one that is found in Moses (Aet 19) by which he means to commend the view that the world was created and is imperishable. He adapted the Platonic "father and maker of the universe" to resemble the creator God of Moses by repeatedly emphasizing the creative and providential role and nature of the "father and maker of the universe." He adapted the Platonic account of the world of forms and ideas to the delineation in Genesis of the first days of creation by positing a God transcendent to the forms who created the ideas. He agrees with Plato that the world was created and reveals a purposeful order and he adds to this that the world was created out of the goodness of a God who is the loving and providential God of Moses.[9] Whatever choices or adaptations Philo made in constructing his cosmology were directed by his piety and intention to build a theology of the spiritual life, and one can move easily back and forth from cosmology to religious psychology.

The cosmology of the De Opificio can be summarized briefly: it begins with the creation of the universe as Moses did which shows that Moses

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[8] Bréhier, op. cit., pp. 158-175.

[9] It is the position of Goodenough, Introduction, p. 38, that Philo introduced the notion of the fatherhood of God. He interprets Philo's insistence on God's providence as God caring for the world as a father cares for his children which, says Goodenough, is an important concept and Jewish in origin. "God the father in pagan tradition was, like God the Father in the Apostles' Creed, 'the almighty creator of heaven and earth.' He was the Begetter, first Cause, not the kindly guide and protector for his offspring. To introduce the new conception of divine fatherhood was a most important change, and in the course of reading Philo it will become apparent that it is one of the essential survivals of Judaism in its mingling with pagan ideas."

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> surpassed all other lawmakers. For while some have begun at once with legislation, others with myths, Moses presents at the outset the place of Law in the universe, and the fact that one who obeys the true Law is thereby living in accord with nature and nature's God. The ultimate is twofold (8), active Cause and passive object. The Active Cause, God, transcends all things, even virtue, the beautiful and the good. But this transcendent Being is at the same time the cause of all created things . . . the fact that the world must have had an origin is argued after the reasoning of Plato in the Timaeus. The two biblical stories of creation are then discussed in detail. The creation in seven days described in the first chapter of Genesis is to Philo the creation of the ideal world (16), the Platonic pattern of the material world. The first creation being immaterial is also nonspatial, and existed in the divine reason or Logos as an architect's plan takes its first and most important formation in the architect's mind (17-22). But in applying this perfect creation to matter, God was from the first limited by the limitations of matter itself, the ultimate passive object. The perfect creation was itself the Logos of God (24f) and the days of creation could not represent time, for time, as Plato had said, came into existence only with the movement of the heavenly bodies in space. The number of days of the first ideal creation then represents the order of, or within, the ideal world . . . much attention is given to the numerological force of each of the numbers from one to seven, and the appropriateness of what was done on each day. . . .[10]

The material for Philo's cosmology was furnished to him by Scripture and mediated by him through an eclectic, general cosmology available in his milieu. His criterion is piety which suggests not only the transcendence of God, but the created nature of the cosmos; it was the opposition between heaven and earth which he continually emphasized in his cosmology, anthropology and philosophy of the spiritual life. In a long but very beautiful passage one can see how his doctrines flow together:

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[10] Ibid., p. 36.

> The sun and moon and the whole heaven stand out in such clear and plain distinctness because everything there remains the same and regulated by the standards of truth itself moves in harmonious order and with the grandest of symphonies; while earthly things are brimful of disorder and confusion and in the fullest sense of the words discordant and inharmonious, because in them deep darkness reigns while in heaven all moves in most radiant light, or rather heaven is light itself most pure and unalloyed. And indeed if one be willing to look into the inner realities he will find that heaven is an eternal day, wherein there is no night or any shadow, because around it shine without ceasing unquenchable and undefiled beams of light. And the same difference that there is here in people when asleep and when awake exists in the universe as a whole between the heavenly and earthly, for the former is kept in unsleeping wakefulness by active forces which do not err or stumble and go always aright, but the earthly life is sunk in sleep and even if it wakes up for a little is dragged down again and falls asleep, because it can see nothing steadily with its soul but wanders and stumbles about darkened as it is by false opinions which compel it to dream, and thus never catching up with realities it is incapable of apprehending anything firmly and securely (Jos 145-148).

The opposition between heaven and earth underlines the transcendence of God and, more importantly, set the stage for the anthropological significance of the πνεῦμα . The doctrine of πνεῦμα does not play a direct role in Philo's cosmology, but one is conscious of it in the background; once Philo establishes the providential creator of Moses as the true God of the universe and underlines His transcendence by his adaptation of some Platonic doctrines, he moves freely, via the macrocosm/microcosm analogy to anthropology where the gift of the πνεῦμα is the first stage of his doctrine of the spiritual life.

The Platonic doctrines Philo used and modified somewhat to underline the transcendence of God were the archetypal world and the Demiurge. The concept of the archetypal world had a religious

significance for Philo which was original.[11] In Plato the Forms were considered to be active principles which influence men's minds, in Aristotle they were reduced to forms of things with no independent existence, in Philo, however, they were forms of things which did have an existence in the upper world where they belonged to the mind of God. The relevance of the archetypal world was a philosophical question for Philo, but the problem which compelled his interest was creation: the archetypal world appeared to him to be an appropriate explanation for the creation of the world, it maintained God's transcendence and power and did nothing to detract from the dignity of the created order. In the process of adopting this view Philo made suggestions which supported his own views about divine transcendence. He accepts the microcosm/macrocosm analogy and notes that man can learn something about God from a study of himself:

> Your reason will show you that as there is mind in you so is there in the universe, and that as your mind has taken upon itself sovereign control of all that is in you, and brought every part into subjection to itself, so too He, that is endued with lordship over all, guides and controls the universe by the law and right of absolute sway (Migr 186).

He adds some distinctions, however, which strengthen his own views: our mind, he reminds us, has not created our body, "but the νοῦς of all things has brought the universe into existence" (Migr 193) and is thereby transcendent to it and uncontained by it (Congr 107). What is clear to Philo from both the microcosm/macrocosm analogy and the

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[11] There are differences of opinion about this and different approaches to an outline of Philo's theories about the archetypal world. The clearest and most appropriate to this discussion, and the one reflected in this explanation is that of Wolfson, op. cit., I.200-325.

witness of Scripture is that the mind of the universe, God, is above understanding (Opif 7-13). The Platonic Demiurge (Timaeus 29D-30C) presented a challenge to Philo. Cornford suggests that the Demiurge is a craftsman who operates upon materials he does not create and a mythic symbol, not really a creator god distinct from the universe he is represented as making.[12] The Demiurge is not an object of worship and not an omnipotent creator god; he does not create the forms, but only contributes an element of order. It is clear that the Demiurge cannot be equated with the God of the Bible who created the world from nothing and who exists as a supreme object of worship, yet it is equally clear that the Demiurge is a symbol of Divine reason: "the whole purpose of the Timaeus is to teach men to regard the universe as revealing the operation of such a Reason, not as the fortuitous outcome of blind and aimless bodily motions."[13] The question which arises logically is: if this Reason is not the creator-god, standing apart

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[12]He explains the Demiurge in terms of the concepts of Reason and Necessity, noting that in the Timaeus Reason can "persuade" Necessity (48A), and that Reason does not have unlimited power to compel. The Demiurge, therefore, is not an omnipotent creator, but one who designs things "as best as possible" which is to say that his purposes were restricted by the other factor, Necessity. To help support his contentions Cornford quotes Galen (De usu partium XI.14): "the doctrine of Moses differed from that of Plato and of all the Greeks who have correctly approached the study of Nature. For Moses, God has only to will to bring matter into order, and matter is ordered immediately. We do not think in that way; we say that certain things are impossible by nature and these things God does not even attempt; he only chooses the best among things that come about" (ibid., pp. 34-36).

[13]Ibid., p. 38.

from the world, what (or who) is? And where is he? Plato can afford to leave the question open. He had already made a major innovation in philosophy with the creator-god function of the Demiurge, urging in the process that there is no aspiration too high for man, even immortality (Tim 90C), and this, says Cornford, is the nucleus of his ethics:

> that man's reason is divine and that his business is to become like the divine by reproducing in his own nature the beauty and harmony revealed in the cosmos which is itself a god, a living creature, with soul in body and reason in soul.[14]

Plato does not have to speak about transcendence, or at least did not, but Philo cannot help speaking about it. Noticing this as a weakness in an otherwise attractive system, he responded by defining God more appropriately in his own cosmology as the God of Moses. He agrees with Plato that immortality is possible to those who desire to see the vision of higher things (QG IV.46), and that reason is the divine in man, but he rejects the aloofness of the Platonic God. Plato says that the "father and maker of the universe is hard to find, and having found him, it would be impossible to declare him to all men" (Tim 28C). Philo says that the father and maker is the God of Moses, transcendent to and qualitatively different from man, but providential and loving and responsive to him.

It is at this point where one can see the πνεῦμα clearly in the background. Plato indicates that it is the business of man to become like the divine by reproducing the cosmic order within himself; Philo follows very closely the idea that man has a duty to the inner

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[14] Ibid., p. 34.

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world of the soul, but he adds the crucial notion that this duty is possible to man because the transcendent God has breathed upon him, has rendered man capable of the spiritual life by sending His own πνεῦμα for man's benefit:

> the body was made through the Artificer taking clay and moulding out of it a human form, but the soul was originated from nothing created, but was from the Father and Ruler of all: for that which He breathed into it was nothing else than a πνεῦμα θεῖον that migrated hither from that blissful and happy existence for the benefit of mankind, to the end that, even if it is mortal in respect to its visible part, it may be rendered immortal in respect to its invisible part. Hence it may be said with propriety that man is the borderland between mortal and immortal nature . . . he was created at once moral and immortal, mortal in respect to the body, immortal in respect to the mind (Opif 135).

The role of the πνεῦμα in Philonic cosmology, therefore, is not immediate. It is sad that any commentary done by Philo on Genesis 1.2, the spirit (or breath) of God hovering over the waters and bringing order to primal chaos, has been lost. Philo's cosmological material was furnished to him by Scripture, and the role of the πνεῦμα in cosmology is most direct in Genesis 1.2; lack of additional material accounts for the relatively minor role of πνεῦμα in his cosmology. Scripture does furnish much about the λόγος, however, and insofar as there were concommitant functions of πνεῦμα and λόγος in some of the philosophical schools Philo was sensitive to, a brief look at the Philonic λόγος as it relates to his cosmology is appropriate.[15]

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[15]The most analytical treatment of the Philonic λόγος can be found in Wolfson, op. cit., I.226-282, 325-360. He treats the doctrine in conjunction with the doctrine of the Powers which is perhaps the most complicated feature in the Philonic corpus. Still, the analytical approach of Wolfson, complete as it is, fails to capture the vital and compelling spirit of the Powers. For an analysis which treats them in

The doctrine of the λόγος has much in common with the doctrine of πνεῦμα , and much in common with Stoic antecedents of λόγος and πνεῦμα. Philo calls the λόγος "the truly seminal substance of existing things" (QE II.68), which is surely Stoic vocabulary; and he says that the λόγος is that which gives distinction to all things (Heres 130-205), makes them what they are (QE II.122-124), and even "binds them together" (QE II.118). All these references to the λόγος appear to be an application of Stoic pneumatological functions to the biblical concept of the word of God. The application extends also to the divine attributes or descriptions of the Stoic πνεῦμα : Philo calls the λόγος "a second god" (Somn II.237), sharing most deeply in the divine characteristics, even to the point of being "unnamable"(Mut 15). The transference of function between πνεῦμα and λόγος was easy enough for Philo since there was an established interchange within the systems of Stoic philosophy,[16] and since the biblical concepts themselves allowed some confluence of function: one "ought not differentiate too

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the context of the spiritual life one should consult Goodenough, By Light, Light, pp. 11-48. For a discussion of the λόγος and its functions in relations to Stoicism see Bréhier, op. cit., pp. 83-112. One of the problems with the Philonic λόγος is that it encompasses so many functions, has so many names and seems inspired from so many sources that one is tempted to think of many λόγοι instead of one λόγος . It is the image of God, the charioteer of the Powers (Fug 101), the husbandsman of the universe (Plant 2), that which binds and holds the universe together (QE II.118) and the high-priest of the universe (Somn I.216), to name only some of the functions. Finding and defending the unity of the λόγος in Philo may well depend upon an energetic definition, i.e., a definition of the Powers as unsubstantialized but influential. The λόγος , therefore, being God's influence, efficient word, spiritual food, etc., could be everything from God to man according to man's ability to receive the divine energy.

[16]For a good discussion on this point and on the possible interrelation among Plato, the Stoics and Pythagoreans in Philo's synthesis see Bréhier, op. cit., pp. 83-112.

radically between 'spirit of Yahweh' and 'word of Yahweh.' Ps 33.6 (and possibly Gen 1) brings together the creative breath and the creative word."[17] It is clear, in any case, that Philo borrowed some Stoic vocabulary and some pneumatological functions delineated by Stoic philosophers; but the differences between his own views and Stoic views point out that his borrowing was pretty well limited to vocabulary and descriptive function. The Stoic λόγος like the Stoic πνεῦμα was considered to be a material principle.[18] Further, as identifiable with divinity, nothing could be thought to be superior to it. The Philonic λόγος on the other hand, was considered to be immaterial, "an extension of the pre-existent logos."[19] It did not intermingle with matter, but resided in things like a soul in a body, a divine energy extended from God to man, much like the πνεῦμα. While Philo called it a "second god" it is clear that it is not God nor even another deity, nor even a substance or being altogether separate from God; Philo's Scriptural basis and his criterion of piety for the transcendent God would not allow this. God is clearly superior to the λόγος in Philo; the λόγος was conceived of by him not as a divine person, but as the first stage of God's expression (Migr 5).

The concept of the soul of the world is an important consideration in Philo's cosmology and doctrine of πνεῦμα. It has been noted that Plato conceived of the world as a body animated by a world-soul, and that the Stoics posited a doctrine of πνεῦμα as the soul of the

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[17]P. van Imschoot, "L'esprit de Yahvé, source de vie dans l'Ancien Testament" in Revue Biblique 44 (1935), 494. Commenting upon this same problem, Hill, op. cit., p. 214, cites a study by J. Hehn (ZAW 43 [1925], 218f) which cites textual evidence to support a thesis that ancient near Eastern peoples thought of the breath and word of a god as identical, both producing life.

[18]Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, op. cit., p. 105.

[19]Wolfson, op. cit., I.327.

world, a cohesive, sustaining and distinguishing principle of the cosmos. Since there was no direct information on a soul of the world theory in Scripture, Philo considered it to be an open question with some valuable benefits for his doctrine of the spiritual life; he approached the question from indirect Scriptural evidence and his criterion of piety, and recast the problem in terms which were most helpful for his religious psychology.

In his treatise on the migrations of Abraham, Philo gives a resumé of Stoic doctrine[20] including the theory of the soul of the world:

> The Chaldeans . . . have set up a harmony between things on earth and things on high, between heavenly things and earthly. Following as it were the laws of musical proportion, they have exhibited the universe as a perfect concord or symphony produced by a sympathetic affinity between its parts, separated indeed in space, but housemaids in kinship. These men imagined that this visible universe was the only thing in existence, either being itself God or containing God in itself as the soul of the whole. And they made Fate and Necessity divine, thus filling human life with much impiety, by teaching that apart from phenomena there is no originating cause of anything whatever, but that the circuits of the sun and moon and of the other heavenly bodies determine for every being in existence both good things and their opposites (Migr 178-180.)

One can see the points in the description which Philo is compelled to oppose: his profound belief in a transcendent, providential God did not permit him to approve a soul of the world theory. His belief in

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[20]The passage refers to the Chaldeans who closely parallel the Stoics in many ways. The identity of the Chaldeans in Philo is complicated: they are mentioned often, always negatively, and usually appear to be Stoics. Jean Pepin, op. cit., however, demonstrates that much of the "Chaldean" doctrine opposed by Philo actually belongs to the young Aristotle in his lost treatise, De Philosophia. It was Pepin's work and the contribution of Festugière in Le Dieu Cosmique, op. cit., pp. 79-90, about the Platonic Demiurge as soul of the world which led Laporte, Eucharistia chez Philon, to clarify the problem in Philo.

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the influence of the heavens upon the earth, however, allowed him to situate the problem in a Scriptural context and evaluate it. In setting the problem within his treatise on the migrations of Abraham, Philo is consciously transferring the problems of Stoic harmony and the soul of the world to the language of Moses so that he can test it against his criterion of piety. Abraham leaves Chaldean doctrine and moves, in a series of allegorical migrations, to Socrates' principle of self-knowledge, to a realization of how mysterious even man is, i.e., to skepticism (which is a pre-condition to faith in Philo) and finally to faith. Once Abraham reaches the level of faith in God and puts his trust in Him, he hears the word of God. It is clear, however, that he knew something of God already: his journeys through cosmological speculation could and did bring him to a knowledge that God exists and cares for the world. Philo indicates by this that there is some value in the cosmological speculations of the Stoics, even in some ways in their soul of the world theory. After he describes the philosophy of the Stoics, he notes that some of it was acceptable to Moses:

> Moses, however, while he seems to confirm the sympathetic affinity of its parts displayed throughout the universe, is at variance with their opinion concerning God. He endorses the former doctrine by declaring the universe to be one and to have been made; for if it came into being and is one, it stands to reason that all its completed parts have the same elementary substances for their substratum, on the principle that interdependence of things is a characteristic which constitutes a unity. He differs from their opinion about God, holding that neither the universe nor its soul is the primal God, and that the constellations or their revolutions are not the primary causes of things that happen to men. No, he teaches that the complete whole around us is held together by invisible powers, which the Creator has made to reach from the ends of the earth to heaven's furthest bounds . . . and even though it be said . . . "God in heaven above

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> and on the earth below" (Deut 4.39), let no one suppose that He that is is spoken of, since the existent Being can contain, but cannot be contained (Migr 180-183).

Moses can accept the harmony of the cosmos,[21] the superiority of the heavens and the power of the heavens over the earth: this does not offend his basic principle of divine transcendence; but he cannot follow the theory about sympathy, fate and necessity to those conclusions which deny the divine transcendence and the fact that God created and caused all things.[22] What is clear is that the world was created by God and is one; the unity permits Moses to accept sympathy and heavenly

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[21] Note, e.g., quotation from De Josepho (p. 86f, above).

[22] The theory of cosmic sympathy is based on the tensional activity of the πνεῦμα as conceived by the Stoics. Sambursky, op. cit., pp. 141-144, situates it within the context of Stoic physics: the πνεῦμα and its tensile force which fill the whole cosmos are also the agents which create the unity and interconnection of its various parts . . . and make the structure of the entire cosmos orderly and harmonious: this order and harmony depend upon the existence of the πνεῦμα , therefore the tension of the πνεῦμα becomes a cosmic force. This extension of the function of the πνεῦμα to a wider sphere (the connection between various parts of the cosmos) was completed in Posidonius' doctrine, and a central feature in his doctrine was the concept of cosmic sympathy. It is Posidonius who is important here: Rist, op. cit., pp. 201-218, summarizes his contribution in this area as: positing a God distinct from nature who permeates the universe and gives it shape, and positing a world soul which is good and which influences man. The end of man therefore is cooperation with the rational in the cosmos. In contradistinction to earlier Stoic views, summarized by Rist as "follow nature," Posidonius says, "join the organization and order of nature where the only good is virtue." Philo may well have followed Posidonius' commentary on the Timaeus while structuring his cosmology in the De Opificio (Bréhier, op. cit., p. 97f). If he did, one can see how attractive parts of the developing Stoic view must have been to him; still, it offended his criterion of piety. The Stoic view was still pantheistic, the ability to progress was based upon a natural sympathy between man and the cosmos, fate and necessity were controlling features in the universe and in the lives of men. Philo had to reject this insofar as his God was the transcendent God of Scripture. The ability to progress was due entirely to the fact that God sent His own πνεῦμα to man so that man could begin to form a conception of Him (even though cosmological speculation led to some conclusions about Him), and God was the cause of things in the universe, not fate or necessity.

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influence, and it is partly his acceptance of this heavenly influence which explains his willingness to discuss the gift of God's πνεῦμα as a divine influence, capable of allowing man to participate in the fellowship of God, himself. Philo says that Moses was opposed to the theory of the soul of the world, but his explanation indicates that the opposition was to the soul of the world as the "primal God." This is probably Philo's view: his opposition to the soul of the world theory is in its functions as a God, especially as a God belonging to the world. This is the Stoic view and Philo opposes it consciously and vigorously.

A concept which also has implications for the doctrine of πνεῦμα in Philo and one which can be situated both in cosmological and anthropological discussions is that of the ether.[23] Philo believed that

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[23]The question of the ether, its relation to the soul of the world, its development in philosophy and its special place in the lost treatise of the young Aristotle, De Philosophia, all bear upon Philo, but not that directly upon the doctrine of πνεῦμα in Philo. The ether will be treated here as a link between cosmology and anthropology and Philo's criterion of piety will be the backdrop of the discussion. It should be noted, however, that the discussion here in no way touches the complexity of the problems involved. For a treatment of the differences and similarities between the ether and the "fifth nature" mentioned by Aristotle in De Philosophia and possibly used by Philo, see Anton-Hermann Chroust, "The Doctrine of the Soul in Aristotle's Lost Dialogue 'On Philosophy'" in The New Scholasticism 42 (1968), 364-373. It appears from Chroust's study that Aristotle at one time believed in "the spiritual nature of the soul . . . and the connaturality of man's soul with the divine or God" (364). The discussion in the article focuses upon the introduction by Aristotle of a "fifth element" or "fifth nature" which was unlike the four elements and not ether; but an intellectual and celestial substance. In an earlier article Chroust discussed the possibility that Aristotle believed in a personal God: "A Cosmological Proof from the Existence of God in Aristotle's Lost Dialogue 'On Philosophy'" (ibid., 40 [1966], 447-463). For an analysis of the treatise, De Philosophia and its relation to Aristotle's development, see W. Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development (Oxford, 1934), pp. 124-166. For the relationship between ether and the soul of the world, and the relationship between ether and Aristotle's fifth element, see Festugière, Le Dieu Cosmique, op. cit., pp. 79-90, 219-260; and Pepin, op. cit., pp. 126-171, 250-291. For a

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ether was the substance of the heavens and the substance of the human mind: "for among created things, that which is holy is, in the universe, the heavens . . . in man it is mind (νοῦς) a fragment of the Deity" (Somn I.34). Both were considered to be imperishable and holy, but neither was considered by him to have absolute power or dignity (Migr 179-181) since absolute power and holiness were reserved for God alone. The "divinity" of the heavens and of the human mind gave each privileged status, but it carried with it some responsibilities:

> Each of these heavens and the human mind seems to me to be correctly spoken of as "for praise." For it is in the heaven and in the mind that the capacity resides to set forth in solemn strains hymns of praise and blessing in honor of the Father who is the author of our being. For man is the recipient of a privilege which gives him distinction beyond other living creatures, namely worshipping Him that is; while heaven is ever melodious, producing, as the heavenly bodies go through their movements, the full and perfect harmony (Somn I.35).

The differences between heaven and the mind lay not in obligations to praise[24] but in the abilities to do so, and those abilities were bound to Philo's theories about the ether and the πνεῦμα .

In order to praise God and to return to Him, man needs the gift of the πνεῦμα ; the heavenly bodies do not, they praise God almost by nature since they live in the ether (Plant 14). The heavenly bodies are made of ether (Somn I.145) which is the purest of substances (Mos II.154) and do not need the gift of the πνεῦμα because they take their goodness, and their life from the ether. The mind of man, however,

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synthesis of the ether/soul of the world problem and its proper situation within Philo's doctrines, see Laporte, op. cit.

[24]The whole created order has an obligation to praise God. "It is a fitting life work for the world to praise its Maker constantly" (Heres 200); "It is most fitting for all creation to give thanks" (Plant 130).

does not live in the ether, but on earth, and thus needs a source of divine energy in order to fulfill obligations to praise God: the divine energy sent to man's mind is the πνεῦμα of God. The πνεῦμα then gives man the opportunity to live in the πνεῦμα as the heavenly bodies live in the ether.

Both the ether and the πνεῦμα sustain life, both are related to divinity and allow participation in the spiritual life; but the ether is a heavenly substance, not a divine energy belonging to God and sent to man out of His love. Both the ether and the πνεῦμα have a notion of immortality bound to them; ether because it is the substance of the heavens which are imperishable and the πνεῦμα because it gives man the gift of divine life, because it is the image of God stamped on the mind. Curiously Philo describes the substance of the soul as ether: "the body then has been formed out of the earth, but soul is of ether, a particle detached from the Deity" (Leg All III.161); but he follows the description immediately with a reference to the πνεῦμα : "for God breathed into his face a breath of life[25] and man became a living soul" (ibid). The pairing is significant and demonstrates that Philo thought the πνεῦμα to be at least as divine and vital as the ether.[26]

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[25]This is one of the places where Philo misquotes Genesis 2.7 to support his anthropological foundations. It is not out of place to suggest that the word ether in the sentence may have caused him to do this. Still, the misquotation itself is not that significant (see above p. 71f).

[26]When Philo defines air and πνεῦμα together it does not diminish his notion of πνεῦμα , but says that πνεῦμα is at the very least like the air (see above, p. 59f). The same is true of the association between the ether and the πνεῦμα . Ether is not comparable with earthly things; it is created and mysterious and sustains life in its highest forms. It is associated with heaven and called "holy fire" (Conf 156) or the "purest of all substances" (Mos II.154). Ethereal sight is said to be "celestial, pure and full of light" (Heres 87f); and it is a sign of a spiritual outlook to gaze upwards or "to

The concept which gives form to Philo's references to ether as they relate to the πνεῦμα is his doctrine of the spiritual life. Whether he describes the substance of the soul as ether or as πνεῦμα , he means to say that man has the full range of the cosmos within him and that the presence of the heavenly obliges him and moves him in some way to return to heavenly regions. The body is described in Scripture as having been formed out of the earth; Philo says it is composed of the four elements in some way (Heres 282); "but the soul whose nature is intellectual and celestial will depart to find a father in the ether, the purest of substances." Ether is connected with the spiritual life not as a means, but as an end; human destiny is to belong forever to the heavenly sphere enjoying a life of contemplation. The mind gifted with the πνεῦμα can reach out to the ether and enjoy contemplation (Gig 62). To attempt to reach ethereal regions without the gift of the πνεῦμα , however, is folly: the Chaldeans claim to be able to "lay hold of the ether" by means of astronomy, a means Philo clearly repudiates (Somn I.54). In a long and beautiful passage in his cosmological treatise, Philo describes the mind in a way which could be suitably discussed under any of his doctrines: one can find in it

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have a mind or soul reaching up to the ether" (Mut 72). From the "ethereal regions" man can know that there is a Father and Maker (Spec III.187) and those who wish to receive the "heavenly, incorruptible food of the soul which delights in vision" should "extend their vision to the ether" (Heres 79). It is the πνεῦμα of God sent to and accepted by man which makes it possible for Philo to interchange images and words. Since his sources are Scriptural, however, and since "ether" is not a Scriptural word, his own doctrine of the spiritual life centers specifically upon the πνεῦμα. Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 264f, says that Philo confused πνεῦμα and ether in terms of the substance of the soul because he wanted on the one hand to affirm the incroporeality of the soul vis-à-vis some uncertain philosophical positions; while on the other hand he needed a concrete expression, in this case, that provided to him by the Bible with the πνεῦμα.

parts of his cosmological and anthropological doctrines as well as those of inspiration and the spiritual life:

> the human mind occupies a position in men precisely answering to that which the great Ruler occupies in all the world. It is invisible while itself seeing all things, and while its own substance is unperceived . . . when soaring on wing it had contemplated the atmosphere in all its phases, it is borne yet higher to the ether and the circuit of heaven, and is whirled around with the dances of planets and fixed stars in accordance with the laws of perfect music, following the love of wisdom . . . and carrying its gaze beyond the confines of all substances discernible by sense, it comes to a point at which it reaches out after the intelligible world . . . finding in that world sights of surpassing loveliness . . . and it is seized by a sober intoxication, . . . inspired, possessed by a longing for nobler things. Wafted by this to the topmost arch of the things perceptible to mind it seems to be on the way to the Great King himself; but amid its longing to see Him, pure and untempered rays of concentrated light stream forth like a torrent, so that by its gleams the eye of the understanding is dazzled (Opif 69-72).

The mind can reach up to the ethereal regions and even approach God Himself, and it can do these things because it has received the gift of the πνεῦμα from God. Philo situates the πνεῦμα anthropologically and then extends it through his doctrines of prophecy and inspiration to his concept of the spiritual life. His anthropology follows from his cosmology[27] because the macrocosm/microcosm analogy forms a natural bridge between them; the doctrine of πνεῦμα in his

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[27]The purpose of this section is not to exhaust the complexities of Philonic anthropology, but only to note the role of the πνεῦμα within it. There are good sections on anthropology in the work of every major Philonic scholar. Most useful for this study were the ones of Bréhier (who suggests philosophical sources), Wolfson (whose analytical descriptions are very detailed and specific) and Goodenough (who extends Philo's anthropology into mystical theology by finding the spiritual ramifications of the types).

anthropology follows from the implications of heavenly influence he subscribed to in his cosmology.

Philo's Hellenistic-Jewish background both complicates and enriches his anthropology since the traditions were so disparate: H. Wheeler Robinson observed that the Greeks conceived of man as an incarnate spirit while the Israelites conceived of him as an animated body.[28] Philo's basic view is Scriptural, man formed from the earth and animated by the breath of God; but he expanded and commented upon this view in terms of the eclectic philosophies of his milieu. His basic premise is that man is a mixture, "moulded not only from earth but also from the divine spirit" (QG I.51). And his basic definition of man is profoundly spiritual:

> The definition, then, of our complex being is "a living creature endowed with reason, subject to death" but that of man as Moses portrays him "a soul so constituted as to hope on the God that really is" (Deter 139).

The ability to hope in God is so crucial to human nature as Philo conceives it that he says "those who do not set their hope on God have no part in a rational nature" (Deter 138). That which renders man capable of hoping in God is what God breathed into man:

> Let us not wonder how man came to have a conception of the invisible God. Moses learned it by a divine communication and has taught us how it was. The Creator wrought for the body a soul which was not capable by itself of seeing the Maker. But, seeing that it would be an advantage to see since this sight determines happiness and blessedness , He breathed into him from above of His own Deity. The invisible

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[28] H. Wheeler Robinson, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament (Oxford, 1946), pp. 69-74.

> Deity stamped on the invisible soul the image of Itself (Deter 86).

Philo's anthropological starting point is the dual account of the creation of man in Genesis: the man created in the image of God (1.26) and the man formed from the earth and animated by God's breath (2.7). He attempted to explain the repetition philosophically. The man made in the image of God was interpreted by him as the man of the intelligible world, the pattern for material creation; the man fashioned from the earth and breathed into by God was interpreted by him as the copy, the man made and put into the material world. This distinction allows him to find and praise elements of Platonic philosophy in Moses. Another distinction forced by a literal reading of the text--that between πνεῦμα and πνοή[29]--is interpreted by him in terms of his religious psychology. The πνεῦμα is described by him as being too strong for the man fashioned from the earth who can accept only a breeze (πνοή) from God (Leg All I.42). What is important here, however, is not the distinction itself, but the point Philo makes about the generosity of God: the fact that the fashioned man receives only a breeze of divine influence is not a kind of divine selfishness but a witness to the fact that God proportions Himself to man, giving man as much as he can possibly accept:

> the human body was made by the hand of God . . . and judged worthy to receive his soul not from any other thing already created, but through the breath of God imparting His own power in such measure as mortal nature could receive it (Virt 203).

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[29] See discussion above, p. 75f.

Once Philo makes the distinction, he does not return to it and freely interchanges the words or misquotes the verse with πνοή , all of which indicate that the distinction between words was not his main concern. What is important for him is that God sends something spiritual to man to which man can respond so that, from the beginning, there is in human nature an impetus toward the spiritual life.

What is the πνεῦμα which is breathed into man at creation? Philo says it is the "divine invisible spirit" (Plant 18) nothing less than God's own breath (Opif 135) which puts man on the border between mortal and immortal nature. It is the substance of the rational soul (QG II.59) which allows the mind (νοῦς) of man to partake of immortal life (Opif 135). It is a share in divine life:

> clearly what was then thus breathed was ethereal spirit or something (if such there be) better than ethereal spirit, even an effulgence of the blessed, thrice blessed nature of the Godhead (Spec IV.123).

In his allegorical interpretations of the creation of man, Philo brings together and answers logical questions about the πνεῦμα and the constitution of man: why would God breathe His own πνεῦμα into the man formed of the earth?

> one thing to be said is that God loves to give and so bestows good things on all, even those who are not perfect, at the same time encouraging in them zeal for virtue and a participation in it, by displaying His own overflowing wealth . . . what else does He prove save the exceeding greatness of His own wealth and goodness? . . . a second thing to be said is this. It is His will to make compliance with positive ordinances part of duty. One, then, into whom real life had not been breathed, but who was without experience of virtue, when punished for his transgressions would have said that he is unjustly punished, for that it was through inexperience of good that he failed in

> respect of it, and that the blame lay with Him who had failed to breathe into him any conception of it. He might even say that he does not sin at all if (as some say) involuntary acts and acts done in ignorance do not count as wrong deeds . . . "breathed into" is equivalent to "inspired" or "be-souled" . . . the expression brings out something which accords with nature. For it implies the necessity of three things . . . that which inbreathes which is God, that which receives which is mind and that which is inbreathed is the spirit or breath . . . and for what purpose save that we may obtain a conception of Him? For how could the soul have conceived of God, had not He breathed into it and mightily laid hold of it? For the mind of man would never have ventured to soar so high as to grasp the nature of God had not God Himself drawn it up to Himself, so far as it was possible that the mind of man should be drawn up, and stamped it with the impress of the powers that are within the scope of its understanding (Leg All I.33-39).

Each point Philo makes in this long interpretation is crucial to his doctrine of πνεῦμα and the constitution of man. It is a gift from God who loves to give and who gives freely, it gives man a share or participation in virtue which means that he can know the good and have an experience of it, it is a divine gift, but it does not diminish man's freedom or compel him against his will into virtuous conduct,[30] it gives man the power to form a conception of God, and most importantly, it is

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[30]Man is as free to turn from the spirit of God as the first man was. Philo describes the first man as a child of God "whose image he was . . . yet though he should have kept that image undefiled . . . when the opposites were set before him to choose or avoid, good and evil, honorable and base, true and false, he was quick to choose the false, the base and the evil . . . with the natural consequence that he exchanged immortality for mortality" (Virt 204). The responsibility for sin belongs to man, and what is important to note is that Philo gives God no responsibility for it whatsoever. In an interpretation of the words "let us make man" (Gen 1.26) Philo refers to his doctrine of the Powers. Since man is a mixture of mortal and immortal, unreason and reason, body and soul, there must be a way to account for the inferior part: it is not fitting, he thinks, that God should make anything but that which is good. God, therefore assigned a share in the work of man's creation to His lieutenants "so that man's right actions might be attributed to God, but his sins to others" (Conf 179).

the way in which God draws man up to Him: "for it accords with God's ways that those who have received His downbreathing should be called up to Him" (Plant 23). One can conclude from this that all men have the ability to pursue the vision of God; the fact that all men receive the breath of life which is God's own breath means that all men have a natural disposition for returning to God and are called up by Him. In reality, however, very few respond to the gift of the πνεῦμα as favorably as they might. Since man is a mixture of earthly substance and divine breath, rational and irrational, body and soul, and since he is free to respond to God as he chooses, there is the option for him to root himself in the irrational part, to turn to earthly things where the spirit cannot abide (QG I.90; Immut 2; Gig 19, 28f). The πνεῦμα as Philo described its functions, has some things in common with the Greek notion of ψυχή , but it is not to be equated with it: the πνεῦμα is a way of expressing the divine influence upon man in a concrete manner, not a definition of soul. In the process of describing the πνεῦμα Philo says that it is a "portion (ἀπόσπασμα) of the divine" (Deter 90) which is a Stoic term[31] but not a Stoic meaning: Philo rejected pantheism vigorously and could not accept Stoic doctrine even though he often borrowed their vocabulary and, in this case, their theory of knowledge."[32]

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[31]Richard A. Baer, Philo's Use of the Categories Male and Female (Leiden, 1970) makes a point of this and concludes that man is able to know God because his soul is a fragment of the divine soul (p. 17). This is surely not Philo's position. Philo thought that the substance of the soul was an open question and he speculated about it, wondering if it were blood, breath, ether, spirit, etc.; but he never answered the question. If he had, it is clear from his criterion of piety and from his cosmological principles that he could not at all accept the pantheistic expression "fragment of the divine soul."

[32]Verbeke, op. cit., p. 243.

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Philo does not comment directly on the nature of the divine πνεῦμα accorded to man. Verbeke believes that those things Philo says about the man created in the image of man, interpreted by Philo as the heavenly man, can be rightly said about the divine πνεῦμα sent to man at creation. The heavenly man is made in the image of God (Heres 56), is immaterial, divine and imperishable (Heres 56; Plant 18; Deter 83; Opif 135). One can conclude, therefore, that the πνεῦμα is also the image of God, immaterial, divine and imperishable.[33] The πνεῦμα is suggested to Philo by the Bible and he is fully sensitive to the scriptural concept of ru'ah as belonging to God and sent to man as gift. As Philo describes the functions of the πνεῦμα , however, it appears somewhat more eclectically inspired: it is the superior part of the human soul and an imprint of divine nature which adds to human nature by profoundly transforming the human mind and giving it the powers of immortal life (Leg All 32-37).

The fruits of the spirit are divine life and immortality. The first man, before he sinned, had welcomed the divine spirit in full current with the result that he "endeavored to please the Father and King . . . to be fully conformed to God and to approach Him" (Opif 144). He was a mixture, however, and eventually capitulated to the attractions of the irrational part: man, says Philo, "is practically the only being who having knowledge of good and evil often chooses the worst" (Conf 178). Since the man formed from the earth does not provide the best example of life in the spirit, one must turn to the man created in the image of God who was the pattern for the creation of man. The heavenly man is a kind

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[33] Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 242-250.

of *type*, an example of the best that human life can be: he functions under the divine influence of the spirit of God (*Leg All* I.33), his heart is under the power of his reason, his passions are pure, and pleasure with him is not excessive, but ruled by his rational part (*QG* II.46, IV.245; *Opif* 147-157). He is governed by order and the hierarchy of virtues; the divine influence shines through him. There are some men who closely resemble the man made in the image of God, but they are few. There are also some men who, having received the first impetus of divine influence, scorn the gift of God to man--like Cain--but they, too, are few. Most men are a mixture, as scriptural anthropology suggests, of the heavenly and the earthly. Philo extends the biblical view to suggest that all men *can* be either one. There are models to follow[34] but that which determines the course a man is to

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[34]The models Philo sketches out within his works are called "types" and they form the structure upon which his spiritual theology is built. The burden of the allegorical books is to point the way man can return to God; Philo does this through a series of images or allegorical interpretations on persons and events suggested to him by the Bible. The whole notion of types and images is very important in Philo but cannot be delineated here; it is important to note, however, that his criticism of philosophical positions is often most clear through his symbols or types (the Chaldeans, for example). In sketching out the essentials of the spiritual life Philo uses types in an ascending order of perfection: there is Enos, who hopes in God (Philo's basic definition of man) followed by Enoch, who repents and Noah, who witnesses to the necessity of reason to tame the passions. This is the first or minor triad of types in Philo. The major triad is composed of patriarchs: Jacob who fights to maintain virtue which is not easy for him; Abraham who was converted through learning to faith in God; and Isaac who is virtuous by nature. He follows the two triads with two special models: Aaron who tempers his passions with reason, and Moses who removes his passions. Moses is *the* model of perfection in Philo, and probably the model for the "one type of man with whom the divine spirit can abide . . . he who has his mind unhampered and comes naked to God" (*Gig* 53). The whole doctrine and device of the types is very rich in Philo and has been treated in a number of places; the best treatment, especially in relation to Philo's religious psychology is Goodenough's *By Light, Light*.

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follow is his own free reaction to the breath of life, the divine spirit sent to him by God.

At the end of his cosmological treatise Philo says that the Mosaic account of creation teaches many things among which five are the fairest and best: that God exists and is eternal, that God is one, that the world has been created, that the world is one, and that God is provident and cares for the world (Opif 170-172). It is a strong statement about those things, furnished to him by Scripture, which Philo considers crucial to his system and, a fortiori, against those positions he finds most reprehensible: atheism, polytheism, pantheism, atomic materialism and determinism. It is also a strong indication that Philo's main concern was with God's creative efficacy and his primary criterion for delineating a doctrine or criticizing a system was the respect one paid to a transcendent God who creates and cares for the world. His criterion of piety furnishes the key to an inherent unity within what appears to be a sometimes wildly eclectic system.

Cosmology can lead man to the positive conclusion that God exists. This God is called the Father and Maker (which is Platonic) and is described most often in terms of His providence and creative efficacy (which is Mosaic). He is the God of Moses, transcendent to the world. Man can never know His essence, but he ought not relinquish his search for Him (Opif 45-79). Cosmology can also lead man to some conclusions about himself in relation to God. God creates the world out of His goodness (Opif 21), and he creates man and sends the spirit to him out of his generosity (Leg All I.33); even though He is transcendent to the world He proportions Himself to the world and to man insofar as man is able to accept or understand or receive Him. Man cannot know the nature

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of God, but this is not surprising when he does not even know the nature of his own mind or soul (Mut 15): the heavens and the mind of man are both mysterious in some ways. The invisibility of the heavens and of the mind, and the lack of positive description of them by Moses mean that they are open questions for Philo: perhaps they are ether, perhaps not. What is clear to him is that they are both mysterious, both lead man to acknowledge a dependence upon God which is a first step in the spiritual life.

The religious quest and the temptations along the way form the basis of Philo's religious psychology, the allegory of the human soul, and it was in view of the problems of the life of the soul that Philo chose his cosmic symbols and notions. The same religious motivation inspired his anthropology. Religion was for him a craving after the fellowship with God, and what linked his religious notions with the reality of the spiritual life was the πνεῦμα . If man hungers for God, if God makes man out of His goodness and love, then God must provide a way for man to get back to Him, or at least to form some conception of Him: that way is conceived by him to be the divine spirit. Philo is open to God's graciousness from his Scriptural sources. He accepts the heavens as something stable and everlasting as Moses did (there is no end of the world in Moses), and he notes that Moses understood and agreed with concepts of harmony and order in the cosmos and with the ability of the heavens to influence the earth. These principles provide a clue to Philo's openness to the πνεῦμα as a divine influence sent by God to man so that man can return to Him. The words and foundations of the πνεῦμα as a divine gift, vital and

efficacious, are provided by the Scriptural concept of ru'ah Yahweh; Philo's extension of the concept to his doctrine of the spiritual life, however, is an original doctrine.

The definition of man as so constituted in his soul that he hopes in God is at once profoundly spiritual and inconclusive. Man for him is unfinished, he has certain capabilities and duties because God has breathed into him; but he is a mixture of earth and heaven capable of refusing the gift of the πνεῦμα . If he accepts the spirit of God, then he is on the road of spiritual progress where he will need and receive greater and greater participations in divine life through the divine spirit. The πνεῦμα sent to those progressing in the spiritual life is not the same as that given to all men as a breath of life; the πνεῦμα which sustains the spiritual life is the prophetic spirit, a supernatural gift sent to those already on the road to perfection.

CHAPTER VI

Πνεῦμα IN PROPHECY AND INSPIRATION

It has been noted that the πνεῦμα of God is sent to man as the breath of life; that it is conceived by Philo as a divine influence which gives to all men at least some idea of God whether it is merely a gentle breeze (πνοή) or the full strength of the divine spirit (πνεῦμα); and that all men can respond to the πνεῦμα favorably or unfavorably, a response which determines the nature of their religious life. The concept of prophetic πνεῦμα in Philo follows from his anthropology but is not synonymous with it. The prophetic spirit is not constitutive of the soul, it is not part of human nature and it is not sent to all men. The concept itself was suggested to Philo by the ru'ah Yahweh of the Bible, specifically perhaps by the passage in Numbers 11 about the transference of the πνεῦμα of Moses to the seventy elders.

As Philo describes it, the prophetic πνεῦμα evicts the mind: true prophecy is not in divination but in the possession of the mind (νοῦς) by the spirit of God:

> For no pronouncement of a prophet is ever his own; he is an interpreter, prompted by another in all his utterances when, knowing not what he does he is filled with inspiration as the reason withdraws and surrenders the citadel of the soul to a new tenant, i.e., to the divine spirit which plays upon the vocal organism and dictates words which clearly express the prophetic message (Spec IV.49).

Verbeke notes that in contradistinction to other theories of inspiration, Philo makes it clear that the prophetic gift is not an elevation of the intellectual power or cognitive faculties of man, "but a divine possession which eliminates all natural light and accords us directly a superior knowledge."[1] The notion of the eviction of the mind is crucial to the description of the activity of the prophetic πνεῦμα . When Philo describes the trance of Abraham (Gen 15.12) he says that it is fitting the trance fell at sunset since the sun represents the mind which must retire before the advance of the divine spirit.[2]

> While the radiance of the mind is still around us, when it pours as it were a noonday beam into the whole soul, we are self-contained not possessed. But when it comes to its setting, naturally ecstacy (ἔκστασις) and divine possession and madness (μάνια) fall upon us. For when the light of God shines, the human light sets; when the divine light sets, the human dawns and rises. This is what regularly befalls the fellowship of the prophets, the mind is evicted at the arrival of the divine spirit (Heres 264-265).

The problem here is that human intelligence, the νοῦς , has been described by Philo as pneumatic, yet one finds that it is evicted by the arrival of the πνεῦμα . Philo says the reason for this is that mortal and immortal may not share the same home (Heres 265). The mind

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[1]Verbeke, op. cit., p. 253.

[2]The notion of solitude is important in relation to the πνεῦμα because it is a recognition by man that he must rid himself of everything in order to receive the spirit. The divine spirit itself will evict the mind, but man must situate himself in order to receive it, he must somehow renounce his own powers of reasoning, Philo expresses this view in a number of ways: Abraham at sunset (Heres 264), Moses pitching his tent outside the camp in order to escape the body and its passions in order to dwell in virtue (Deter 159, Leg All 11.54), Isaac going out to the plain to meditate and there meeting wisdom (Rebecca), sent to him by God (Deter 29, Post 77-80, Congr 34-38), the notion of nakedness before God (Gig 54, Sacr 85, Probus 43) and the solitude of the Therapeutae (Cont 18-21).

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has been created by God and is spiritual, but inspiration means to Philo that God himself is present to man in a special and particular way: "when the mind is divinely possessed and becomes filled with God, it is no longer within itself, for it receives the divine spirit to dwell within it" (QG III.9 on Gen 15.12). The gift of God to man in inspiration is reminiscent of the gift of the divine spirit to man in Philo's allegory on the double account of creation: man before the fall was "of near kin to the Ruler, since the divine spirit had flowed into him in full current" and this ability of his to welcome the full force of the πνεῦμα , the abundance of God's gift, inspired him in some way to lead the life of spiritual perfection. Philo visualizes this man as "earnestly endeavoring in all his words and actions to please the Father and King, following Him step by step in the highways cut out by virtues, since only for souls who regard it as their goal to be fully conformed to God . . . is it lawful to draw near Him" (Opif 144). The gift of the spirit to man in creation is that which enables him to begin the life of grace; the gift of the spirit in inspiration is that which enables him to sustain it.

The prophetic spirit, like the πνεῦμα in other usages, is something sent from God; it belongs to Him, not to man. Like the ru'ah Yahweh the Philonic concept of prophetic spirit acts in a charismatic way: it seizes (QG IV.196), or falls upon (Mos II.291), or possesses (Mos I.175) the prophet and fills his mind (QG IV.140). It is divine and powerful and able to overcome, in its boundless might, all powers here below (Plant 24). The divine prophetic spirit is not sent to men in general, but only to special men in special circumstances: it

is sent to the translators of the LXX, for example, "whose sincerity and singleness of thought enables them to go hand in hand with the purest of spirits, the spirit of Moses" (Mos II.40), and it is transferred from Moses to the seventy elders as "the spirit of perfect wisdom" (Gig 24). The divine spirit comes to men in this way only periodically (ἐπιπεφοιτηκότος , Spec IV.49) and cannot abide long in man since he is flesh. Within these limits, however, the divine spirit of inspiration is available to any man who fulfills certain conditions, viz., to those men who meet the Philonic definition of a "God-born" man:

> The men of God are priests and prophets who have refused to accept membership in the commonwealth of the world and to become citizens therein, but have risen wholly above the sphere of sense-perception and have been translated into the world of the intelligible and dwell there registered as freemen of the commonwealth of Ideas, which are imperishable and incorporeal (Gig 61).

The description lends itself to interpretations about Platonic theories of knowledge[3] or Stoic theories of the citizenship of the world; but what is most basic to the description is Philo's notion that the coming of the spirit of inspiration is contingent upon man's moral condition, it is sent to those who are able to ask for and accept it. Here Philo betrays a "striking acquaintance" as Verbeke says,[4] with the double activity of the spirit of wisdom in WS: there is on the one hand the description of the spirit of wisdom as a creative force penetrating and renewing all things (7.27) and on the other hand a description of it as a principle of superior knowledge and moral life (7.17-21) which extends even to the practice of virtues (8.7-9, 9.11). In the first sense the

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[3] Wolfson, op. cit., II.10-14.

[4] Verbeke, op. cit., p. 259.

spirit of wisdom is given to all men, much as the breath or spirit of God animates all men in Philo's biblical anthropology. In the second sense, however, the spirit of wisdom is given only to those who aspire to the moral life and who ask God for it, qualifications which are not unlike those imposed by Philo upon the divine spirit of prophecy. The concept of the prophetic spirit in Philo, however, extends beyond the considerations of the author of WS since it draws more fully upon Greek notions of prophecy and since it extends more dynamically into the realm of the spiritual life.

The concept of prophecy in Philo is fairly clear as is the role of the πνεῦμα within that concept. One reason for this is that Philo's main source, Scripture, furnished more material for him on this point. He was also influenced by Greek concepts, but not as much as Beider indicates.[5] Wolfson suggests a logical sequence of thought in Philo which allowed him to connect Scriptural notions to Platonic theories. He suggests that Philo found a four-fold function of prophecy in the Old Testament: divination,[6] knowledge of propitiation rites,[7] revelation of laws and poetry,[8] and the power to perceive things the senses cannot,

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[5] In Kittel, op. cit., p. 374, he says: "He is dependent here when speaking of the prophetic spirit on Plato's criticism of Apollonian inspiration manticism, and sets the prophetic spirit in antithesis to the νοῦς ."

[6] This is pretty straightforward in the Old Testament. See, e.g., Moses predicting the successful crossing of the Red Sea (Ex 14.13f).

[7] Power to know rites and prayers typified by Moses telling Aaron how to take fire pan and lay increase on it to propitiate God (Num 17. 11-13).

[8] Moses' reception of the Law is the clearest example; an example of inspired poetry would be the song of Deborah (Jdg 5).

of themselves, perceive.[9] He then suggests that Philo found a profound similarity between Old Testament prophetic functions and the four types of inspiration described by Plato in the Phaedrus (244ff): the inspiration of the diviner, the priest, the muses for the poet, and the philosopher who recollects ideas that cannot be perceived by the senses. The result is, says Wolfson, that Philo reads Old Testament concepts of prophecy into the Platonic hierarchy of inspirational forms which extends the Greek concepts of prophecy significantly beyond their limits. Philo is able to do this because the Hebrew term, nabi, refers to all the prophetic powers described in the Old Testament whereas the Greek word, προφήτης , is reserved for the diviner. Further, Philo replaces the Platonic notion of philosophic recollection with a concept of prophecy suggested to him by the Old Testament, the vision of the prophet.[10] The Philonic concept of prophecy, therefore, benefits as his other concepts do from an amalgamation of Greek and Hebrew traditions. Philo's criterion here, as elsewhere, is piety, the respect paid to God as the transcendent,providential creator. Questions which impugn God's creative efficacy or violate the sense of the πνεῦμα as divine and something belonging to God are rejected by him while questions left open in Scripture are taken by him to be open to speculation by means of philosophical systems. He opposes popular divination, for example, because it

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[9] This refers to those things in Scripture which clearly elude the senses, like God or angels but which the prophet can pray to see as Moses prays to see the "glory" of God (Ex 33.18).

[10] Wolfson, op. cit., II.11-22. The problem is more complicated than this brief summary allows one to conclude. It is associated by Wolfson with his analysis of Plato's theory of knowledge and Philo's contributions to it.

neglects the "true Cause of all things."[11] At the same time, his notion of prophecy goes somewhat beyond Scripture: it recognizes oracles and dreams and defines as prophetic what Plato defined as philosophical frenzy (Tim 71E). Still, since he recognizes the distinction between artificial and enthusiastic inspiration,[12] dismisses the first as a human invention while endorsing the second as the mode in which the soul can communicate directly with God by way of the divine spirit, he appears to be sensitive to and in concert with Biblical notions of the ru'ah Yahweh.

The prophet is the "God-born" man typified par excellence by Moses.[13] The life and personality of Moses reflect the activity of the spirit of God in him and thus provides a good summary of the role of the spirit in the Philonic concept of prophecy. Moses is for Philo the type of an ideal man and his description of him is almost extreme: Philo

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[11] On this point see Bréhier, op. cit., pp. 180-190. He notes that Philo opposes popular divination, not the theory of divination: the devices of popular divination (augury, signs, charmers, movements of reptiles or birds, examination of blood or stool) do not bring certitude since their basis is unstable. Popular divination is a sin against piety since it does not refer to the supreme Cause.

[12] The distinction is Stoic and reported in Cicero's De Divinatione. For a textual treatment of the concept of divination see De Vogel, op. cit. It is clear from his listing of texts that the artificial mantic was founded on the theory of cosmic sympathy (see text 934), a concept Philo accepted with certain reservations (see above, p. 100). For an analysis of the concept as it is described in Cicero and as it influenced Philo see Bréhier, op. cit., pp. 179-205.

[13] The "God-born" men in Philo are few because the Scriptural types of them are few. Philo reasons in types, and in Scripture finds only Moses, Isaac and, in some ways, Samuel (who serves God alone [Ebr 143] and is a type of "inspired temper" [Somn I.254]). The scarcity of "God-born" men in Scripture, however, does not necessarily mean that there will be or must be few of them in the world. There can be as many in the world as possible, i.e., the notion of "God-born" is an open category.

calls Moses a "god" (Sacr 9) and says he was a "great nature who knew all things from the beginning" (Mos I.20f). Concretely he is described as the perfect king, legislator and prophet, descriptions designed by Philo to interest and win a Gentile audience. Moses attained the summits of the spiritual life. He could not perceive God in His essence when he asked to see His "glory" but he did come closer than any other man to a vision of the essence of God, and he did so because "the divine spirit abides with him" (Gig 54). Philo says that Moses was made akin to God and even "truly divine" (QE II.29).[14]

Philo, before discussing why Moses is a prophet, says that a prophet is one who "declares by inspiration what cannot be apprehended by reason" (Mos II.187).[15] Then he declares Moses to be a prophet of the highest quality and introduces his remarks with the following reflection:

> Of the divine utterances, some are spoken by God in His own Person with His prophet for interpreter, in some the revelation comes through question and answer, and others are spoken by Moses in his own person, when possessed by God and carried away out of himself. The first kind are absolutely and entirely signs of divine excellences, graciousness and beneficence, by which He incites all men to noble conduct, and particularly the nation of His worshippers, for whom He opens up the road which leads to happiness. In the second kind we

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[14] Philo, as Goodenough notes, vacillates on this point though Goodenough sees the statement itself as highly significant. See By Light, Light, op. cit., pp. 223-229.

[15] R. M. Grant, The Letter and the Spirit (London, 1957), pp. 1-41, discusses inspiration in the ancient world. At one point he discusses the early views of Plato, viz., that God speaks through the poets, or that the poets are the interpreters of the gods vis-à-vis his later views that the prophet is the one who interprets, or that philosophy, as the most rational gift of the gods, qualifies the philosopher as an interpreter. One can see from this, as Wolfson notes, how logical it would appear to Philo to conceive of the Platonic philosopher function as prophetic.

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> find combination and partnership: the prophet asks questions of God . . . and God instructs him. The third kind are assigned to the lawgiver himself: God has given to him of His own power of foreknowledge and by this he will reveal future events. Now the first kind must be left out of the discussion . . . they are too great to be lauded by human lips . . . besides, they are delivered through an interpreter, and interpretation and prophecy are not the same thing . . . the third kind, in which the speaker appears under that divine possession in virtue of which he is chiefly and in the strict sense considered a prophet (Mos II.188-192).

The remarks indicate that the eviction of the mind by the spirit is the "strict sense of prophecy and that interpretation is not the same as prophecy. It is interesting to note that in another place Philo defines a prophet as "the interpreter of God" (Spec I.65). The contradiction can be resolved from context: in the treatise on the special laws Philo is involved in a discussion about the first commandment which has led him to a denunciation of divination. His point is simply that the future will be revealed to those who are pious; those who turn to popular divination will find only falsehood, but those who do not swerve from piety will not be denied full knowledge of the future (Spec I.64). With this as his context, then, Philo describes the mode of knowing the future for those who trust in God:

> a prophet possessed by God will suddenly appear and give prophetic oracles. Nothing of what he says will be his own, for he is truly under the control of divine inspiration has no power of apprehension when he speaks but serves as the channel for the insistent words of Another's prompting. For prophets are the interpreters of God who makes full use of their organs to set forth what He wills (Spec I.65).

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What Philo is describing here is prophecy in the strict sense, eviction of the mind by the divine spirit, and possession by God; the apparent contradiction comes in his use of the concept interpreter.[16]

Philo wishes to concentrate upon the third type of divine utterance in his presentation of Moses as a prophet since the divine possession is the "strict sense" of prophecy. It is interesting that the content of most of the prophecies presented is predictive: Moses foretells the Red Sea crossing and so "began and opened his work as a prophet possessed by God's spirit" (Mos II.258). He predicts the manna

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[16]The question of interpretation is bound to the question of inspiration in Philo. Moses is for him the prototype of inspiration, and as prophet Moses is not just an interpreter; but this does not mean interpreters do not need to be inspired. The Philonic synthesis of interpretation and inspiration is summarized by Grant, op. cit., pp. 36-38, as follows: theoretical questions of inspiration and interpretation arose only when Greek-speaking Jews had produced the LXX and had confronted the Hellenistic world with its interest in theory. Allegorical method entered Hellenistic-Jewish thought and Philo is the most prominent figure among Jewish allegorists; he tried to steer between too much allegorizing and not enough. He values philosophy highly but does not place philosophical inspiration above that of the prophets: in his view the irrational inspiration of the prophets is beyond reason. The basic method of Philonic exegesis is simple: it is based on his inherited Jewish faith in God as the creator and ruler of history, a faith which he expresses in terms taken from Greek philosophy. Biblical passages which correspond to this faith are taken literally while others are allegorized. Philo believes the literal meaning must be rejected if it involves something unworthy of God, when it leads to historical impossibility, or when the passage under consideration is plainly allegorical or symbolical. On the basis of his philosophical theology Philo makes use of the allegorical method in order to correlate the detached insights of the Old Testament. Summing up Philo's idea of points at which the allegorical method must be applied we find that these points all involve obscurities and instances of irrationality. On the one hand they resemble the work of a poet, on the other they are clearly produced by prophets writing or speaking in ecstasy with their rational faculties suspended . . . here Philo's doctrines of inspiration and interpretation come together. "The peculiarities of scripture are due to the ecstatic state of the prophet, not to the immutable (and presumably grammatical and logical) God. The task of the exegete is to observe these peculiarities from a rational point of view and then to apply the allegorical method, also rational. The inspiration of the exegete is rational, not ecstatic" (37). It should be noted that the rational for Philo was more a stress upon words and not dialectics. It has primarily a grammatical connotation.

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(Mos II.268) and even his own death accurately (Mos II.291). None of his predictions, however, would have been possible without the spirit of God within him: "the mind could not have made so straight an aim if there was not the divine spirit guiding it to truth itself" (Mos II. 265). The prophetic spirit, therefore, is a special kind of illumination which guides men to truth, a kind of special light.[17] In one place Philo calls it knowledge or wisdom (QE II.7). The prophetic spirit is divine and sent by God to man for special reasons; when Moses puts it on the seventy elders it is called the "spirit of perfect wisdom" (Gig 24). When it is described as abiding with Moses it is said to be

> the wise, the divine, the excellent spirit susceptible to neither severance nor division, diffused everywhere in its fullness and even when shared, suffers no diminution in understanding, knowledge and wisdom (Gig 27).

The prophetic spirit, however, is more than a temporary charismatic presence to certain men under certain conditions: it is the gift of grace which transforms man and abides with him insofar as he is able to "come naked to God" (Gig 53). It is not insignificant that Philo notes in his allegory on creation, that the word "breathed into" (ἐνεφύσησεν) is equivalent to "inspired" (ἐνέπνευσεν) or "besouled" (ἐψύχωσε)(Leg All I.36). And it is important to recall that Philo's reason for God breathing into man at all was to show His generosity by giving man a way in which he might conceive of God: the

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[17]The image of light in Philo is very rich and complex and cannot be investigated here. For a study devoted to this image and its possible sources and uses in Philo see Franz-Norbert Klein, Die Lichtterminologie bei Philon von Alexandrien und in den Hermetischen Schriften (Leiden, 1962). The masterpiece on this topic is still Goodenough, By Light, Light.

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mind of man needs to be drawn up by God, the way He draws man to Himself is to send the πνεῦμα to him. The gift of inspiration, therefore, is the gift of grace.[18] It transforms man and leads him to God. One example of a man who received the πνεῦμα and progressed through several levels of transformation is Abraham. He was a Chaldean, Philo says, but recognized the impiety of Chaldean astrological doctrine. How?

> divine inspiration induced him to leave his native country . . . to discover the One who alone is eternal. . . . At the same time a fire of yearning possessed him . . . nor did he pause until he received clearer visions, not of His essence, for that is impossible, but of His existence and providence . . . and he gained faith . . . and with it all the other virtues, so that he was regarded as a king . . . not because of his outward state . . . but because of the greatness of soul, for his spirit was the spirit of a king . . . and the society which he sought was not [common society] but, under inspiration, something more august. Thus whenever he was possessed, everything in him changed to something better, eyes, complexion, stature, carriage, movements, voice. For the divine spirit which was breathed upon him from high made its lodging in his soul (Virt 214-218).

The spirit of inspiration not only transforms Abraham and gives him a special illumination which enables him to progress from Chaldean doctrine to a knowledge of the existence of the one true God, it also gives him a yearning for God, a greatness of soul, and a desire to seek the august company of the Deity insofar as that is possible. The spirit of

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[18] Philo considers the highest truth to be this: to know "that all things are the grace (χάρις) or gift of God" (Immut 107). The context of the statement is the creation of the world and Philo intends to link creation to God's goodness. This notion is extended through his anthropology, especially in his repeated insistence on God's generous gift of the πνεῦμα to men in creation. Grace for him is something healing (Leg All III.178), and gives men the power for virtue: Isaac, e.g., is gifted with "the fulness of divine gifts, conveyed by the breath of God's higher graces" (Congr 38).

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inspiration leads him to truth and as such can be called the spirit of wisdom, but it also makes its lodging in Abraham's soul, transforming him into a kind of king, and as such is a real participation in divine life, the gift of grace sent to those who ask for it and able to abide a while with those who are God-born.[19]

The prophetic spirit, however, is able to do more than transform man in this life; it holds the power of immortality. A clear description of this gift of the prophetic spirit may be found in Philo's account of the death of Moses (Virt 68-80). Under the influence of the spirit Moses predicts his own death which was a prophecy in the "strict sense" based upon the eviction of the mind by the divine πνεῦμα . When the predictive prophecy was finished, however, the spirit was still with Moses. He chose a successor, instructed him and began to sing a hymn to God so that all men could learn from him the lesson of a thankful heart. He sang so beautifully and in such perfect harmony that the angels could scarcely believe that a human being could be so perfectly in tune with the universe. When he ended his hymn, he began to pass over "from mortal to immortal existence," but not before he blessed the tribes and implored God to bless them:

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[19]The figure of a king and the concept of kingship in Philo are related to the life of virtue which is the fruit of the spirit of inspiration. Philo describes Moses as the perfect king, for example. For an analysis of the doctrine of kingship in Philo and its relationship to his other doctrines and to possible sources see E. R. Goodenough, The Political Philosophy of Hellenistic Kingship (Yale, 1928), pp. 55-105. Another approach is that of Louis Delatte, Les Traités de la Royauté d'Ecphante, Diotogène et Sthénidas (Paris, 1942). He reconsiders the data on kingship and gives it a further analysis by comparing it to these treatises. His point is that the idea of kingship was widely spread in the time of Philo, and that Philo witnesses to the spread of the idea. The treatises themselves are not and need not be related to Philo as direct sources.

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> what he had himself he gave them . . . what he did not possess he supplicated God to grant them knowing that though the fountain of His grace is perennial, it is not free for all, but only to suppliants. And suppliants are those who love a virtuous life, to whom it is permitted to quench their thirst for wisdom with waters drawn from the fountains of true holiness (79).

Moses receives the prophetic spirit from God and is able to prophesy; but he is also a suppliant, a "God-born man" with whom the spirit can abide. Moses is a model par excellence for Philo and typifies the best possible accommodation a human being can make to the divine spirit; he shares in divine life, is in tune with the harmony of the universe and finally is able to pass from mortal to immortal life. There are other models which typify different aspects of the spirit of inspiration: Balaam who is a prophet in the strict sense and who witnesses to the power of the inspiring spirit which evicts the mind and is stronger than the human will; and Hannah who receives the spirit and is led by it to mystical experience.

Balaam is an example of prophecy in the strict sense because his mind is evicted by the divine spirit. He prophesies in spite of himself which testifies to the power of the spirit vis-à-vis the powers of the human mind. He also serves as a negative model, as one who does not respond to the spirit; as such he is used by Philo to show that man must respond to the spirit if he is to enjoy the life of grace which accompanies and follows the experience of prophecy itself. Philo uses the Balaam story (Num 22-25) to condemn false divination and auguries and to give a clear example of false inspiration; but in the process he indicates some important features of the interaction between the spirit and the recipient of divine inspiration.

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Balaam is hired to curse the Israelites. The name, Balaam, Philo says, means "vain" and Balaam is a "dealer in augury" whose words were restamped under God's providence and turned toward good; but his heart was not moved (Conf 159). Balaam cannot be truly inspired because he does not make room for the spirit, he does not "come naked" to God. In a long section on the possible meanings of the flaming sword and the two Cherubim in the biblical account of the expulsion from the garden Philo speculates that the two Cherubim represent the two chief powers of God (His goodness which begets everything, and His sovereignty which rules everything) and the flaming sword represents reason. The point of the story for Philo is that for one to be truly God-possessed or inspired, he must sever the mortal element within him and follow reason. He mentions Abraham as an example, someone who did what Balaam did not:

> Remember how Abraham the wise, when he began to make God his standard in all things and leave nothing to the created, takes a copy of the flaming sword--"fire and knife" it says (Gen 22.6)--desiring to sever and consume the mortal element away from himself and thus to fly upwards to God with his understanding stripped of its trammels (Cher 31).

Balaam cannot do this; he is a "madman," Philo says, who does not have the sword of reason (Cher 32). The problem with Balaam is that he pays no attention to God; he hears the oracles of God, Scripture testifies to this (Num 24.16), but "what good did it do him?" (Mut 202). He did not turn aside when he was warned and as a result the "ailments of his soul became beyond healing because he set his own desire above God-sent conviction . . . he ignored the inner judge" (Immut 181). Philo here points to the necessity of a certain moral condition to receive the spirit of inspiration, but also to an unpardonable sin. Throughout his

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writings Philo maintains that piety is a chief virtue, that man has an absolute duty to respect and praise God and that putting oneself above God or ignoring God is impious. Balaam refuses to heed God, puts himself above God-sent conviction, and is thus beyond healing even by the power of the spirit.

Still, Balaam does prophesy; his mind is evicted by the spirit of inspiration which is stronger than his own will (Mut 202). Philo even credits Balaam with "that most divine of canticles, 'God is not as a man'[Num 23.19]" (Migr 113), which is a strong testament to the power of the spirit since a beautiful statement of piety comes from an impious man. His utterances are prompted by God and he thus is able to be a prophet in the strict sense, but his "soul is not changed . . . his intention is not changed"(Migr 113). He is therefore unable to reap the rewards of visitation by the spirit, especially the gifts of "sober wisdom" (Conf 159). One who does welcome the spirit and who responds to it piously, in contrast to Balaam, is Hannah, the mother of Samuel.

Philo uses the song of Hannah (1 Sam 2.1-10) as an example of the heights one can reach when inspired and cooperative. He compares Hannah to Abraham who "put his trust in God" (Immut 5), and says that she is a "prophetess and mother of a prophet" who offers even her inspired enthusiasm to God (Somn I.254). The name Hannah, he says, means grace (χάρις),she is the gift of the wisdom of God, beloved of God (θεόφιλους) an example of piety (Immut 5, 10). In a long passage in his treatise on drunkenness Philo describes the significance of Hannah:

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> Hannah's name in our language means "grace." For without divine grace it is impossible either to leave the ranks of mortality or to stay forever among the immortal. Now when grace fills the soul, that soul thereby rejoices and smiles and dances, for it is possessed and inspired . . . to the unenlightened it may seem to be drunken . . . and therefore she is asked, "How long will you be drunken? Put away wine from yourself" (1 Sam 1.14). For with the God-possessed not only is the soul wont to be stirred and goaded, as it were, into ecstacy, but the body is also flushed and fiery, warmed by the overflowing joy within which passes on the sensation to the outer man, and thus many of the foolish are deceived into thinking that the sober are drunk. Though, indeed, it is true that these sober ones are drunk in a sense, for all good things are united in the strong wine on which they feast, and they receive the loving-cup from perfect virtue . . . not like others who are drunk with the drunkenness of wine . . . [her soul] is filled with the gracious gifts of God . . . she declares that she has not partaken of wine or strong liquor, glorying that he whole life has been one of unbroken abstinence. And rightly, for indeed it was a great and wonderful feat to follow reason (the λόγος), the free, the unshackled, the pure, which no passion inebriates. And the result of this is that the mind . . . becomes a libation . . . which is poured out to God. What else is meant by the words "I will pour out my soul before the Lord" but these: "I will consecrate it all to Him, I will loosen all chains that bound it which the empty aims and desires of mortal life had fastened upon it; I will send it abroad, extended and diffuse it so that it shall touch the bounds of the All, and hasten to that most glorious and loveliest of visions, the Vision of the Uncreated (Ebr 145-152).

Hannah is inspired and God-possessed and "goaded into ecstacy." It is significant that the power of immortality held by the spirit and described as that which enables Moses to pass from mortal to immortal existence is here referred to grace. It is significant, too, that the pole around which Philo describes responses to the spirit of inspiration is Abraham: Philo describes Balaam as one who could not respond to the

spirit, "as Abraham had" and he describes Hannah as "like Abraham . . . one who put his trust in God" (Immut 5). Abraham typifies for Philo one who comes to a knowledge and experience of God through learning and through gradual understanding and progressive stages of religious experience. Abraham moves, in Philo's allegories, from the impious doctrines of the Chaldeans, to faith in the one true God and experience of Him. This use of Abraham to measure responses to the spirit of inspiration therefore witnesses to Philo's view that the divine spirit is universally extended, that all men can receive it even though very few do; but the difference between the many and the few is a difference which does not depend upon the divine spirit or upon God, but upon the response of man, himself.[20]

Hannah responds to the divine spirit of inspiration in a perfectly pious manner: she offers even her inspiration back to God (Somn I.254), witnessing to the vocation of man made in the image of God and stamped with the spirit, viz., thankfulness. Her response allows her to ascend the heights of the spiritual life and to experience God. It is interesting that Philo describes her mystical experience with the metaphor of drunkenness, a concept which was extensive in his writings and which had a history in Greek models of ecstacy, especially the

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[20]The response of man is an indication of his worthiness, but it should be noted that the πνεῦμα sent to man in creation, or at any stage of his spiritual life, is efficacious in making man worthy. Worthiness itself, therefore, is a gift of God. The face that some men do not respond to the preliminary gift of the πνεῦμα testifies to man's freedom to accept or to refuse God's gifts, but it does not mean that man's grateful response is independent of God. This view is consistent with Philo's doctrine of grace.

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paradoxical concept of "sober drunkenness."[21] Philo is able, by using this metaphor, to illustrate an important point about inspiration as he understands it within his criterion of piety. In the Greek world there were models of ecstasy which suggested that inspiration could be induced, that by performing certain deeds one could receive the πνεῦμα .[22] In the case of the Pythian oracle at Delphia, for example, inspiration and communication with the gods could be induced by drinking wine, chewing laurel leaves, inhaling gases, dancing wildly, or drinking an excess of water. In adopting some of the vocabulary, especially the notion of sober drunkenness, in his interpretation of Hannah's ecstasy Philo is able to disparage old models and to point to two important features of inspiration: it cannot be induced and it is the πνεῦμα of God which calls men to ecstatic experience. In setting the Hannah story within his treatise on drunkenness Philo intends to compare the sober drunkenness of ecstatic experience with drunkenness of

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[21]For a study devoted entirely to the concept of νηφάλιος μέθη see Hans Lewy, Sobria Ebrietas: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Antiken Mystik (Geissen, 1929). The first part (1-108) is devoted to Philo and the different models or types Philo used to express and describe his concept of sober drunkenness. Lewy traces the concepts and attempts to find roots in the Greeks and extensions through the Greek fathers. He notes that the impregnation of the Pythian oracle at Delphi by the πνεῦμα has been suggested as a possible source for Philo's interpretation of the story of Hannah. The similarities between them led Leisegang (Der Heilige Geist, 1922) to suggest a continuity between old orgiastic models and the Philonic model of inspiration. Lewy criticizes Leisegang for this saying that the Philonic doctrine of πνεῦμα is too complex and drawn from too many sources to be a simple extension of old orgiastic models; he concludes that there is no continuity between the orgiastic and Philo. It is interesting that Baer, op. cit. pp. 96-99, criticizes Leisegang's conclusions in the same way, but from the perspective of the concepts of male and female in Philo. He maintains that there is no necessary connection between virginity and divine inspiration in Philo and that Leisegang went too far in concluding to a continuity between Philo and the old orgiastic.

[22]Lewy, op. cit., pp. 42-56. For an analysis of Philonic ecstasy in terms of Stoic formulas and parallels see Bréhier, op. cit., pp. 195-205.

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wine.[23] It is not wine which induces religious experience, he says, but "God-sent inspiration." In another place he says that it is the "divine spirit of wisdom" which makes it appear that one is drunk when one is in fact in a divinely inspired state of enthusiasm (Fug 166). The whole context of inspiration and the models of those who receive the prophetic spirit in Philo lead to the conclusion that inspiration cannot be induced. It is the πνεῦμα of God, something sent and sent only to suppliants, the "God-born" who put their trust in God and who are able to put aside the mortal element in order to make room for the divine spirit.

Hannah therefore is an example of what heights one can reach when one responds to the gift of inspiration. She is God-possessed, responds to inspiration piously by offering it back to God, the source of all blessings, she is a manifest sign of grace and is led by the experience of inspiration to the summit of the spiritual life. The story of Hannah is used indirectly by Philo to disparage notions of induced inspiration and to emphasize the God-sent nature of the πνεῦμα of inspiration and the necessary moral condition of the recipient. Philo's

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[23] An old question in philosophy, especially for those concerned with the concept of the "wise man" (as the Stoics) was whether or not a wise man could get drunk. The Stoics considered man either to have virtue or not, with no middle ground (see above, p. 20). This means that the wise man is one who is totally wise or not wise at all and when a recognized wise man was observed in a drunken condition, the question arose about the congruence of wisdom and drunkenness. Philo knows the question, and whatever he may have thought about its seriousness as a question, used it to describe his views about "sober drunkenness." For him, sober drunkenness comes from God as a gift and a truly wise man is one who is able to receive the prophetic spirit and follow it to the heights of mystical experience. He invigorates the old question of a drunken wise man with the notion of πνεῦμα as a gift from God and extends it to his concept of mystical experience described as sober drunkenness.

condemnation of induced inspiration is not a complete condemnation of Greek models; the description of the mystical experience of Hannah is Greek in concept and language. Hannah sends her soul abroad to the vision of the Uncreated, a conception which is more akin to Greek notions of ecstasy than to Hebrew concepts of possession.[24]

The purpose of inspiration in Philo beyond the eviction of the mind by the divine spirit, which is prophecy in the strict sense, is the sustenance of the spiritual life. The prophetic spirit brings with it an understanding of a superior order and that understanding is communicated directly by God to the recipient of the prophetic spirit; but the purpose of the communication is to enable the recipient to see, not to have visions in the strict sense, but to realize something of God. Philo makes it clear in his writings that no vision of the essence of the transcendent God is possible,[25] but he makes it equally clear that those who can receive and accept the prophetic spirit become more and more like God in some way (Opif 144).

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[24]H. Wheeler Robinson, op. cit., pp. 180-186, commenting upon the psychology of inspiration for the Hebrews says: "Possession, or some equivalent term denoting invasion, is preferable to the commonly used 'ecstasy' because the latter springs from a Greek conception of personality, which does not at all harmonize with Hebrew psychology. 'Ecstasy' (ἔκστασις) implies that the psyche can leave its usual earthly dwelling, the human body, and travel into other regions . . . But the Hebrew nephesh is not conceived as such an entity, potentially independent of the body; it is no more than the animating principle of the body."

[25]What is seen of God is His activity in the world, especially in creation. Sometimes His Powers may be seen (as with Moses who sees the "back" of God [Fug 141, Mut 134, Mos I.66] and not His essence). The Powers themselves are transcendent (see Goodenough, By Light, Light, pp. 59, 170, 344) and as such are not seen; insofar as they work in the world, however, they can be seen, at least by the eyes of the soul enlightened by God.

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The prophetic spirit takes possession of man and the fruit of that possession is ecstasy. One can see here the mixture of Hebrew and Greek concepts used by Philo to clarify his views. The notion of possession is Hebrew[26] and witnesses to the divinity of the spirit and the necessity of it being sent from God to man; Philo means to emphasize that inspiration is a rapture which is the work of God, not of man. The notion of ecstasy is Greek[27] and witnesses to Philo's belief that in mystical experience man leaves the mortal element behind and sends his soul up to the ether or to the heavens to be closer to God.

What is odd in a study of prophecy and inspiration in Philo is that he pays little or no attention to the major prophets.[28] There are two reasons for this omission: in the first place, Moses is for him the prophet par excellence whose experience needs no augmentation by reference to the prophets of the classical period of prophecy, and secondly, he is not as concerned with prophecy in terms of revelation and the psychology of inspiration as he is with the prophetic spirit as a means to and sustaining force of the spiritual life. His images of

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[26] Ibid., p. 178, "belief in the accessibility of human personality to invasion by some external spirit or energy is, of course, widespread in the ancient world . . . inspiration, even at its highest levels, is genetically linked with such beliefs, as the development of the term ru ah itself shows."

[27] Lewy, op. cit., gives various models of ecstasy and their sources. Philo refuses to be led to notions of induced inspiration, or to the belief that man calls the πνεῦμα ; it is clear to him that the πνεῦμα is something sent. The fruit of the spirit, however, lends itself to interpretation via Platonic models of ecstasy, especially those in the Symposium and the Phaedrus (42-56).

[28] The major prophets for Philo do not have the value of the Law. Prophets are rarely mentioned by him and when they are it is in the context of their religious experience. He calls Jeremiah, e.g., a "worthy minister of holy secrets" (Cher 49).

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prophecy are therefore expressed by several terms: possession, eviction of the mind, light, mania, enthusiasm, sober drunkenness, and joy, all of which lend themselves more readily to his theology of the spiritual life than to classical concepts of prophecy.

It has already been noted that Philo used the term prophecy for the four kinds of frenzy enumerated by Plato.[29] Wolfson analyzes Philo's concept of prophecy in conjunction with Platonic theories of knowledge and concludes that knowledge inspired by God is the highest type of knowledge:

> The prophet to Philo, therefore, is not only a diviner, but he is also one who, like a priest, expiates the sins of the people, like a philosopher, has a direct vision of things incorporeal, and especially, like a legislator, through divine revelation, becomes the author of the laws.[30]

It is clear from this concept that Moses is the prophet; and what is clear from Philo's treatment of Moses is that Moses is the mystic, embodying in himself and in his life the perfection and fruits of the divine spirit.

Philo's mystical doctrine lends itself to different interpretations.[31] It is relevant to this study only insofar as Philo connects the life of the mystic to the prophetic experience as he does with Isaac and Moses. In the section of QG pertaining to Isaac and Rebecca

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[29] See above, p. 119.

[30] Wolfson, op. cit., II.60.

[31] Goodenough is particularly interested in the mystical side of Philo and interprets his mystical doctrine in terms of the Mystery religions in an effort to show where Philo went beyond Plato's theories of contemplation. In a short chapter in the Introduction to Philo Judaeus Goodenough gives a summary of the fruit of his work in By Light, Light. He connects Philo's theories of interpretation, the mystical life and the attraction he believes the Mysteries had for Philo (chapter 9).

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at the well, Philo makes a strong connection between prophecy and mystical experience. In a long, ecstatic passage Philo says:

> Oh contemplation fitting to God and worthy of intellection and vision . . . which the eyes of the body cannot see . . . behold the example of unsorrowing laughter, Isaac, who without interruption rejoices continually over all things which have been created by God . . . he is not guarded or confused, but spends his time in the genuine and most proper part of wisdom . . . by which I understand, "seeing" . . . an appropriate and natural name for the contemplative life in reference to Him Who exists and to the incorporeal ideas in Him which were made as measure of all things of both worlds. For we are mixed with the incorporeal, since our better part soars upward to that region which is beyond the ether and above heaven . . . similarly, every true prophet was called "seer" or "beholder" the name being given in reference to the eye of the soul (IV.138).

The connection between the contemplative life and the life of a true prophet is clear, but it is emphasized in subsequent passages again. Philo says that when the mind begins to be "filled with God and divinely possessed and divinely inspired by God" it must go out where it can meditate (QG IV.140). Further, he says, the fruit of such meditation is "spiritual conversation" and friendship with God (QG IV.141).

The interpretation of the name and character of Isaac by Philo is "joy" which is a fruit of the spiritual life. The lack of material on Isaac, however, and Philo's preference for Moses as the type of the ideal man, suggest that the life of Moses is the best source for the conjunction of the mystical life with the prophetic spirit.[32] It has

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[32] Isaac is a type of the same thing, but the treatise on Isaac has been lost. Isaac is a man quickened by God, a concept expressed by Philo in terms of the conjugal life. Isaac is "joy" but more than that, he represents virtue (Migr 125, Congr 34-36), or wisdom (Post 78, Congr 37), or knowledge (Sobr 9) which is self-learned (Mut 88). He marries Rebecca who is, for Philo, "constancy" (Congr 34-38). Isaac can be interpreted therefore as a man of the spirit married to virtue which comes

already been noted that Moses was a prophet in the strict sense, that he was able to receive the prophetic spirit and predict events, and that the spirit could abide with him and eventually lead him from mortal to immortal existence.

Philo maintains that it is "wholly impossible to know God in His essence" (Post 167), a concept which corresponds to his belief in the divine transcendence. This same insistence upon the transcendence of God, however, forms the basis of the doctrine of spiritual progress in Philo: man can continually progress toward God and never exhaust the reality of God, but in his progress will be on increasingly higher levels of spirituality until he can be said to be close to God, and even in some sense, be able to see God.

> For the beginning and end of happiness is to be able to see God. But this cannot happen to him who has not made his soul . . . a sanctuary and altogether a shrine of God (QE II.51).

Moses is the type of one who did make his soul a sanctuary and who thus could enjoy the presence of God, and on Sinai Moses came as close as any man can to a vision of the essence of God. Philo's language in describing Moses' mystical ascent is beautiful and his images testify to his view that Moses was in perfect harmony with the universe (Virt 75). What gives Moses this power is the divine spirit of inspiration. Moses pitches his tent outside the camp so he can prepare himself to receive the spirit. The context makes it clear that it is in this way that Moses can "come naked to God" (Gig 54):

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to him in the attire of a young bride and no longer (as with Abraham) as an old person. Isaac does not need to be taught, but needs a partnership with virtue for his lifetime (Congr 34-38).

> Then only does he begin to worship God and entering the darkness, the invisible region, abides there while he learns the secrets of the most holy mysteries. There he becomes not only one of the congregation of the initiated, but also the hierophant and teacher of divine rites . . . he then has ever the divine spirit at his side, taking the lead in every journey of righteousness (Gig 54).[33]

Moses is called to the vision of God by the prophetic spirit, and is led by the spirit to mystical experience; as such he typifies the apex of the spiritual life and the true end of prophetic experience.

The role of the πνεῦμα in prophecy and inspiration, therefore, is one of a sustaining force in the spiritual life. In the strict sense the prophetic spirit evicts the mind, a concept consistent with Philo's views about the divine nature of the spirit and the mixed mortal and immortal nature of man. In a more enduring sense, the prophetic

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[33] This passage is open to different interpretations, especially in terms of the divine spirit. Colson gives the Greek text as τούτῳ μὲν οὖν τὸ θεῖον ἀεί παρίσταται πνεῦμα πάσης ὀρθῆς ἀφηγούμενον ὁδοῦ and translates it: "he then has ever the divine spirit at his side, taking him in every right way"), op. cit., II.472-473. Goodenough, By Light, Light, p. 214, is convinced that a τῆς has been lost before the word πάσης which would change the meaning from the spirit leading Moses to Moses acting with the spirit to lead people to perfection. Goodenough's interpretation is based upon his thesis that Moses was the high priest of the Mysteries, and the context of the passage gives his interpretation weight. Whether one follows Goodenough to the full weight of his conclusions about Philo's intentions to describe Judaism as the mystery par excellence, or not, one can accept his textual suggestion. The spirit as Philo describes it is something powerful, belonging to God and sent to man. In this sense the spirit must lead Moses, not act with him. On the other hand, Philo has taken pains to suggest that the spirit is able to abide with Moses, that Moses is so able to "come naked to God" that he enjoys the divine presence in a very special manner. In this sense, it is possible to suggest that Moses acts with the spirit in certain circumstances. What is important to maintain is the divinity and power of the spirit to transform man and lead him to a higher life; both readings protect these meanings.

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spirit leads man to the spiritual life and sustains him there insofar as he is able to make room for the spirit, a concept expressed by Philo in a variety of ways: - following reason, severing the mortal part, and coming naked to God. The prophetic spirit is able to abide for a long time with God-born men. The prophet par excellence is Moses; he is a prophet in the strict sense and reaches the summits of the spiritual life because the divine spirit abides with him. Philo does not describe the activity of the prophetic spirit by referring to the major prophets, but by referring to those who have their minds evicted, like Balaam, or to those who are inspired with frenzy, like Hannah. Philo uses Abraham as a measure of response to the prophetic spirit because Abraham is a symbol of spiritual progress and because referral to one who progressed so far is an indication of the generosity of God and the extension of the divine spirit to man. It is clear from Philo's descriptions and examples that the prophetic spirit is powerful and divine and can override man's will in some cases; but it is equally clear that unless man responds to the spirit in a pious and thankful manner he cannot reap the rewards of the spiritual life. Since man is a mixture, however, and does not live only a contemplative or mystical life, the fruits of the spirit are described by Philo on a practical level in terms of morality and the virtuous life.

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CHAPTER VII

Πνεῦμα IN MORALITY AND THE LIFE OF VIRTUE

The doctrine of πνεῦμα in Philo reaches its spiritual apex in the doctrine of mystical ascent typified most excellently in Moses. The fruits of the spirit of inspiration are joy and the vision of God in some way, and those fruits are extended to the practical level by Philo's doctrine of the moral life, a life of grace characterized by piety and virtuous conduct. Philo's willingness to use ordinary meanings of πνεῦμα in illustrative ways and to develop a doctrine of πνεῦμα which functions within his anthropological, cosmological and prophetic doctrines all point to his interest in the spiritual life. The role of the πνεῦμα in morality and the life of virtue is an extension of this interest to the practical level.

The moral life for Philo is a life of virtue founded upon his criterion of piety, and it is made possible because God sends his πνεῦμα to man to quicken him and to offer him a share in divine life. His doctrine of the moral life, therefore, may be described in terms of those doctrines already dealt with--the anthropological foundations, and the categories of inspiration--and extend from there to the moral life itself and the doctrine of participation. Since the role of the πνεῦμα in the moral life involves, in part, a recapitulation of other doctrines and extends to his doctrine of grace, this chapter will serve as a summary and conclusion.

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Philo's anthropological foundations, as noted, are Scriptural: man is made in the image of God and he comes alive when God breathes His πνεῦμα into man's face. The concept of man made in the image of God carries with it the notion that man has a vocation to praise God, a notion crucial to his doctrine of the spiritual life and to virtue. The concept that God breathes His own πνεῦμα into man's face carries with it the notion that man is a mixture of the heavenly and the earthly, that there is a hierarchy of functions in man and a proper order he must follow if he is to live the life of virtue; this notion of order is described by Philo in his account of the ideal man and the earthly man and extended by him in his delineation of types.

Philo's concern for God's creative efficacy, inspired by the witness of the Old Testament, make God's creation of man and the world firm principles for Philo. The image of God in man could not be something earthly since that would be an affront to divine transcendence, so he described the image of God as the mind, stamped by the divine spirit. Whatever ambivalence Philo had about the <u>substance</u> of the heavens or the human mind, it did not prevent him from making a strong assertion about the responsibilities man (and the heavens) had as an image of God:

> for among created things, that which is holy is, in the universe, the heavens . . . in man it is the mind, a fragment of the Deity as the words of Moses bear witness, "He breathed into his face a breath of life. . . ." And each of these appears to me to be correctly spoken of as "for praise." For it is in the heaven and in the mind that the capacity resides to set forth in solemn strains hymns of praise and blessing in honor of the Father who is the author of our being. For man

> is the recipient of a privilege which gives him distinction beyond other living creatures, that namely of worshipping Him that is (Somn I.35).

The vocation to praise is clear in Philo and is a large part of his spiritual doctrine. What gives man the responsibility and capacity for praise is the πνεῦμα , clearly linked by Philo to the concept of image:

> to the faculty which streams forth from the fountain of reason breath (πνεῦμα) has been assigned; not moving air, but . . . an impression stamped by the divine power, to which Moses gives the appropriate title of "image" (Deter 83).

Man praises God, therefore, because he has been made in His image, because being so constituted he receives the gift of heavenly nourishment, the πνεῦμα .[1]

Man made in the image of God is a testament to God's creative efficacy and to His generosity. The point at which Philo moves from creative efficacy to providence, however, is the point at which he begins to structure the moral ramifications of man's special constitution. Divine providence is one of his cosmological principles and a complement to creation; and just as creation brings with it a vocation to praise, so divine providence brings with it a responsibility and

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[1] Laporte, Eucharistia chez Philon, connects the vocation to praise with Philo's spiritual doctrine. The notion of image in Philo is more of a vocational than substantial one. The world as the work of God is an expression of His perfection and is, itself, sufficient praise: its mere description by Moses without the attire of mythology is, for Philo, the best form of praise (Opif 7). Man as a thinking creature whose mind is stamped with the spirit of God, has the vocation to give expression to praise, a vocation linked with the πνεῦμα in Philo's description of the "race of the poets." Poets were, for him, "those who in eulogies of prose and poetry . . . give honor to the Creator of the world" (Plant 131). A poet, for him, was one who was gifted with powers of expression and inspired, and Philo links poetic talent to the duty of praise through his interpretation of man made in the image of God.

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capacity for the life of virtue. Man made in the image of God is entitled to "celestial nourishment" (Deter 85); the divine spirit stamped upon man's soul gives him the power to obtain a conception of God (Deter 86). Since no man can see or know God's essence, however, God proportions Himself to man's capacities: the πνεῦμα itself is God's power "imparted in such measure as mortal nature could receive" (Virt 203). God's providential proportioning is expressed by Philo in various ways which range from intellectual light to the life of virtue. One symbol of a relationship between God and man in Scripture is the covenant, which Philo interprets as a sharing in divine life:

> now covenants are drawn up for the benefit of those who are worthy of the gift, and the covenant is a symbol of the grace (χάρις) which God has set between Himself, who proffers it and man who receives. And this is the crowning benefaction, that there is nothing between God and the soul save virgin grace (Mut 52).

There is an implicit relationship here between the life of grace and the πνεῦμα since Abraham is a symbol of one who received the spirit of inspiration and progressed from impious doctrines to mystical experience. The intimate life of grace characterized by the covenant relationship, therefore, may be seen as the "crowning benefaction" of a life of virtue.

The capacity for the life of virtue is given to man when he receives the πνεῦμα . His constitution as the image of God demands that he praise God and live a life of virtue; it is as a spiritual being that he praises and is distinguished from other living creatures. Since man is a mixture of the heavenly and the earthly, however, he

must adapt to a certain hierarchy of functions if he is to live a moral life. The πνεῦμα gives man the capacity for virtue in general, and moral deeds should be the logical consequence of man's vocation to praise; but the mixed nature of man sometimes mitigates against it. The relation of a general moral or virtuous attitude to moral deeds is contained in Philo's anthropological description of the ideal man and the fashioned man.

The hierarchy of functions in Philo's moral structure is God's governance of man and man's governance of his irrational part. The ideal man in his interpretation of the creation account welcomed the full force of the πνεῦμα, was made in the image of God. The ideal man represents for Philo a type of man who is sinless and virtuous, who is truly a man of the spirit. The moulded man in his allegories was created sinless and given the breath of life, but turned to sin because of a lapse in the proper order of things: his mind neglected the governance of his irrational part. The moulded man, thus represents a type of man who fails in his vocation. Philo illustrates and describes the moral life by commenting upon biblical characters in terms of their conformity to these two types; and since both types have been described by him in terms of πνεῦμα, the moral life can be connected through his illustrations to his doctrine of πνεῦμα.

The moulded man is created sinless; he receives the πνεῦμα (or πνοή) from God and is perfect since "nothing was imperfect in the first creation" (QE I.1). The moulded man, until he sins, is a philosopher who doesn't need the help of the senses (the woman) to behold the intelligibles (Cher 96). His nature is completed with the

senses, however, in order to provide him with the opportunity for self-mastery and virtue (Leg All II.23). The moulded man, therefore, as a mixture of heavenly and earthly elements has the challenge and vocation for virtue within a framework of order. He is to be a tiller of virtues in the garden of his soul (Leg All I.53-55), and he is to pursue virtue by keeping his mind ever in control of his irrational part. If he succeeds, he proves himself to be a man of the spirit who can truly enjoy a spiritual life, which is a share in divine life (Sacr 5-9); if he fails, he proves himself unworthy of the spiritual life and will be cast from the garden. Since the moulded man fails, he becomes a type for Philo of those who neglect the hierarchy of values and cut themselves off from the life of grace.

Philo's allegory of the fall, which places the elements of sin within human nature, provides the structure upon which he can construct the negative side of his doctrine of the virtuous life. The biblical account of the fall (Gen 3) lends itself to the interpretation that woman, beguiled by the snake, is the cause of sin in the world. Philo, however, interprets the man as mind, the woman as sense-perception and the snake as pleasure, all human elements which require proper ordering if moral action is to follow. When the mind sleeps, sense-perception is beguiled by pleasure and the proper order is disrupted with disastrous consequences: immoral and impious conduct follows. The disorder which leads to sin also leads to a turning away from God; the mind (man) becomes an exile from God and, away from the power of divine influence, ultimately repudiates God by refusing to see that God, not man, is the cause of all things. The biblical figure Philo uses to

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illustrate this type of impiety and refusal of the virtuous life is Cain.[2] Adam may be interpreted as an involuntary sinner, responsible for the disorder, but taken by surprise; his repentance indicates that he is not totally lost to the life of virtue:

> Adam then is driven out by God; Cain goes out voluntarily. Moses is showing us each form of moral failure, one of free choice, the other not so. The involuntary act, not owing its existence to our deliberate judgment, is to obtain later on such healing as the case admits of (Post 10).

Cain turns deliberately from God, does not repent and even asks for a sign of his everlasting exile (Deter 179).

Turning from God is refusing to recognize Him and refusing the vocation to praise Him. This for Philo is the vilest impiety and the surest refusal of the life of grace. It has been noted that Philo's devotion to a transcendent, providential God elucidates itself in the primacy he gives to the virtue of piety: "the best of the virtues in man is piety, through which pre-eminently the mind becomes immortal" (QG I.10). Since it is a criterion for his delineation of major doctrines, and is the best of the virtues, it is not surprising that

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[2]The figure of Cain is more a figure of the root of evil than of evil itself. His descendents are all figures of vice for Philo, and are directly related to atheism and impiety of which Cain is a type. Cain imputes everything to man's mind and does not honor God (Sacr 2) and his descendents are examples of the ramifications of his sin: Gaidad represents the "flock of untended virtues," Maiel is "cut off from the love of God," Lamech is described as "low cringing," Jobel as one "who removes the boundaries of virtue fixed by right reason," Jubel as "inclining this way and that with no sure, firm speech," etc. (Post 66-111). The consequences of Cain's impiety are formidable. In an elaborate list of bad qualities situated in his treatise on the sacrifices of Cain and Abel, Philo lists the characteristics of those who turn from God and love pleasure. It is a list of 148 bad qualities or vices ending with the words, "a mass of misery and misfortune without relief" (Sacr 32).

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sinfulness is conceived in terms of impiety. The allegory of the moulded man is for him an allegory of disorder which results in impiety; and the type of Cain typifies the disastrous consequences of man's free refusal of a share in divine life. His allegory of the ideal man, on the other hand, is a demonstration of piety and the virtuous life.

The ideal man welcomes the πνεῦμα ; he is the man made in the image of God. The ideal man is not cast out of the garden (Leg All I.53). He is not given commands as such and is not put on trial since virtue grows in him in an unchallenged atmosphere of piety (Leg All I.91). The ideal man thus represents for Philo a man who succeeds in living up to his vocation, and he succeeds because the πνεῦμα is stamped on him. The influence of God shines over his whole being, his mind is governed by God, his heart is under the power of his reason, his passions are pure and even pleasure, which is part of human nature, is kept in proper proportion (Opif 147-157). The ideal man typifies proper order in himself and in the universe; he is a man of virtue in the highest sense.

It has been noted that the man as the image is man stamped with the πνεῦμα of God. The ideal man is the man made in the image of God and is thus a representative of the virtuous life at its apex, a life under the influence of the divine πνεῦμα . Philo uses the concept of the ideal man to describe various types of virtue, especially in terms of personalities. Each type represents different aspects of the life of virtue; all of them conform to the principle of piety, the vocation of the man of the spirit.

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Judah and Issachar are compared by him to two precious stones:

> Judah and Issachar seem to be these. For the man who exercises himself in the practical wisdom of God, makes thankful acknowledgement to Him who bestowed good without stint; while the representative of the other aspect is furthermore engaged in noble and worthy works . . . now of the man who makes confession of thankfulness Judah is the symbol . . . but of him who is engaged in noble deeds Issachar is the figure (Leg All I.80).

Judah represents good sense as a mystical condition, while Issachar represents good sense in the activity of noble deeds. Both represent piety because both manifest thankfulness to God, and Philo approves both manifestations of virtue, the contemplative and the active. In a more specified description of types of virtue, Philo approves a variety of approaches to the moral life:

> the naturally gifted, of which Reuben is a type; the docile scholar, as Simeon . . . the suppliants who take refuge with God, and this is the company of the Levites; those who raise the hymn of thankfulness with their hearts rather than with their voices, and the leader of that choir is Judah; those who have been judged worthy of rewards and prizes because of their own free will they have toiled in the acquisition of virtue, as Issachar; those who have abandoned the Chaldean research of the supra-terrestrial to engage in the contemplation of the Uncreated, as Abraham; those who have acquired virtue through no other voice but their own and no teacher but themselves, as Isaac; those who are full of courage and strength and are dear to God, as Moses, the most perfect of men (Ebr 94).

What differentiates the types of men described by Philo as virtuous is the different avenues of approach they take toward the moral life; but those avenues are implicitly and sometimes explicitly related to the activity of the πνεῦμα within those men. The πνεῦμα gives man a share in divine life and a vocation to praise God; it also

gives him the power to return to God in some way, and is proportioned to man's ability to respond to that power. It has been noted that the divine spirit cannot abide long with men because they are flesh (Gig 29); but it has also been noted that the divine spirit does abide with "God-born" men, of which Moses is the primary example. Perfect virtue, therefore, is related to the activity of the πνεῦμα within man, it is a participation in divine life made possible by the enduring presence of the divine spirit.

The common element in the types of virtuous life described by Philo is their piety; they all recognize and praise God for His goodness, though that praise is worked out in the practical level in various ways. Piety itself is related to the life of grace and the presence of the πνεῦμα . The types described, therefore, are all types of virtue and one should not be led to conclude that the type of Moses overshadows other types and reduces them to an insignificant role. The very fact that God proportions Himself to man recognizes the viability of different approaches, and the variety of types used by Philo to describe man's way back to God recognizes the great differences he observed in the moral behavior of different men. What is crucial to the moral life is piety. If man can recognize and praise God and be led by Him along the paths of virtue, he leads a moral life; and the capability for piety comes with the gift of the divine πνεῦμα sent to man from God.

One can conclude that Philo recognized a variety of approaches to the virtuous life and did not restrict it to the contemplative or spiritual life typified by Moses. Since Philo's primary interest, however, is the religious life, he did extend from simpler manifestations

of piety and virtue to more direct participation in divine life. One needs the spirit to lead a moral life, but one needs the spirit in a special way if he is to participate in divine life, to be one of "the perfect." The special extension of the divine spirit to man is, as noted, the spirit of inspiration. The πνεῦμα is given to a prophet in a strict sense and also in a special sense; the first enables him to function as a prophet who predicts events or is moved by God to say certain things, the second enables him to aspire to and attain the heights of the mystical life.

The spirit of inspiration is sent to any man who wishes to understand spiritual things. Philo says that it is sent to the translators of the LXX, and his allegorical interpretations imply that it must be sent to the interpreters of Scripture. The role of interpreter was crucial for Philo; his desire to find the spiritual meanings in scriptural passages is evident throughout his allegorical writings and is especially evident in his books of questions and answers in Genesis and Exodus where he consistently and in a detailed fashion gives first the literal, then the "spiritual" meanings of the passages. The ability to find the spiritual meanings of God's words to men was, for him, a key to the spiritual life.[3]

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[3]Grant, op. cit., pp. 32-38, analyzes Philo's doctrines of inspiration and interpretation. Philo, he says, believed the peculiarities of Scripture were due to the ecstatic state of the prophet and that the task of the exegete is to observe these peculiarities from a rational point of view and to apply the allegorical method, also rational. This means that the inspiration of the exegete is rational, not ecstatic. It should be noted that there is a form of inspired interpretation for Philo which is more than rational. He says that once, while interpreting a passage in Scripture, he read Jeremiah and "knew him to be a worthy minister of the holy secrets" (Cher 49). He was inspired by Jeremiah's interpretation and describes it in a manner which goes beyond the "rational" inspiration described by Grant.

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What is crucial to Philo's doctrine of the moral life is that a man respond to the πνεῦμα within him and recognize his vocation to praise God. On more advanced levels of the moral life, especially as it extends to mystical apprehension of God, what is crucial is that a man hear and obey the spirit within him, coming progressively to the status of a "God-born" man with whom the spirit can abide. Those who arrive at this point are the "perfect" and Philo feels a particular obligation to them, especially to warn them against abandoning their first spiritual steps. The moral life begins with the vocation of praise, the recognition that God is the cause of all things; the temptation of those who progress toward perfect virtue is to begin to think that they have arrived there by their own efforts and not through the activity of the πνεῦμα within them. Many of the illustrative uses of πνεῦμα as wind[4] are directed to those far advanced on the path of spiritual progress.

The fruits of the moral life in its highest state are those fruits of the spiritual life already noted: joy, peace, and to some extent, the vision of God. Since man cannot live forever within the vision of God, however, one can expect Philo to delineate some of the practical behavior which follows from the moral life, in all its stages. In the passage about types of virtuous men he says that Issachar is worthy of rewards because he has worked in the acquisition of virtue, this may be interpreted to mean that Issachar labors freely and performs noble deeds. In another passage, Philo suggests that the deeds themselves may

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[4]See above, p. 61f.

constitute the reward (Somn II.34). Good deeds, therefore, may be taken as a sign of the moral life.

An example of virtue of the highest type which manifests itself in moral deeds is that of the Therapeutae: they set themselves apart to pursue the spiritual life, and they enjoy mystical experience (Cont 10). Their life style is a practical extension of their life of virtue. They take no possessions for themselves, they live in solitude in simple houses, they keep the memory of God alive and do not forget it, they pray twice a day and spend their time in spiritual exercise, they read the Scriptures finding in them the deeper spiritual meanings through allegory, and they compose hymns and psalms (Cont 13-30). They do not confine themselves to contemplation, but make self-control the foundation for other virtues and conduct: they are abstemious in food and drink, dress simply, they have no slaves, but serve each other in turn. This remarkable form of living is recognized by Philo as an ideal; it is the best of virtuous living:

> they have taken into their hearts the contemplation of nature and what it has to teach, and have lived in the soul alone, citizens of Heaven and the world, presented to the Father and Maker of all by their faithful sponsor, Virtue, who has procured for them God's friendship and added a gift going hand in hand with it, true excellence of life, a boon better than all good fortune and rising to the very summit of felicity (Cont 90).

The Therapeutae are citizens of Heaven and the world; they are truly men of the spirit who are sensitive to the influence of God, and as such can serve as models of virtue for men. Philo's ordinary experience, however, is with men who are not so remarkable:

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> hapless we, how long a time had we, as is now evident been ill all unaware of it with the illness of folly and senselessness and unrighteousness in our conduct (Leg All III.211).

Ordinary men, not the Therapeutae, inspire Philo's structure of the moral life.

Philo's doctrine of the moral life is the thread which connects his other doctrines and as such is not the proper subject of this study.[5] The role of the πνεῦμα within the moral life is that of a divine influence, the breath of life given to men in creation and extended to men on higher planes of the spiritual life as a real share in divine life. His biblical models typify certain kinds of behavior which are moral or immoral insofar as they conform to his criterion of piety. His most important types, Abraham, Jacob, Isaac, Aaron and Moses exemplify some of the means to the moral life: education, practice in virtue, nature, tempering the passions with reason and cutting the passions away in order to "come naked to God." The role of the πνεῦμα within these major types has been noted, and the results of these various ways of responding to the πνεῦμα have been noted. Man is stimulated to moral progress by conscience.[6] Once man realizes that he has turned from God,

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[5]The most analytical treatment of Philo's moral doctrine is that of Wolfson, op. cit., II.165-322.

[6]Kennedy, op. cit., maintains that the Philonic concept of conscience is that of legislative reason within man and as such is a significant contribution to ancient ethics: Philo transfers the emphasis from the ritual of the Law to the condition of the soul before God, a notion which opens the door for the universal validity of the Law (53). Bréhier, op. cit., notes that what is important in the Philonic notion of conscience is that the inner morality is not simply morality, but a morality accompanied by the consciousness of its superhuman, divine origin (228). This surely testifies to the Philonic criterion of piety, the recognition that all good, even good deeds, depend upon divine influence. Goodenough, By Light, Light gives an analysis of the Greek

or failed to respond to the πνεῦμα within him (Leg All III.211), he can with confidence, rely on divine mercy (QG I.82): the function of the minor types in Philo is to describe the initial steps of moral progress: repentance and hope.[7] As man follows the moral life and becomes a lover of virtue, he becomes a lover of God and beloved by Him, allowed to share in divine life through the gift of the prophetic spirit.

The role of the πνεῦμα , therefore, is to give man a share in divine life, and this is the foundation for a theology of grace, a real participation in divine life. The soul can return to God because God sends His πνεῦμα to man. Philo testifies throughout his writings that the fixing of the soul's gaze upon God is the supreme achievement of man; and he makes it clear through his doctrine of πνεῦμα , that the vision of God can only be attained because man has a real experience of the divine working within him. Man, therefore, receives the gift of the πνεῦμα with the stipulation only that he recognize the source of the gift; if he responds to God piously, recognizing that his spiritual opportunities result from divine initiative and the gift of the divine πνεῦμα , he can attain the summits of the spiritual life by

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concept of personality and the importance of justification in terms of order within the cosmos or within the personality, and suggests possible parallels for the Philonic model (370-413). Wolfson, op. cit., gives the most analytic approach to Philonic ethics, but does not treat conscience as such (II.165-322). Bréhier is most clear in noting the Philonic contribution. The Stoics, he says, posited the authoritative norm in reason, a doctrine recognized by Philo but transformed by him: conscience for him involved the impact of God upon the soul, the assessor of the nature of the inner life (301). Kennedy is most clear in relating the notion of conscience to the spiritual life, saying that it is identified in Philo with the vision of the good, and that this vision is nothing else than a visitation of the spirit of God (112). Conscience, therefore, is a real factor in awakening man's spiritual aspirations.

[7] See Goodenough, By Light, Light, pp. 121-153.

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whatever means is most concommitant with his own personality. God's loving kindness is, for Philo, something imparted to man freely and generously (Mut 58-60), even after man sins (Leg All I.34).

Aside from the duty of man to respond to God's generosity in a pious manner, Philo does not discuss the relation of human effort to divine grace. Man must recognize, even when he is near the summits of the spiritual life, that all good comes from God and that mystical ascent is possible only through the free action of God. It is this attitude which characterizes his theology of grace. All goodness in the soul is due to divine initiative:

> it becomes God to plant and to build virtues in the soul; the mind which shows itself to be without God and full of self-love . . . the mind which says, "I plant" is guilty of impiety (Leg All I.48).

The progress of the soul, therefore, depends upon God manifesting Himself to man. Man is a mixture of heavenly and earthly and is often a sinner. Since sin is a turning away from God, it follows that man must turn back to God if he is to enjoy the life of virtue. Following his criterion of piety, however, Philo insists that man cannot return to God on his own initiative:

> the gifts of the harlot are unholy [but] more unholy still are the gifts of the soul which has committed whoredom, which has thrown itself into ignominy and the lowest depths of outrageous conduct, into wine-bibbing and gluttony, into the love of money, or love of reputation, of pleasure and numberless other forms of passion and soul-sickness and vice. What length of time can purge these stains away? None . . . only God, with Whom that is possible which is impossible with us [can purge these sins] (Spec I.282).

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Philo makes it clear that there is no limit to the generous outpouring of divine mercy (Heres 31), that God is untiring in His concern for man:

> [Moses says] "Behold, the cry of the children of Israel has come to Me" (Ex 3.9). Very beautiful is it that the entreaty reached as far as God; but it would not have reached so far, but for the kindness of Him that is called. Some souls He anticipates and goes forth to meet: "I will come to you and bless you" (Ex 20.24). One sees how great is the grace (χάρις) of the First Cause, as He is beforehand with our hesitation, and anticipates and meets us, bringing unlimited gain to the soul. And what is said is a divine intimation full of instruction. For if a thought of God comes into the mind, He forthwith blesses it and heals all its sicknesses (Leg All III.215).

At the same time, however, Philo makes it clear that God does not force His way into men's hearts. There must be a free assent on the part of the soul typified by Philo in his description of the suppliant attitude. The only limit to God's grace in man, therefore, is man's inability to receive it.

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Πνεῦμα in Philo is a complex doctrine as its uses and importance in other doctrines indicate. The most important ramification of his doctrine is its relation to a theology of grace. Throughout his writings, πνεῦμα is used in a variety of ways, but always with a sensitivity to the notion that the πνεῦμα is something apart from human nature, sent from God to man. Some of his uses of the word are very common, as air and wind and breath, and owe their significance to the illustrative uses he makes of them. Some of his uses are quite

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extraordinary, as the prophetic spirit which evicts the mind and gives man a means to mystical experience.[8]

The religious ideology of Judaism is fundamental to Philo and provides the frame of reference for his confrontation of or adaptation to other doctrines. As a Jew he accepts the Law of Moses as inspired doctrine and is loathe to speculate about those things which Moses sets forth as clear principles: the oneness and eternity of a God who is, the oneness and creation of the world, and divine providence (Opif 170-172). As a man in philosophic milieu, exposed to the allegorical method, however, he recognizes the right and duty of an interpreter to search for the deeper or more spiritual meanings of Scripture, and to speculate about those questions left open by Moses as, e.g., the substance of the mind and the heavens. His speculation is always done within his criterion of piety, and his selection of certain current philosophic views is made in relation to his belief in a transcendent, providential God.

In his doctrines Philo manifests his criterion of piety. His cosmological speculation is founded upon the belief that God created one world and cares for it. If he demonstrates a willingness to accept theories about the harmony of the cosmos, or ether as a divine substance, it is because these things do not conflict with the divine transcendence. He distinguishes πνεῦμα clearly from ether, maintaining that the πνεῦμα is a divine energy belonging to God and sent to man. His anthropological notions are suggested to him by the Bible and are not as

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[8] Verbeke, op. cit., p. 259, believes that the Philonic concept of the prophetic spirit is new in the history of the development of πνεῦμα. The amalgamation of his religious ideology and exposure to the doctrines of the later Stoics, especially Posidonius, allow him to achieve a real "spiritualization" of the concept of πνεῦμα.

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open to speculation. Since Moses did not speak definitively on the substance of the human mind, however, Philo feels free to suggest possible interpretations, but only within the framework of the biblical view of man as a body animated by the πνεῦμα of God. He feels free also to make connections between the πνεῦμα and the mind or the soul of man, but only insofar as the character of the πνεῦμα is maintained: the πνεῦμα is for him a divine influence upon man in a concrete way and not a definition of soul, and the notion of image is interpreted by him to mean that the πνεῦμα is sent to man's mind, it does not define the mind or its substance. In his cosmological and anthropological doctrines, therefore, the πνεῦμα retains its character as a divine influence, not part of the universe of human nature, but sent from God.

In his doctrines of prophecy and the spiritual life and their extension to moral behavior, Philo maintains the divine character of the πνεῦμα and invests it with new meaning in his view that it offers man a real share in divine life and a road to mystical experience. The point he makes throughout these doctrines is that it is the divine πνεῦμα which gives man the power to return to God and to behave in ways commensurate with the spiritual life. His concept of prophecy in the "strict sense" is a modified concept of the Greek notion of mantic; the modification is that it is God's πνεῦμα which inspires men, that inspiration is a gift sent from God, not something induced from outside. The concept of the prophetic spirit as a vehicle to mystical experience, and the description of mystical experience is also more typically Greek than Hebrew, but modified by Biblical ideology since it is God's

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graciousness which calls men up to Him, and God's gift of the πνεῦμα in creation which allows man to form first impressions of the Deity. In his doctrines of prophecy and the spiritual life, therefore, the divine characteristics of the πνεῦμα are maintained.

The moral life is a logical extension of the life sustained or initiated by the prophetic spirit. Insofar as the moral life is attitudinal, the pious recognition of God's goodness and efficacy in man's goodness, the divine character of the πνεῦμα is maintained. Insofar as the moral life exhibits itself in moral deeds, it is also measured under the criterion of piety, in deeds which always recognize God as cause. Philo's moral and ethical doctrines are complex and borrow from a variety of sources, but that borrowing is done, as always, within the framework of his religious ideology. Panaetius, e.g., made a significant contribution to Stoic doctrine by introducing the Platonic notion of an irrational part in man and then suggesting that man could become virtuous by mastering his irrational part.[9] Philo could follow the concept of an irrational part and the necessity of order in man if moral behavior were to follow, but he insisted that virtue depended upon God, that the way man mastered his irrational part was through fidelity to the image of God within himself which is the πνεῦμα stamped on the mind, or response to the πνεῦμα given to him in creation.

The πνεῦμα therefore is a gift from God to man. In the writings of Philo and in his doctrines there are many names for the gifts of God to man and those names typify gifts to men in proportion to their

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[9] De Vogel, op. cit., texts 1183-1191.

ability to receive them. The most general term, however, is grace, an extension of divine life to man, and grace has been shown to be linked closely to his concept of πνεῦμα . It is universally and freely given, it is given to men in various states of life and various stages of the spiritual life. It is a means for man to return to God, a concept clearly linked by Philo to the concept of the divine spirit by his view that man could form no conception of God if God had not breathed His own πνεῦμα on man, and that what God has breathed upon He is wont to call back to Himself.

The challenge of this study has been to present Philo's use and doctrine of πνεῦμα within the full range of its richness and implications. Philo wrote prolifically, but not systematically, and the systematic study of his concept of πνεῦμα has some inherent dangers. One should not be led to conclude from this presentation that Philo's doctrine of πνεῦμα developed in the way it has been delineated here. His concern with the spiritual life gives the doctrine of πνεῦμα some internal cohesion, but his approach to the religious life and his style of writing are not particularly cohesive.[10] The structure of this study was designed to give the πνεῦμα its full importance and, at the same time, to allow an analytical approach to the problem. One should also not be led to conclude that the larger doctrines of Philo in which πνεῦμα has an important place have been discussed here in any way except in relation to the πνεῦμα . The volume of the Philonic corpus

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[10] It is particularly significant for this study that the treatises on Genesis 1 have been lost, and that the treatise on Isaac has been lost. In them one could have expected to find much material for the cosmological role of the πνεῦμα , and for the role of the πνεῦμα in the type of man who is virtuous by nature.

and the complex nature of his milieu have led to a variety of approaches to all of Philo's doctrines and sources. Many of those approaches have been noted in the course of this study, but none of them have been used exclusively and none of them is exhaustive. The purpose of this study has been to find and describe the uses of the word πνεῦμα in the Philonic corpus and to suggest its importance in his theology of the spiritual life by noting its importance in some of his larger doctrines. It is hoped that this work can be useful to students of Philo and to those who wish to study the antecedents of a theology of grace.

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APPENDIX I

Πνεῦμα ACCORDING TO TREATISE

De Opificio Mundi	12 instances
element	29, 30
wind	41, 58, 80, 113
cohesive bond	67, 131
soul/mind	134
divine spirit	134, 135, 144
Legum Allegorium I	8 instances
element	91
divine spirit	33, 34, 34, 37, 42, 42, 42
Legum Allegorium II	None
Legum Allegorium III	3 instances
wind	53, 223
breath	14
De Cherubim	5 instances
element	111
wind	13, 37, 38
cohesive bond	82
De Sacrificiis	1 instance
element	97
Quod Deterius Potiori	6 instances
soul/mind	80, 80, 83, 84, 85
misc.	17
De Posteritate Caini	3 instances
wind	22
breath	113
misc.	67

De Gigantibus	13 instances
element	10
breath	10
prophetic spirit	24, 26
divine spirit	19, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 47, 53, 55
Quod Deus Immutabilis	9 instances
wind	26, 60, 98, 176
breath	28, 84
cohesive bond	35
divine spirit	2, 2
De Agricultura	5 instances
wind	62, 174
breath	116, 177
misc.	44
De Plantatione	4 instances
breath	23
divine spirit	18, 24, 44
De Ebrietate	2 instances
element	106
breath	58
De Sobrietate	None
De Confusione Linguarum	1 instance
breath	44
De Migratione Abrahami	3 instances
wind	123, 148, 217
Quis Rerum Divin. Heres	9 instances
wind	208
breath	56, 64, 184, 201
cohesive bond	242
divine spirit	55, 57, 265
De Congressu	4 instances
wind	133
breath	38, 64, 108

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De Fuga et Inventione	4 instances
breath	97
soul/mind	133
cohesive bond	182
divine spirit	186
De Mutatione Nominum	2 instances
wind	95
prophetic spirit	123
De Somniis I	1 instance
mind/soul	30
De Somniis II	8 instances
wind	13, 67, 85, 86, 143, 166
breath	146
prophetic spirit	252
De Abrahamo	6 instances
wind	43, 92, 160
breath	117, 183
misc.	113
De Josepho	4 instances
wind	33, 149
breath	181
divine spirit	116
De Vita Mosis I	10 instances
wind	41, 179
breath	30, 42, 44, 93, 106, 201
prophetic spirit	175, 277
De Vita Mosis II	4 instances
wind	104
prophetic spirit	40, 291
divine spirit	265
De Decalogo	3 instances
breath	33, 35
divine spirit	175

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Specialibus Legibus I	9 instances
wind	26, 92, 224, 301
breath	69, 338
cohesive bond	6, 171
mind/soul	277
Specialibus Legibus II	4 instances
wind	71, 153, 172, 191
Specialibus Legibus III	2 instances
wind	6
breath	114
Specialibus Legibus IV	6 instances
wind	27
cohesive bond	217
divine spirit	49, 123, 123, 123
De Virtutibus	5 instances
breath	6, 135
divine spirit	203, 217
misc.	58
De Praemiis et Poenis	3 instances
wind	41
breath	144
cohesive bond	48
Q. Omnis Probus Liber Sit	1 instance
cohesive bond	26
De Vita Contemplativa	2 instances
breath	75, 76
De Aeternitate Mundi	7 instances
wind	11, 139
breath	128, 135
cohesive bond	86, 125
mind/soul	111
In Flaccum	1 instance
wind	155

Hypothetica	None
De Providentia	3 instances
wind	43, 45, 47
Legatione ad Gaium	5 instances
wind	177
breath	125, 188, 243
mind/soul	63
Quaes. in Gen. I	14 instances
mind/soul	55
divine spirit	4, 21, 28, 51, 90, 90, 90, 90, 90
misc.	51, 92, 92, 99
Quaes. in Gen. II	17 instances
breath	3, 8, 8
cohesive bond	82
mind/soul	8, 12, 22, 27, 49, 59, 59
divine spirit	28, 28, 28, 59
misc.	15, 25
Quaes. in Gen. III	6 instances
breath	3, 4
divine spirit	9, 18
misc.	16, 27
Quaes. in Gen. IV	11 instances
mind/soul	1, 102
prophetic spirit	196
divine spirit	5, 140
misc.	2, 26, 102, 102, 140, 214
Quaes. in Exod. I	2 instances
mind/soul	4
misc.	5
Quaes. in Exod. II	4 instances
prophetic spirit	3, 7, 33
misc.	13

Note: the separation has been made according to the closest point of reference.

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APPENDIX II

Πνεῦμα ACCORDING TO MEANING

I. As an element — 7 instances

Opif 29, 30; Leg All I 91; Cher 111; Sacr 97; Gig 10; Ebr 106.

II. As a wind, breeze, counterwind — 54 instances

Opif 41, 58, 80, 113; Leg All III 53, 223; Cher 13, 37, 38; Post 22; Immut 26, 60, 98, 176; Agr 62, 174; Migr 123, 148, 217; Heres 208; Congr 133; Mut 95; Somn II 13, 67, 85, 86, 143, 166; Abr 43, 92, 160; Jos 33, 149; Mos I 41, 179; Mos II 104; Spec I 26, 92, 224, 301; Spec II 71, 153, 172, 191; Spec III 6; Spec IV 27; Praem 41; Aet 11, 139; Flac 155; Provid II 43, 45, 47; Legat 177.

III. As breath — 62 instances

A) Breathing and inhalation

Leg All III 14; Post 113; Gig 10; Immut 84; Plant 23; Ebr 58; Congr 38, 108; Somn II 146; Abr 117; Mos I 30, 93; Decal 33, 35; Spec I 338; Spec III 114; Virt 6, 135; Praem 144; Cont 75; Aet 128; Legat 125, 188, 243; QG II 3, 8, 8; QG III 3, 4.

B) Breathless or breathing space

Immut 38; Agr 116, 177; Heres 201; Congr 64; Fug 97; Abr 183; Jos 181; Mos I 42, 44, 106; Spec I 69; Cont 76; Aet 135.

C) Breath of inspiration

Conf 44; Heres 56, 64, 184; Mos I 201.

D. Cohesive bond

Opif 67, 131; Cher 82; Immut 35; Heres 242; Fug 182; Spec I 6, 171; Spec IV 217; Praem 48; Probus 26; Aet 86, 125; QG II 82.

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IV. Relating to mind or soul — 20 instances

Opif 134; Deter 80, 80, 83, 84, 85; Fug 133; Somn I 30; Spec I 277; Aet 111; Legat 63; QG I 25; QG II 8, 22, 27, 49, 59; QG IV 1, 102; QE I 4.

V. Prophetic Spirit — 13 instances

Gig 24, 26; Mut 123; Somn II 252; Mos I 175, 277; Mos II 40, 291; Decal 35; QG IV 196; QE II 3, 7, 33.

VI. Divine Spirit — 55 instances

A) Constitution of Man

Opif 134, 135, 144; Leg All I 33, 34, 34, 37, 42, 42, 42; Gig 19, 28, 29, 53; Immut 2, 2; Plant 18, 44; Heres 55; Spec IV 123, 123, 123; Virt 203; QG I 4, 51, 90, 90; QG II 59.

B) Divine prophetic spirit

Gig 27, 47, 55; Plant 24; Heres 57, 265; Fug 186; Jos 116; Mos II 265; Dec 175; Spec IV 49; Virt 217; QG I 90; QG III 9; QG IV 140.

C) Nature of the Divine Spirit

Gig 22, 23, QG I 21, 28, 90, 90; QG II 28, 28, 28, 59; QG III 18; QG IV 5.

VII. Miscellaneous references — 20 instances

A) Quoting Numbers 27.16 ("let the God of spirits and all flesh . . .")

Post 67; Agr 44; Virt 58.

B) Spirit of something

Deter 17: spirit of steadfastness
QG IV 102: spirit of uttered discourse

C) In relation to angels

Abr 113; QG I 92, 92; QE II 13.

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D) As an adjective (often interchangeable in concept with ψυχή)

QG I:

51)	spiritual death	fragment gives ψυχή
99)	spiritual corruption	fragment gives ψυχή

QG II:

15)	spiritual dissolution	no fragment
25)	spiritual diseases	no fragment

QG III:

16)	spiritual goods	no fragment
27)	a more worthy spirit	no fragment

QG IV:

2)	spiritual eyes	no fragment
26)	spiritual health	note gives πνεῦμα or ψυχή
102)	spiritual food	no fragment
140)	spiritual conversation	note gives πνεῦμα or ψυχή
214)	spiritual field	no fragment

QE I:

5)	spiritual instruction	note gives πνεῦμα .

ABBREVIATIONS

To Philo's works:

Abr	= De Abrahamo
Aet	= De Aeternitate Mundi
Agr	= De Agricultura
Cher	= De Cherubim
Conf	= De Confusione Linguarum
Congr	= De Congressu Eruditionis Gratia
Cont	= De Vita Contemplativa
Decal	= De Decalogo
Deter	= Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Soleat
Ebr	= De Ebrietate
Flac	= In Flaccum
Fug	= De Fuga et Inventione
Gig	= De Gigantibus
Heres	= Quis Rerum Divinarum Heres
Hypoth	= Hypothetica
Immut	= Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis
Jos	= De Josepho
Leg All	= Legum Allegoria
Legat	= Legatio ad Gaium
Migr	= De Migratione Abrahami
Mos	= De Vita Mosis
Mut	= De Mutatione Nominum
Opif	= De Opificio Mundi
Plant	= De Plantatione
Post	= De Posteritate Caini
Praem	= De Praemiis et Poenis
Probus	= Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit

Provid	= De Providentia
QE	= Quaestiones et Solutiones in Exodum
QG	= Quaestiones et Solutiones in Genesin
Sacr	= De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini
Sobr	= De Sobrietate
Somn	= De Somniis
Spec	= De Specialibus Legibus
Virt	= De Virtutibus

Other:

Ex	= Exodus
Gen	= Genesis
LXX	= Septuagint
WS	= Wisdom of Solomon
Num	= Numbers
SVF	= Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, collegit Joannes ab Arnim, Lipsiae, 1903-1924, 4 vols.
Diels	= Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th edition.

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